The long-cherished dream of Italian unity, which Lord Clarendon treated with so much scorn, was as little likely as any other political dream to be realised. The difficulties lying in the way seemed to be absolutely insuperable. The country was cut up into sections called principalities. It was the policy of their numerous Sovereigns, while cultivating a fraternal feeling among themselves, to foster animosities between their respective populations, lest by any chance they should unite for their own deliverance. The shadow of Austrian power, like an immense poison-tree, shed a blighting influence over the whole land, and under its shelter the petty princes exercised their despotic arts according to their own capricious wills. In 1815 a defensive alliance was concluded between the Emperor of Austria and the Duke of Tuscany for the defence of their respective States, Austria engaging to furnish 80,000 men of all arms, and the Grand Duke 6,000. In 1847 the Emperor made a similar treaty, called a special convention, with the Duke of Modena, by which the Emperor of Austria was bound, as soon as applied to, to give immediately all the military support necessary to put down any insurrectionary movement. It was, however, a singular fact that the means adopted to extinguish all hope in the hearts of the people and to render deliverance impossible, should have been the very means by which that deliverance was effected. Had Austria confined herself to her own possessions secured to her by treaty, it would have been difficult for Victor Emmanuel, or Louis Napoleon, to find a cause of quarrel sufficient to justify a war. But she had usurped the virtual sovereignty of the duchies of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma; and her troops occupied the Legations, while the King of Naples and the Pope were little more than her creatures. It was this crushing domination of a foreign Power that warranted foreign intervention, and excused even the ambition of France and Piedmont.
Such was the state of things at the close of the year 1858, when, save this one dark spot in the political horizon, everything indicated profound peace. On New Year's Day the French Emperor was accustomed to receive the foreign ambassadors at the Tuileries. On the 1st of January, 1859, he turned to M. Hübner, the Austrian Minister, and abruptly said to him, "I regret that our relations with your Government are not so good as they have been hitherto; but I beg you to assure the Emperor that my personal feelings towards him are not changed." A portentous meaning was generally ascribed to this remark, and in order to allay the apprehensions it excited, the Moniteur was instructed to declare that there was nothing in the diplomatic relations of the two Courts to warrant the prevailing rumours of war. But this pacific assurance was more than counteracted by the speech of Victor Emmanuel in opening the Sardinian Chambers on the 10th of the same month. "The horizon," he said, "was not entirely serene, but encouraged by the experience of the past, he was prepared resolutely to encounter the eventualities of the future. His country, small in territory, had acquired credit in the councils of Europe, because it was great through the ideas it represented and the sympathies it inspired. This position," said the King, "is not exempt from perils, since, while we respect treaties, we are not insensible to the cry of suffering which reaches us from so many parts of Italy. Strong by our concord, confiding in our good right, we await, prudent and decided, the decrees of Divine Providence."
It was generally believed at this time that a secret alliance had been formed between the Emperor and the King, though its exact nature could not be conjectured. That it implied much to the advantage of France, or to the family of the Emperor, as the price of his armed intervention, was inferred from the marriage of Prince Napoleon to the Princess Clothilde, eldest daughter of Victor Emmanuel, then only sixteen years of age. Her hand was demanded by General Niel on the 23rd of January, and the marriage took place a week after. As a matter of fact Count Cavour had held secret interviews with the Emperor Napoleon at Plombières in the previous July, where the Emperor of the French had agreed to aid Sardinia in obtaining Lombardy, Venetia, and perhaps something more in return for the cession of Nice and Savoy. These and other indications of the designs of the French Emperor warned the Austrian Government to make energetic preparations for the defence of its possessions in Italy; and a manifesto on the subject was issued on the 5th of February in the form of an address from the Prime Minister, Count Buol, to the representatives of Austria at foreign Courts. This was an appeal to the German Confederation to act as a united Power, if Austria, by an attack on her possessions in Italy, should be called upon to take up arms against one of the greatest military States in Europe. While thus appealing for support to the other German Governments, Austria was pushing forward extraordinary armaments along the frontier of the Po and Ticino. Strong masses of troops were quartered at Cremona, Piacenza, and Pavia, assuming an aggressive aspect towards Piedmont. Orders had been given to hold military stores and quarters in readiness in many places. A decree was issued forbidding the exportation of horses into Piedmont. As another indication of war, Austria had contracted a loan of 150,000,000 francs. These facts were alluded to in the Sardinian Chamber, as warranting that Government in contracting a loan of 50,000,000 francs. This was carried in the Chamber by a majority of 116 to 35. The Prime Minister, Count Cavour, also issued a counter-manifesto to the Sardinian agents at foreign Courts, vindicating his policy, as being rendered necessary by the hostile manifestations on the part of Austria.
