After Sir Robert Napier had come up to Senafé, discussion arose and much doubt was entertained as to the best method of applying the force in hand to the attainment of the one paramount object of the expedition, the rescue of the captives. There were many who thought, forming their judgment from the ordinary experience of the conduct of uncivilised rulers, that if Theodore (who was known to be on the march from Debra Tabor to Magdala) should reach the fortress before the British army, he would, after the inevitable defeat and dispersion of his army, be certain, in an access of impotent rage and revenge, to put to death the English and other prisoners there confined. It was urged therefore that what ought before all things to be aimed at was to intercept the march of Theodore, and prevent him from ever reaching Magdala. But to effect this it would be necessary to march at once with a lightly equipped force of about 2,000 men, who, while drawing a portion of their supplies from the stores that were already at Senafé, should be largely dependent on the resources of the country through which they marched. The other plan was to wait till stores were accumulated at Senafé in sufficient quantity to support a force capable of marching upon and capturing Magdala (to take which it was thought that siege operations might be required), with only slight dependence on local supplies. It was decided that the march should be on Magdala; and the safety of the prisoners was left to the generosity of the strange monarch, who in all his cruelties and excesses never wholly forgot that he was a Christian King.
It would weary the reader if we were to describe in minute detail a march that was never opposed, and movements of troops involving no triumphs but those of the Control department. The 350 miles of road that separated Senafé from Magdala were indeed full of difficulty; for many steep and lofty ranges had to be crossed; many narrow and uneven tracks to be repaired and widened; many long marches to be made under a tropical sun. The advance guard of the army moved from Senafé on the 18th of January; and the headquarters were established at Buya camp, near Antalo, rather more than half way from the coast to Magdala, on the 2nd of March. When the march was resumed a new arrangement of the forces was adopted. A large proportion of the Indian troops was left at the Buya camp; the column destined to march on Magdala was formed into two brigades and a pioneer force. The latter, commanded by the active Quartermaster-General, Colonel Phayre, consisted of about 500 men. Both brigades were under the command of Sir Charles Staveley; with the first marched the Commander-in-Chief and the headquarters. The total strength of the column was about 3,000 men. From the 12th of March, on which day the march was resumed, seventeen days were required to bring the column to the top of the Wadela plateau, a distance of 118 miles. This plateau, rising in precipitous cliffs from the southern bank of the Takkazye river (a large feeder of the Blue Nile) to the height of nearly 10,000 feet, runs for many miles in a nearly unbroken wall from east to west, and forms one of the most striking natural features in the country. At the time when our troops were scaling Wadela, Theodore arrived in the immediate vicinity of Magdala; that is, he had outstripped our army by a distance of nearly sixty miles. Marching to the right along the flat Wadela plateau, descending by a zigzag road that Theodore had just cut for his guns into the deep valley of the Jidda, crossing it, and ascending the Dalanta plateau, the British army (April 8th), on reaching the southern edge of this last, above the river Beshilo, beheld in front of them the goal of their labours—the table-topped mountain of Magdala.
