“The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction, and reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service.
“If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.
“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“Major-General H. W. Halleck.”
BATTLE OF PIEDMONT, VA.
June 5, 1864.
General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the Shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and after a well-contested battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms.
On the 8th of the same month Hunter formed a junction with Crook and Averill at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that, to the enemy, important point. The destruction of the enemy’s supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to the country the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north; at a period, too, when they were urgently needed.
Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James river canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. General Grant says: “I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter and I am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interest of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.”
As soon as it was ascertained by the enemy that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha river, thus laying the Shenandoah valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward, and moved down that valley. When this movement of the rebels was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper’s Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this purpose General Grant detailed the Sixth corps, taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the result of the Red river expedition had become known. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days’ men, and detachments from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the Sixth corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the Sixth corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington.
On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of the Federal forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepardstown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper’s Ferry, crossed the river and occupied Maryland heights. On the sixth, the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick city. General Wallace, with Rickett’s division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. A spirited engagement took place, but owing to the inferiority of General Wallace’s command in numbers and discipline, he was unable to withstand the rebel army, and the Federal arms suffered defeat. An important result was gained, however, for the rebel army was checked in its onward march, and sufficient time gained to enable General Wright, with two divisions of the Sixth corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth corps to reach Washington, and guard the national capital from the peril which was threatening it. General Wallace was warmly commended by the commander-in-chief, for his courage and promptness in meeting the enemy at that important crisis.