OFFICE OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY, 10, DOWNING STREET, LONDON.
The attitude of France towards Austria and Italy was the subject of much discussion and great difference of opinion previous to the commencement of the war. Notwithstanding the emphatic declaration of Louis Napoleon, that the Empire meant peace, there was a strong suspicion, especially in Conservative quarters, that the Imperial policy would be guided by a spirit of war and conquest. The Emperor took great pains to remove this impression, especially from the minds of English statesmen. In a conversation with Lord Cowley, he remarked—"What I said to M. de Cavour I repeat now. My sympathies always have been, and still are, with Italy. I regret that Lombardy should be in the possession of Austria; but I cannot and do not dispute the right of the latter. I respect existing treaties, because they are the only landmarks we have; so long as Austria remains within her own frontier, she is, of course, mistress to do as she pleases. With regard to Sardinia, if she provokes hostilities unjustly, and places herself in the wrong, she must expect no support from me."
Lord Malmesbury, our Foreign Secretary, exerted himself with each of the parties as a zealous peacemaker, taking his stand upon the treaties of 1815. At the same time in a despatch to Sir James Hudson, our Minister at Turin, he fully acknowledged the grievances of Italy. Lord A. Loftus, our representative at the Court of Vienna, pleading for peace with Count Buol, received the following answer:—"If you wish to preach peace and to prevent war, address yourselves with firmness to France and Piedmont. We are not meditating war; we shall not be the aggressors. Tell the Emperor Louis Napoleon that Great Britain will not passively look on if his Majesty should commence hostilities. Say to him that should he take such a course, it will be at his own risk and peril. On the other hand, warn King Victor Emmanuel that England will not sanction any act of wilful aggression, undertaken in full peace by Piedmont against Austria. If Great Britain is prepared to hold this language, no war will arise." Lord A. Loftus did not seem satisfied with the statement that Austria did not mean to be the aggressor, and he therefore demanded from Count Buol an assurance that in no case would Austria move a single soldier across her frontier in Italy, without previous concert with France. Then he would consider that war might be averted. But Count Buol could not give that assurance. "It would be a surrender," he said, "of the sovereign power of Austria;" but he asked, "What will you say to Piedmont if she were to attack us?" To which the British Minister replied, "I cannot imagine such an eventuality. It would be a mouse attacking the lion." Count Buol then went on to say that they could never come to an understanding with France on Italian affairs, because France sympathised with and protected the cause of nationalities; while Austria supported sovereigns, governments, and established order. Besides, he said, it was a great mistake to suppose that Italy required change. All she wanted was quiet—that agitation should be put down, and the hopes of interested agitators extinguished.
In the month of February Lord Cowley was sent on a special mission to Vienna, which resulted only in an elaborate defence of the Austrian policy in Italy from Count Buol, in reply to objections and proposals made by Count Walewski. Lord Cowley had to encounter in the Austrian Government the idea that France was determined on war, and that to make concessions was only to put off the evil day; and also a bitter feeling of hostility against Sardinia. His proposals were (1) the evacuation of the Roman States by Austria and France, (2) reforms in the administration of those States, (3) security for better relations between Austria and Italy, (4) the abrogation or modification of the Austrian-Italian treaties of 1849. These conditions, which in the circumstances of the case were certainly not unfavourable to Italy, were adopted by Russia as the bases for the proposed convocation of a Congress, with a view to prevent the complications to which the state of Italy might give rise. This proposal seemed to meet with general acquiescence and highly pleased Lord Malmesbury, who expressed his satisfaction to the Sardinian Ambassador. Sardinia naturally claimed the right of being represented in it. To this Austria decidedly objected and demanded, moreover, that before it assembled Sardinia should be required to disarm, which was afterwards modified into a proposal that there should be a simultaneous disarming of the Great Powers. This was one of a series of proposals made by the British Cabinet, as a last attempt to preserve the peace of Europe. But all efforts at conciliation proved unavailing, as Napoleon simply played with them in order to gain time for his military preparations. Thus he agreed to disarm himself, but refused to make any representation to Sardinia. Strange as it may seem, it was the patience of the phlegmatic German that first gave way.