We must now return to Theodore, who, since he put Mr. Rassam and his companions into irons, had been chiefly stationed at Debra Tabor, in the province of Beguemder. Here he kept his German artisans fully employed in casting guns and mortars, and constructing carriages for their conveyance. His revenues being gone, he obtained subsistence for his army simply by plunder, until the people of Beguemder rose against him, and commenced a desultory warfare against his half-starved soldiers, numbers of whom were continually deserting. The once noble nature of the man was now marred by licentiousness, drunkenness, and cruelty. But when—the resources of the country round Debra Tabor being destroyed by cruel and long-continued rapine—it became necessary to take and act upon a decision, Theodore, it would seem, woke up from his sensual dream, and for a while became himself again. He resolved to return to Magdala, and to transport thither the heavy ordnance that had just been constructed. First setting fire to Debra Tabor, his own capital, he began his march on the 10th of October, 1867, with his European workmen, about 6,000 soldiers, and a host of camp followers. Although the distance to Magdala did not exceed a hundred miles, the difficulties in the way of transporting guns, owing to the want of roads and the mountainous nature of the country, were enormous. Thus labouring on for weeks and months, and conveying his guns and stores without loss on twenty heavy waggons dragged by his soldiers along the roads that he had previously built, Theodore arrived at last (March 25th) on the plateau of Islamgyé below Magdala. On the 29th he came up to Magdala and sent for Mr. Rassam. The interview was very friendly, and the King, who seems to have really liked the envoy, was gracious and affable. His army, through continual desertions, had by this time dwindled down to about 3,000 men. He afterwards told Mr. Rassam that when he was excited he was not responsible for his actions. It is to be hoped that it was so, and that in the fact some palliation may be found for the horrible massacre that he ordered a few days later. On the 9th of April, having on the previous day caused all his native prisoners, 570 in number, to be brought down to Islamgyé from Magdala, he set a considerable number free, including all, or almost all, the women and children. After that he drank deeply and went to lie down in his tent. Those who were retained in captivity, no order having been given to take them back to Magdala, were kept on the barren top of Islamgyé; and having nothing to eat, they began to clamour for food. This enraged him to such a degree that, starting up in a drunken fury, he commanded them all to be put to death, and commenced the butchery by cutting one down with his sword, and shooting two others with his pistols. The rest were hurled alive over the precipice of Islamgyé, and those who showed any signs of life were fired upon by the soldiers stationed below. The massacre lasted from about 4 till 6.30 P.M., and there were no less than 197 victims, only thirty-five of whom were criminals.
Meanwhile the toils were being drawn closer round the doomed King. The 12th Bengal Cavalry and six companies of the 45th Regiment, having been ordered up from the coast by Sir Robert Napier, arrived at the camp on the 8th of April. The 45th accomplished the distance from Mulkutto to the Beshilo River in twenty-five days. The force before Magdala, with these accessions, numbered upwards of 3,700 men, including a rocket brigade consisting of eighty sailors of H.M.S. Dryad. On the 9th of April, the whole force being now concentrated on the Dalanta plateau, the approaches to Magdala were carefully reconnoitred. It was suggested to Sir Robert Napier to send a force round to the saddle connecting Magdala with the Tanta plateau, so as to cut off Theodore's retreat while he was attacked in front. But the Commander-in-Chief deemed that the force at his disposal was not large enough to allow of its being divided with safety. It was finally resolved to attack the position of Magdala by way of the great projecting mass of Fâla, from which the lower terrace of Islamgyé could be easily reached.
Early on the morning of the 10th of April Sir Charles Staveley led the 1st Brigade down the steep side of the Dalanta plateau, forded the Beshilo, and, mounting the bold spur of Gumbaji, proceeded along it in the direction of Fâla. His intention was to choose a suitable site for an encampment, and await the arrival of the 2nd Brigade, led by the Commander-in-Chief, which was to pass the night in the valley of the Beshilo. Meanwhile, Colonel Phayre, with the pioneer force under his command, was moving up the Wark-Waha ravine, parallel with, and to the left of, the march of Sir Charles Staveley, in order to examine the position of the enemy. He ascertained that neither in the ravine, nor on any part of the great open slopes and terraces of which he obtained a view, right up to the ascent of Fâla, was there any trace of a hostile force; and he sent back a message to this effect to Sir Robert Napier, which on its way was read by Sir Charles Staveley. Sir Robert, on receiving Colonel Phayre's report, ordered the Naval Brigade, Colonel Penn's battery of mountain guns, and the baggage of the 1st Brigade, which had been left at the Beshilo by Sir Charles waiting orders to advance, to press forward up the Wark-Waha ravine. They did so, the sailors leading the way. It was about four o'clock when the Naval Brigade, followed by the battery, emerged by a steep ascent from the ravine on to the diversified surface of the Arogé plains, just above which, to their right, on the Aficho terrace, the 1st Brigade was posted. Presently a gun, followed by several others in succession, was fired from the crest of Fâla; the direction being good, and the elevation from which the guns were discharged considerable, the shot came plunging into the ground near the British ranks. Then, from the top of the mountain, rushing down the steep sides of Fâla, came Theodore's warriors in headlong charge. There were about 1,000 musketeers, armed with double-barrel guns, 2,000 men carrying match-locks, and a multitude of spearmen. They reached the bottom of the hill, and began advancing towards the British, part plunging down a ravine called Dam-Wanz on the British left, to attack the baggage train.
