Almost from the first inception of the enterprise, there was a want of harmony between General Butler and Admiral Porter, which destroyed all unity of action, and contributed in great measure, to the failure of the expedition. General Butler also incurred the severe displeasure of General Grant, first in accompanying the expedition as its commander, and finally by his conduct in withdrawing the troops, which General Grant regarded as a breach of orders, for which General Butler was immediately relieved from command.
The embarkation was accomplished on the morning of the 27th. General Grant thus details the preliminaries of a subsequent expedition in which Major-General A. H. Terry was appointed to command the land forces:
“Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that, when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force, and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about fifteen hundred, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition, the following instructions:
“City Point, Va., January 3, 1865.
“General: The expedition entrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic blockading Squadron.
“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.
“My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.
“A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.
“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.
“In case of failure to effect a lauding, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.