With his customary promptitude, General Sherman soon perceived that his last movement would not effect the dislodgment of Hood from Atlanta, and he accordingly changed his tactics. He still further extended the right wing of his army, with the view of outflanking Hood in that manner. The Twenty-third and Fourteenth were, therefore, during the 5th and 6th of August, transferred from their position on the left to the extreme right, where they joined the Fifteenth corps, and formed the army’s right flank.
While this movement was in progress, occasional demonstrations were made against the enemy, which only served to show that he was protected by defences of the strongest description, and was in a condition to maintain his position for a long period, unless dislodged by some master-piece of generalship on the part of the Union commander.
The Union army was now very much changed from its first position for the siege of Atlanta. Instead of threatening the city north and east, General Sherman’s left now covered the northern approaches to it, while his extreme right lay southwest and ran parallel to the railroad. The lines of his army were drawn about two and a half miles from the city, and between them and the enemy’s works lay a narrow strip of wooded country, which had been the scene of almost perpetual skirmishing between the opposing forces.
A movement against the enemy had now become of the first importance, as nothing could be gained to the National troops by delay, while Hood was every day strengthening the city’s defences, and adding to his army by organizing all the laborers, teamsters, and quartermasters’ men within Atlanta, and filling their places by negroes. Without haste, and after mature consideration as to the safest course to pursue, General Sherman, having satisfied himself that the rebel lines could not be taken except by a fearful sacrifice of life, determined upon the capture of Atlanta by a bold strategic movement. A new movement by the right flank was ordered, which would require the participation of nearly the whole army. One corps was withdrawn and sent to the intrenched position across the Chattahoochie, in order to preserve, in any event, communication with the base. The whole of the remaining army was ordered to move upon the south and southwest sides of the city, destroy the railroad communications, and thus place Atlanta beyond the possibility of obtaining supplies. Preparations for these operations were entered upon at once, and by the 16th General Sherman’s plans were virtually completed. On the 18th, General Kilpatrick, with five thousand men, made a raid, and struck the Macon railroad at Jonesboro’ and Lovejoy’s, and the Atlanta and West Point road at Fairburn. But the enemy resisted him at all points and he failed to inflict permanent injury upon the roads. Retreating, therefore, on the 22d instant, by way of Decatur, he brought in one hundred prisoners, and a piece of artillery. General Sherman now made no further delay in executing his plan to force Hood to abandon Atlanta. That plan, as already noted, consisted in changing the position of his lines, getting in between Atlanta and Macon, and thus cutting off Hood’s supplies. The scheme was brilliant, and was cleverly executed. A brisk engagement took place near Jonesboro’, on the 31st of August, in which the rebels under Hardee were severely defeated, which was accomplished with little loss to the Union arms. Finding himself thus dangerously situated, General Hood, on the 1st of September, ordered the evacuation of Atlanta—first taking care to burn the railroad rolling stock and all other material that would have been useful to the National army. On leaving the city he retreated to McDonough, whence, moving westward, he was able to join his forces to those of Hardee and S. D. Lee. Meanwhile, at daybreak on the 2d of September, the Union troops marched into Atlanta. “We have,” says General Sherman, announcing the capture of the city, “as the result of this quick, and, as I think, well-executed movement, twenty-seven guns, over three thousand prisoners, and have buried over four hundred rebel dead, and left as many wounded that could not be removed. The rebels have lost, besides the important city of Atlanta and their stores, about five hundred killed, twenty-five hundred wounded, and three thousand prisoners; whereas our aggregate loss will not foot up fifteen hundred. If that is not success I don’t know what is.”
To lose no time in the improvement of his victory, General Sherman, on the 4th of September, issued an order to the effect that the city of Atlanta being exclusively required for warlike purposes, all citizens must remove from it; and to expedite such removal, he entered into a truce with General Hood, and made arrangements with him for forwarding the citizens and their effects beyond the Federal lines. In connection with this event the following correspondence took place between the authorities of Atlanta and General Sherman.
“Atlanta, Ga., Sept. 11, 1864.
“Major-General William T. Sherman:
“Sir: The undersigned, Mayor and two members of Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard the statements as to the inconvenience, loss and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.
“Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy; others have young children, whose husbands, for the greater part, are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: ‘I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?’ Others say: ‘What are we to do? we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or friends to go to.’ Another says: ‘I will try and take this or that article of property; but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much.’ We reply to them: ‘General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and then General Hood will take it thence on:’ and they will reply to that: ‘But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from thence on.’
“We only refer to a few facts to illustrate, in part, how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people here had retired south; so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without sufficient houses to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other outbuildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find shelter, and how can they live through the winter in the woods? no shelter or subsistence; in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them much if they were willing to do so.