General McClellan has been bitterly censured for his alleged slothfulness and hesitation, at this juncture; nor can it be denied that his advance towards Richmond was made slowly and with extreme caution. It must be remembered, however, that to march through sloughs of mire, in the face of a powerful and well intrenched foe, is far less easy than to advance on paper, and conquer enemies with printers’ ink. This is not a partisan history—its design is simply to record facts and to do justice. Subsequent events have shed much light upon General McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign. That he had not over-estimated the power of the rebel forces, was conclusively shown in the bloody and terrible seven days’ battles. That he was obliged to deviate from his own chosen plan is evident, and is not denied: yet that plan was the same which was ultimately adopted by General Grant, in the final campaign of the war. Richmond when finally taken, was approached from the east and south, and not from the north. General McClellan may have been overcautious; but his tactics were wise, and his patriotism stainless.
The following is the language of General McClellan’s Report, as to several essential points: “The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell’s march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of my campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that stream....
“In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundations, it became necessary to construct between Bottom’s Bridge and Mechanicsville, eleven new bridges, all new and difficult, with extensive by-way approaches.
“The entire army could, probably, have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day’s supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army would have been paralyzed.
“It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward toward Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city, for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations.
“Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed.”
STONEWALL JACKSON’S RAID: RETREAT OF GEN. BANKS.
While the Army of the Potomac was thus occupied in bridging the Chickahominy, and while General McClellan and the President were in correspondence, the rebels did not remain idle. On the 23rd of May commenced the well-remembered raid, up the valley of the Shenandoah, which was the occasion of a serious panic at Washington, and even further north than New York; which prevented the junction of McDowell’s and McClellan’s forces; and which involved the splendid retreat of General Banks from Strasburgh to Winchester, and thence to Williamsport on the Potomac river. The distance is fifty-three miles, and the retreat was accomplished in forty-eight hours. The Army of the Shenandoah, commanded by General Banks, consisted of about six thousand men, while the forces of the rebel raiders numbered upwards of twenty thousand, and were led by the brilliant and dashing Stonewall Jackson. The advance of the rebels was made up the valley, to the westward of the Blue Ridge, and the first point attacked was Front Royal. Here the enemy encountered the First Maryland Regiment, Col. Kenly, which was attacked with great fury, and driven back towards Strasburgh. Col. Kenly fought with wonderful valor, and was heartily sustained by his men. The fighting, indeed, was of almost unexampled severity, but the regiment was soon overpowered by numbers. Colonel Kenly, when asked to surrender, shot the rebel who thus summoned him to yield: and finally, when overpowered, broke his sword in halves, to avoid surrendering it. He was shot, but only wounded, and was placed in an ambulance. In that ambulance he was subjected to much suffering, for want of surgical aid.
As soon as General Banks received news of this disaster at Front Royal, and knew that General Jackson was advancing in force, he perceived his danger and ordered a retreat. And now commenced a race between the two armies, for the town of Winchester. Had Jackson reached that point first, he would have intercepted the little band of Union soldiers, cut off their supplies, and forced their surrender. But the celerity and courage of General Banks’s forces proved their salvation. They retired, indeed, in the face of superior numbers; but they retired fighting. At Newtown, at Kernstown, and at Winchester they were closely pushed by the pursuing foe; but, at every point of attack, the enemy was checked and held at bay. The severest encounter took place at Winchester. General Gordon’s brigade was here engaged, and gained great honor by its gallantry and coolness. The regiments constituting it were the Second Massachusetts, Lieut-Col. Andrews; the Third Wisconsin, Col. Ruger; the Twenty-seventh Indiana, Col. Colgrove; and the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania, Col. Murphy. The stability with which this brigade opposed itself to overwhelming numbers undoubtedly saved General Banks’ Army. General Gordon thus describes its final retreat:
“I fell back slowly, but generally in good order. The Second Massachusetts in column of companies moving by flank, the Third Wisconsin in line of battle moving to the rear. On every side above the surrounding crest surged the rebel forces. A sharp and withering fire of musketry was opened by the enemy from the crest upon our centre, left and right. The yells of a victorious and merciless foe were heard above the din of battle, but my command was not dismayed. The Second Massachusetts halted in a street of the town to reform its line, then pushed on with the column, which, with its long train of baggage-wagons, division, brigade, and regimental, was making its way in good order towards Martinsburgh.