From the 5th till the 14th of June, General Grant occupied himself in building defensive works, receiving and placing reinforcements, distributing supplies, and preparing for a movement across the Chickahominy and the James rivers, in pursuance of his design of extending his lines of circumvallation around Petersburg, and of pushing Lee nearer and nearer to the interior rebel works.
On the 12th of June the enemy’s line extended from Bottom’s Bridge along the Chickahominy, confronting that of Grant at every point. That night the National forces began to move, crossing the Chickahominy at Long’s Bridge and at Jones’s Bridge, and marching for Wilcox’s wharf on the James river. A portion of the troops went by transports from White House to Bermuda Hundred, General Butler’s headquarters. On Wednesday, the 15th, the entire army was on the south side of the James river, having lost, in the skirmishing incident to this important movement, only about four hundred men. White House had been abandoned as a base, the railroad leading thither being taken up and all the supplies there accumulated brought safely away. The distance traversed was fifty-five miles.
By this change of base General Grant’s army was augmented by a junction with General Butler’s, and by alliance with the United States naval forces on the James river. He had possessed himself, moreover, with a healthier tract of country in which to operate, and he had narrowed the scene of his operations. His dispositions for other and cooperative campaigns had been wisely made—as shown in other chapters of this narrative—so that he had now nothing to fear from rebel invasion of the North. Lee’s attention would now be concentrated on Petersburg and Richmond, and it was evident that the close of the struggle could not long be deferred.
OPERATIONS ON JAMES RIVER, VA.
May 4–10, 1864.
When General Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States, the headquarters of General Butler was at Fortress Monroe, from whence he exercised jurisdiction over the Department of Southern Virginia and North Carolina. The part assigned him in the coming campaign was an important one, and is thus fully described in the report of the Lieutenant-General:
“My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture the enemy’s important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee’s army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or so to cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James river, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.
“Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communications as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James river.”
Under date of April 2d, General Grant gave written instructions to General Butler, in which were more specially detailed his plans for the opening of the campaign:
“General: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.
“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country from the territory they have to guard. By such movements they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained. Lee’s army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of a movement. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable. The army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee’s army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty, I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men to operate on the south side of James river, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.