Here the British Government wisely interposed. On the 9th of September, Mr. Elliot, the British Minister at Naples, received a telegram from Lord John Russell, desiring him to express to General Garibaldi the hope that no attack would be made upon Venetia. On September 10th General Garibaldi and Mr. Elliot met on board the Hannibal at eleven o'clock. "After I had made her Majesty's Minister and the Dictator acquainted with each other," wrote Admiral Mundy, "I requested the latter to desire his attendant staff to leave the cabin, as Mr. Elliot was desirous of a private conversation, and Captain Farquhar took them on the lower deck to watch the gunnery exercise. Mr. Elliot having expressed to General Garibaldi the astonishment with which, in common with all the world, he had witnessed the marvellous results he had accomplished with such trifling means, informed him that though he could have no official relations with him, he should remain at Naples until he received further instructions from her Majesty's Government. This information appeared to give great satisfaction to the Dictator, who said he fully understood that official intercourse was not practicable. Mr. Elliot then informed him that Lord John Russell had charged him to express the hope that no attack would be made on Venetia, as, in his lordship's opinion, it would be calculated to bring the greatest calamities upon Italy. Garibaldi replied by stating that he would make no concealment of his plans, which were plain and straightforward. He intended to push on at once to Rome, and there place the crown of United Italy on the head of King Victor Emmanuel, upon whom would devolve the task of the liberation of Venetia, and in which he would himself be but the lieutenant of his Majesty. If that liberation could be accomplished by purchase or by negotiation, so much the better. He added that he was sure that Lord John Russell, in counselling the abandonment of Venetia, did not fairly represent the generous feelings of the people of England towards the Italian nation, although he cheerfully recognised the obligation Italy was under to her Majesty's Government for the sympathy they had exhibited with regard to Rome." Nevertheless the warning, accompanied by another to the King of Sardinia, was not without its effect.
The speedy annexation of Naples to Piedmont was most desirable; and the main difficulty that stood in the way was the antagonism between Garibaldi and Cavour. The former wrote to the King requesting that the obnoxious Minister might be removed from office; but Victor Emmanuel answered that he could not, as a constitutional Sovereign, withdraw a Minister who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of his subjects. Garibaldi, however, lost no time in making all necessary arrangements for the annexation, which was hastened by the march of events in another quarter. The celebrated French General, Lamoricière, had tendered his sword to the Pope and had organised an army of volunteers which began to assume alarming proportions. Garibaldi would have marched to meet this new enemy and would have attacked Rome. The French garrison of that city must then have interfered and France would have been forced into actual war against the liberators of Italy. This complication of circumstances led the Emperor to consent to the invasion of the Papal States by Victor Emmanuel, which was the very thing that Cavour desired. Consequently, with but a few days' notice, the Sardinian army crossed the Papal frontier, scattered Lamoricière's forces, compelling himself to fly for safety, and added some of the finest provinces in Italy to the new Italian kingdom.
Towards the middle of September Garibaldi had permanently established his headquarters in the magnificent palace of Caserta, the summer residence of the ex-royal family. The organisation of the army was his first care after his arrival in Naples. Altogether Garibaldi could muster an army of 37,000 men by the middle of September. He distributed his forces so as to be in a position to be able to repel any attack that might be made by the Royalists, and to be at the same time free to cross the Volturno and assume the offensive. Up to September the 17th there had been no encounter between the two armies but slight skirmishes, in which the Royalists were invariably worsted. On that day Garibaldi ordered a forward movement, which was conducted by Colonel Turr, and was followed by an attack upon Capua. In presence of the advancing column of Major Cattabene, the enemy abandoned the town of Cajazzo, a strong position which the Garibaldians were thus enabled to occupy. But they were only 600 in number, and separated by a river from their base of operations, which was four miles distant. Two days afterwards they were attacked by an overwhelming force, which cut off half their number and took the major prisoner to Capua. This unfortunate affair, which occurred on the 19th, was only a preliminary encounter. The advance of the Piedmontese army through the Papal States, threatening the rear of the Neapolitans, compelled them to assume the offensive against Garibaldi. It was consequently determined by a council of war that, on the 1st of October, the whole army should cross the Volturno at different points and fall upon the Garibaldian lines. The principal attack was directed against Garibaldi's line between Santa Maria and St. Angelo. It was vigorously conducted, and well supported by powerful artillery; but the military genius of Garibaldi and the enthusiasm of his troops prevailed, though the victory was by no means decisive. The remnant of the royal forces were withdrawn to Gaeta.
