The Union army was called upon to mourn the loss, among many other valuable officers, of Brigadier-General Isaac P. Rodman, of Rhode Island. He had left the quiet pursuits of business, and volunteered in defence of the Government. He entered the service in one of the regiments of his native State as Captain, and was quickly promoted to a Colonelcy, and led his regiment in General Burnside’s North Carolina expedition. He was made a Brigadier for services at Roanoke and Newbern, and was mortally wounded while acting as division commander at Antietam. The loss of the Federal army in this terrible battle bears ample testimony to its courage and endurance. From the official records the total loss in killed was two thousand and ten; missing, one thousand and forty-three; total, twelve thousand and sixty-nine. The combined loss at South Mountain, Antietam and Harper’s Ferry, was twenty-six thousand three hundred and ninety-four.
The report of General McClellan estimates the rebel loss in Maryland at thirty thousand men.
General Burnside, whose corps was stationed on the left of the Federal lines, testified before the investigating committee of Congress, that at half-past eight o’clock in the evening of the 17th, he went over to McClellan’s headquarters, and urged the renewal of the attack, saying that with five thousand fresh troops to place beside his own, he was willing to commence the attack in the morning. As his corps had maintained the most critical position during the battle, and had defended the salient points with remarkable bravery and endurance, while suffering heavy loss, it may not be amiss to record his testimony in this place.
General Franklin, whose corps occupied a position on the right of the Federal lines, also gave testimony before the Commission in the following terms:
“When General McClellan visited the right in the afternoon, I showed him a position on the right of this wood, which I have already mentioned, in which was the Dunker church, which I thought commanded the wood; and that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood, by merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on that place the next morning from General Sumner’s position. I thought there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and I had no doubt we could take the place the next morning, and I thought that would uncover the whole left of the enemy.”
No advance was made by the Federal forces on the 18th, which passed away without any engagement. General McClellan was waiting for reinforcements under Generals Couch and Humphreys, then on their way, and in the mean time, had ordered an attack on the 19th. A reconnoissance of the Federal cavalry advanced to the Maryland shore of the Potomac on the evening of the 19th, where they skirmished with the rear guard of the rebels, and captured six guns. General Lee had safely withdrawn his army to the Virginia shore, and was slowly conducting his retreat to the banks of the Rappahannock.
Though the battle of Antietam can hardly be classed as a decisive victory on the part of the Federal forces, in a strictly military point of view, it was conclusive in its results; and General Lee retreated into Virginia with a full conviction of his inability to cope successfully on that ground with the army opposed to him, and thoroughly dispossessed of the confident expectation he had entertained, that the inhabitants would flock by thousands to his standard, when his forces should appear in their midst. Restricted as he had ever been in his commissariat, he had discovered that no dependence could be placed on obtaining supplies in a hostile territory, surrounded by a numerous and vigilant foe, whose well-disciplined and eager cavalry would surely cut off any supplies from the Shenandoah Valley, long before they reached the banks of the Potomac. With a loss of thirty thousand men, in killed, wounded and prisoners, he was compelled therefore to retrace his steps, which he was allowed to do, deliberately and securely.
M’CLELLAN’S ARMY ON THE POTOMAC.
October 1–26, 1862.
At this juncture in military affairs, the cautious policy of General McClellan once more came into conflict with that of the United States Government, at Washington. It was McClellan’s desire to reorganize the army, which had suffered much under the command of General Pope, and which had just passed through two severe battles. Maryland Heights and Harper’s Ferry had been occupied and fortified, and, as the Potomac was low, and easily fordable by rebel raiders, McClellan designed to stretch his forces along that river, from near Washington, to Cumberland, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles, to prevent further incursions, and to make occasional sallies for reconnaissance or offensive operations, while the work of reorganization should be in progress. General Halleck, on the other hand, representing the President and the War Department, denied the necessity for any delay and urged an immediate onset.
No onward movement was made until the 26th of October. In the meanwhile, President Lincoln, visiting the Army of McClellan on the first of the month, had discussed the whole campaign with that officer, and had personally inspected the battle-field of Antietam; then, returning to Washington, he had, through General Halleck, issued an order to General McClellan, directing him to cross the Potomac and attack General Lee. It was in pursuance of this order that the advance was commenced on the 26th—the intermediate days having been spent in the work of reorganization. But this work had not been accomplished without difficulty. On the 10th of October, the rebel General Stuart crossed the Potomac, at McCoy’s Ferry, leading a force of two thousand cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and made a raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Means were immediately taken to cut off and capture those forces. All the fords of the river were ordered to be guarded, and Generals Pleasanton and Stoneman started in pursuit. General Stuart, by his raid of the 13th of June, into the rear of the Union armies between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy, had acquired great credit for boldness and celerity of movement. Hence the desire to capture him was all the more eager, on the part of the National troops. But the failure of a subordinate officer of General Stoneman’s to seasonably occupy White’s Ford, a point about three miles below the mouth of the Monocacy, unfortunately left open a chance of retreat, through which, on the 12th of October Stuart succeeded in making his escape, after a conflict with the Union forces, which lasted upwards of four hours. The fight took place near the mouth of the river Monocacy, and, on the Union side, was conducted by General Pleasanton. The losses were slight, upon both sides.