Footnote 894: [(return)]
Britton, Civil War on the Borde, vol. ii, 236.
Footnote 895: [(return)]
Official Records, vol. xxii, part i, 781-782.
Footnote 896: [(return)]
—Ibid., part ii, 722, 746, 752.
XIII. ASPECTS, CHIEFLY MILITARY, 1864-1865
The assignment of General Maxey to the command of Indian Territory invigorated Confederate administration north of the Red River, the only part of the country in undisputed occupancy. Close upon the assumption of his new duties, came a project[897] for sweeping reforms, involving army reorganization, camps of instruction for the Indian soldiery, a more general enlistment, virtually conscription, of Indians—this upon the theory that "Whosoever is not for us is against us"—the selection of more competent and reliable staff officers, and the adoption of such a plan of offensive operations as would mean the retaking of Forts Smith and Gibson.[898] To Maxey, thoroughly familiar with the geography of the region, the surrender of those two places appeared as a gross error in military technique; for the Arkansas River was a natural line of defence, the Red was not. "If the Indian Territory gives way," argued he, "the granary of the Trans-Mississippi Department, the breadstuffs, and beef of this and the Arkansas army are gone, the left flank of Holmes' army is turned, and with it not only the meat and bread, but the salt and iron of what is left of the Trans-Mississippi Department."[899]
Footnote 897: [(return)]
Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii, 856-858.
Footnote 898: [(return)]
To this list might be added the proper fitting out of the troops, which was one of the first things that Maxey called to Smith's attention [ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1112-1113].
Footnote 899: [(return)]
This idea met with Smith's full approval [ibid., vol. xxxiv, part ii, 918].