On the 23rd of April an aide-de-camp of the General Gyulai, who commanded the army in Lombardy, then massed along the Austrian frontier, was the bearer of a peremptory demand that Sardinia should disarm within three days, and that in the event of refusal war would immediately commence. To this demand Count Cavour returned an answer which, like all the documents that issued from his pen, was a conclusive argument that the great adversary of Piedmont was in the wrong, and had sent a threatening summons instead of compliance with the propositions that the Great Powers had deemed reasonable, and he made a similar defiance in a popular manifesto. The rashness of Austria in commencing the war by an invasion of Piedmont alienated the British Government. On the 22nd of April Lord Malmesbury, in writing to Lord Augustus Loftus, referred to the strong feeling of indignation against her which prevailed in England, and told him that his language could not be too strong with regard to the course adopted by that Power, and requesting that he would give Count Buol clearly to understand that the refusal of Austria to stop the march of her armies would enlist against her the feelings of the Government and of all classes in Britain. He was instructed to inform Count Buol that her Majesty's Government felt it due to themselves and to the great interests of humanity, which they had so earnestly striven to uphold, solemnly to record their protest against the course that Austria—regardless of the terrible consequences to Europe and indifferent to the public opinion of the world—had so rashly and so unjustly adopted. He said, "They assign to Austria and fix upon her the last responsibility for all the miseries and calamities inevitably consequent on a conflict which was on the eve of being averted, but which, once begun, will infallibly produce a more than ordinary amount of social suffering and political convulsion." He urged the German States to remain quiet, but gained no credit at the Tuileries, as the despatch was suppressed by the Foreign Minister, Count Walewski.
On the 3rd of May the Emperor caused a communication to be made to the Corps Législatif, in which he said that Austria "had brought matters to this extremity, that she must rule up to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the shores of the Adriatic; for in this country every corner of territory which remains independent endangers her power. Hitherto," he said, "moderation has been the rule of my conduct; now energy becomes my first duty. Let France arm, and resolutely tell Europe, I desire not conquest, but I desire firmly to maintain my national and traditional policy. I observe the treaties on condition that no one shall violate them against me. I respect the territories and the rights of neutral Powers; but I boldly avow my sympathies for a people whose history is mingled with our own, and who groan under foreign oppression." The Emperor proceeded to explain the object of the war in which he was about to engage. It was to restore Italy to herself—not to impose on her a change of masters; and we shall then have upon our frontiers a friendly people, who will owe to us their independence. "We do not," he said, "go into Italy to foment disorder, or to disturb the power of the Holy Father, whom we have replaced upon his throne, but to remove from him this foreign pressure, which weighs upon the whole peninsula, and to help to establish there order, based upon pure, legitimate, satisfied interests. We are going, then, to seek upon this classic ground, illustrious by so many victories, the footsteps of our fathers. God grant that we may be worthy of them!" In this spirit the Emperor set out on his mission for the liberation of Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic." Instead of obeying the order of Austria, his ally, Victor Emmanuel, summoned Garibaldi to take the command of the little army of Volunteers, which included in its ranks members of the noblest families in Italy, and Garibaldi obeyed. The Volunteers had got the general whom of all others they preferred, and whose name had magic power with all Italian patriots. Piedmont stood prepared for the threatened invasion by Austria. That false step was taken on the 27th of April, 1859, when the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Gyulai, ordered two columns of his army to cross the Ticino. On the 2nd of May the King called the nation to arms. He was himself Commander-in-Chief. In the meantime three Austrian corps d'armée were encamped on the plains of Piedmont, on both banks of the Po; and it was expected that an attempt would be made to take Turin by a coup de main before the arrival of the French. But these were hurrying to the field of battle from the slopes of Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre, and a junction was duly effected.