| BATTERY. | NO. OF GUNS. | SIZE. | KIND. | WEIGHT. LBS. | RANGE. | COMMANDER. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stanton | 3 | 13 | inch. | Mortar. | 17,120 | 3,476 | Captain | Skinner. |
| Grant | 3 | 13 | „ | „ | 17,120 | 3,256 | „ | Palmer. |
| Lyon | 4 | 10 | „ | Columb’d | 15,059 | 3,256 | „ | Pelouze. |
| Lincoln | 3 | 8 | „ | „ | 9,240 | 3,045 | „ | Pelouze. |
| Burnside | 1 | 13 | „ | Mortar. | 17,120 | 2,760 | Sergeant | Wilson. |
| Sherman | 3 | 13 | „ | „ | 17,120 | 2,677 | Captain | Francis. |
| Halleck | 2 | 13 | „ | „ | 17,120 | 2,407 | „ | Sanford. |
| Scott | 2 | 10 | „ | Columb’d | 15,059 | 1,777 | „ | Mason. |
| 1 | 8 | „ | „ | 9,240 | ||||
| Sigel | 5 | 30 | lbs. | Part’s s.c’r | „ | Seldenkirk. | ||
| 1 | 24 | „ | James | |||||
| McClellan | 2 | 42 | „ | „ | „ | Rogers. | ||
| 3 | 32 | „ | „ | |||||
| Totten | 4 | 10 | inch. | Mortar. | 1,852 | 1,643 | „ | Rodman. |
These works were erected wholly at night, as they were all within range of Fort Pulaski. Their faces were bomb-proof, while in the rear of those most exposed lay a long wide swamp, into which it was supposed that a great portion of the shot and shells from Fort Pulaski would fall. The supposition proved correct. The magazines were bomb-proof, and trenches connected the batteries on Goat’s Point; besides this, splinter-proofs were provided for the reliefs, so that every protection possible was secured to the men. The result proved with how great success these preparations were made; during the bombardment of thirty hours the gunners lost but one man killed or wounded. The work occupied six weeks, and was chiefly performed by the Seventh Connecticut, Colonel Terry, the Forty-fifth New York, Colonel Ross, and a detachment of Volunteer Engineers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hall. When the guns were nearly all in position, a battalion of the Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery was sent to Tybee to assist in manning the guns, and later the Eighth Maine regiment, Colonel Rust.
The mounting of ordnance was executed under the direction of Lieutenant Porter, of the U. S. army; he also assumed the entire charge of all duties connected with the ordnance department on the island, supervised the landing of ammunition and implements, and directed the transportation of all the guns. This was a task of infinite labor. The transportation of heavy guns, always difficult, was here rendered peculiarly so. They had to be landed through a bad surf on an open beach, and thence dragged by the soldiers for nearly two miles through a yielding sand. The works were placed so as to be hidden from the enemy until they opened fire. Battery Totten was nearly 1,700 yards from the fort; Batteries Sigel and McClellan 1,620; Battery Scott nearly 1,677; Battery Halleck 2,400; Battery Burnside and others were all more than 3,000; Battery Grant 3,500 yards away. Breaching casemated forts at this distance had never been supposed practicable in modern warfare; indeed, 800 yards is the greatest distance at which it was ever attempted.
On the 9th of April the batteries were completed, the guns placed, and the magazines filled. General Viele had constructed a co-operating battery on the southern extremity of Long Island, in the Savannah, and not more than two miles, if so far, from the fort. The purpose of this was to obtain a reverse fire during the bombardment, which otherwise would proceed entirely from Tybee Island. This battery was not completed in time to engage in the first day’s action, but opened fire on the second.
A day or two before the bombardment actually commenced, General Hunter (who had superseded General Sherman in command of the land forces at Hilton Head) and his aids, and General Benham with his staff, came down on steamers from Hilton Head to be present during the engagement, though the command was left with General Gillmore.
On the 9th of April General Gillmore issued orders when the bombardment should be opened, and the part which each of the batteries should take in the work. General Hunter sent a letter to Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, First Regiment Georgia Volunteers, demanding an unconditional surrender of the fort to the United States; and representing the loss of life which would occur if resistance were made to the numerous batteries with which he was surrounded. Colonel Olmstead replied briefly, saying in language worthy of a more sacred cause, “I am here to defend the fort, not to surrender it.” When Lieutenant J. H. Wilson returned with this reply, orders were given to open fire from the batteries, and at half-past seven A. M., the first shot was fired from Battery Halleck. The other batteries followed, and Fort Pulaski promptly responded.
The guns for some time not obtaining the proper range, were ineffective. The Federal gunners after a little time learned to distinguish the various shot fired by the enemy, and the range they had. When a gun was fired, and the shot was seen approaching, the cry of “casemate” or “barbette” was given, and they sheltered themselves accordingly. Still later in the engagement they distinguished the shot by the cry “barbette” and “rifle,” and when the latter was fired they protected themselves under cover, as far as possible. The same skill was attained by the rebels in the fort.
The bombardment had continued several hours, when two mortar batteries along the shore outside of the fort, on Goat’s Point, opened, and to them the enemy directed his hottest fire.
About one o’clock the halyards attached to the flagstaff were shot away, and the flag came down, but was immediately raised in a less conspicuous place. During the afternoon an embrasure in the pancoupe, on the south-east angle of the fort, was struck repeatedly, and pieces of the brick work gave way. This angle was the nearest point to the batteries, and in a direct line with the magazine of Fort Pulaski—a fact well known to the Federals from plans of the work in their possession. Afterwards all efforts to effect a breach were directed to this spot. Several of the most important guns, however, were out of order; the mortar shells were observed to fall mostly wide of the mark; and no great result could be noticed even when one fell within the fort. Numerous marks, however, all along both faces of the work which were exposed, told the force and accuracy of the firing. By nightfall, the breach was so far effected that it was evident it could eventually be converted into a practicable one. The bombardment was discontinued at dark, three mortar batteries firing one shell each at intervals of five minutes all night long, worrying the enemy, and preventing any attempt to stop the breach, but without any idea of doing material harm. Several of his guns had evidently been dismounted, and others silenced, during the day. The breach had been commenced, but on the whole the result did not seem especially encouraging. The men and officers were very thoroughly tired with the severe work they had undergone, and the still more fatiguing excitement; few had found time to eat or drink. Many, however, had night duties to perform. Strong infantry pickets were placed, and still stronger supports, in expectation an attempt would be made to relieve the garrison.
Shortly after daybreak all the batteries were opened again. The reply was more vigorous than on the day before. On the Federal side every gun was in readiness, and did good service. The great columbiads under Captain Pelouze were especially effective; they certainly shook the walls of old Pulaski, and damaged them to a considerable extent. All along the line the firing was more rapid and more accurate, five shots striking the walls within as many seconds. Rebel officers said that, on an average, one out of three shots that were fired took effect, and that during all of the second day one shot or shell every minute was the average they received. Early in the morning Captain Seldenkirk, of Battery Sigel, was relieved, and Captain C. P. R. Rodgers, of the frigate Wabash, with a portion of her crew, worked several of the guns of this battery during the remainder of the fight. At the same time Captain Turner, Chief of Commissary on General Hunter’s staff, and Lieutenant Wilson, undertook to drill a detachment of the Eighth Maine Volunteers (Colonel Rust). These men went to work, were drilled under fire, and in ten minutes were able to serve their guns with more than tolerable accuracy, and did some of the most effective service rendered that day. This same regiment lay not more than half a mile in the rear of Battery Halleck, for more than half of the entire engagement, covered only by some brushwood, but perfectly content with their exposed position.