The advance of Victor Emmanuel's army on the Garigliano decided the fate of Southern Italy and of the Bourbon dynasty. It seemed rather a triumphal progress than a contest between two fighting armies. A Sardinian division under General de Sonaz landed at Manfredonia on the 14th of October, and marched on Maddaloni; while the main body of the Sardinian army, under General Cialdini, was pushing on from the Abruzzi towards Capua, compelling the Neapolitans to fall back on Gaeta. Garibaldi had, meantime, concentrated his forces at Calvi, whence he sent Colonel Missori to convey his respects to Victor Emmanuel at Teana. The King received Missori most affectionately, evincing the liveliest interest in the army of Garibaldi and complimenting the gallant envoy on his own exploits at Melazzo. It was agreed that the King should meet the Dictator next day at the foot of a hill called Santa Maria della Croce. The two great leaders of Italian unity cordially shook hands, and showed by their faces that the action was the expression of a true sentiment of affection on Garibaldi's part, and of the greatest admiration on the part of the King. The King complimented the General by saying that without his daring expedition the unity of Italy would not be a reality for ten years to come. "It may be, sire," answered Garibaldi; "but I could not have attempted my expedition had not Victor Emmanuel been the most noble and generous of kings."
The triumphs of the Piedmontese army were rapid. The earthworks were stormed, the Garigliano was crossed, and the main body of the Neapolitan army was driven back to Gaeta. Capua having been bombarded for forty-eight hours, the garrison surrendered on the 2nd of November, yielding almost without conditions. Meanwhile, universal suffrage had declared Victor Emmanuel King of the Two Sicilies; there being but about 10,000 votes for the Bourbon, against 1,300,000. The task of Garibaldi was now gloriously accomplished; his programme, as conqueror and Dictator, exactly fulfilled. On the 7th of November Victor Emmanuel made his triumphal entry into Naples. The General now asked three things of the King, in return for the two crowns he had given him, namely: first, to be appointed Governor of Southern Italy for three years; secondly, that the decrees he had signed during his dictatorship should be ratified, so far as they were in accordance with the constitutional laws of the country; and thirdly, that the rank conferred by him, in virtue of his dictatorship of the Two Sicilies, on his companions in arms, should be recognised by the new Italian Government. A peremptory refusal was given to the first request, which, indeed, it was impossible to grant. The two last the King's Ministers were disposed to grant, but upon certain conditions to be named by themselves. In the end, the King renewed the royal promise he had previously made, that Garibaldi's volunteers should be incorporated with the regular army, and be subject to the scrutiny of a mixed commission—a promise that was afterwards broken by his Ministers. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Garibaldi declined all the offers afterwards made to him and retired, poor and unrewarded, to Caprera. Although the task of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel was accomplished, yet the diplomatic situation was gloomy in the extreme. Napoleon III. sent a threatening squadron of ships in order to avert, if possible, the surrender of the final stronghold of the Neapolitans at Gaeta, but the Italian army persisted in the siege and the demonstration was a complete failure. Then France and Spain withdrew their Ministers from Turin; Austria and Prussia expressed their indignation and displeasure, and Russia followed suit by directing her Minister to depart. Lord John Russell thereupon wrote a famous despatch, dated the 27th of October, 1860. He declined to follow in the wake of the Powers, and after asserting that the people of Naples and the Roman States had taken up arms for good reasons, concluded with these stirring words—"Such having been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy, her Majesty's Government can see no sufficient grounds for the severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe."
CHAPTER XX.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
The Session of 1860—Debates on Nice and Savoy—Mr. Gladstone's Budget—The French Commercial Treaty—The Paper Duties Bill—Lord Palmerston's Motion of Inquiry—Mr. Gladstone's Resolution—Lord John Russell's Reform Bill—It falls flat—Mr. James Wilson and Sir Charles Trevelyan—The Defences of India and Great Britain—Foreign Affairs in the Queen's Speech—The Massacre by the Druses—The French Expedition—Palmerston's Distrust of Napoleon—China once more—Repulse on the Peiho—Lord Elgin and Baron Gros—The Advance on Pekin—Capture of the Taku Forts—Futile Negotiations—Treacherous Treatment of the British Envoys—The Summer Palace looted—Release of Mr. Parkes—Lord Elgin decrees the Destruction of the Palace—It perishes in the Flames—The Treaty of Peace—The Prince of Wales in Canada—Death of the Duchess of Kent—The American Civil War—Causes of Dispute between North and South—Election of Lincoln—Secession of South Carolina—Her Example followed—The Confederate States—Fall of Fort Sumter—Lincoln calls out the Militia—He places the South under Blockade—The British Cabinet declares Neutrality—The Order in Council—Affair of the Trent—Capture of Mason and Slidell—Excitement in England—Canadian Loyalty—Russell's Ultimatum—His Correspondence with Seward—Release of the Envoys—The Paper Duties Bill and the Church Rates Bill—Sidney Herbert and the Volunteers.