Finding that the enemy were too strong in numbers and position, while the Union troops were posted in a low, marshy position, it was determined to withdraw about three hundred yards in the rear, in an open pine barren, which had been previously selected. This was done in good order.
The rebels, now supposing that the Federal force were in full retreat, advanced in force, with artillery and infantry; but, to their surprise, they were received by a perfect line of infantry supported by artillery. Two desperate charges were made by the enemy, but they were repulsed with heavy loss on the part of the assailants, and the Union troops remained masters of the field. The Federal loss was about one hundred and fifty in killed, wounded and prisoners.
No further advance was deemed prudent by General Newton, and he accordingly reembarked his troops, and returned to Key West.
STONEMAN’S EXPEDITION IN NORTH CAROLINA.
March 20-April 13, 1865.
On the 14th of February, General Grant sent the following communication to General Thomas, containing instructions for a proposed cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from General Thomas’s army. It was the design of General Grant that this expedition should have started early in February, and have penetrated as far as Columbia, South Carolina, in cooperation with General Sherman’s forces in that State at that time. As General Stoneman’s troops did not move at the time appointed, it now became necessary to change the plan and route of the expedition:
“City Point, Va., February 14, 1865.
“General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith’s command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in cooperation. Hood’s army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon its defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of his men to oppose Sherman. Canby’s movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be three-fold: first, to attract as much of the enemy’s force as possible to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy’s line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.
“Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week.
“U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
“Major-General G. H. Thomas.”