With such an inequality of arms as existed between the combatants, no real fighting was possible. The sailors, on seeing the enemy swarming down the hill, quickly got their rocket tubes into position, and opened upon them. Sir Charles Staveley ordered all the infantry of his brigade to come down the steep ascent from Aficho to Arogé, and advance firing against the enemy. Against the Sniders of the British infantry, what was the use of smooth-bore muzzle-loaders and undisciplined valour? The brave chief Gabriyé—Theodore's Fitaurari or Quartermaster-General—after doing all that man could do to encourage his followers, was shot down, and many other chiefs with him. Finding it impossible to get near their enemy, the Abyssinians after a time lost heart and turned to flee. Those who had gone down into the Dam-Wanz ravine were hemmed in there between the Punjab Pioneers and baggage guard in their front, and some companies of the 4th, whom Sir Charles Staveley had sent against their left flank, and mown down with terrible slaughter. As the fugitives retreated up the hill-side, the Naval Brigade advanced, and sent rockets among them with destructive effect. Evening closed in; Theodore, who had watched the action from the top of Fâla, knew that his army was destroyed and his power at an end; the British army seeing its task well-nigh accomplished, but full of anxiety for the fate of the captives, bivouacked that night on the slopes of Aficho and Arogé. The loss of the Abyssinians in this action was estimated at between 700 and 800 killed, and 1,500 wounded. On the English side twenty men were wounded, two mortally.
DEATH OF THE EMPEROR THEODORE. (See p. [491].)
Theodore, clearly perceiving all further resistance to be vain, now desired to come to terms with the British general. Early on the morning of April 11th he sent down from Selassyé, where he had passed the night, two of the captives, Lieutenant Prideaux and Mr. Flad, to bear his proposals to the British camp. They were instructed to say that the King now desired to be reconciled with the British. The delight and enthusiasm caused by the presence of Lieutenant Prideaux in the camp may be easily imagined. But the "reconciliation" sought by the King, which would have left him seated on his throne, could not, it was thought, be granted. As far as Britain was concerned, if the captives were all given up, her honour was satisfied, her aims were fulfilled, and her troops might be at once withdrawn. But it was considered by the Commander-in-Chief that the British had been welcomed in their country by the Abyssinians, and that the various chiefs had abstained from impeding or molesting the march, on the tacit but clearly implied understanding that Theodore's power was to be destroyed, and that he was to be a king in Abyssinia no longer. No terms, therefore, could be granted which did not involve his absolute submission and deposition from the throne, and a letter to that effect was conveyed to him, which he haughtily returned, together with a cartel of defiance. After a frustrated attempt at suicide, the King held a council of war, and asked the opinions of the bravest and most influential of the surviving chiefs. Most of them gave counsel, like the soldiers on board St. Paul's vessel, "to kill the prisoners, lest they should escape," and then to fight to the last. It is to the credit of Theodore that he resisted this counsel. Doubtless he thought that their release might be the means of relieving him from further demands, but friendly feeling towards Mr. Rassam, and even towards his poor artisans, had probably much to do with his decision. About four o'clock in the afternoon (Saturday, April 11th) the King sent the Governor of Magdala to Mr. Rassam and the other Europeans with the following message: "Go at once to your people; you can send for your property to-morrow." The prisoners made haste to depart, and descended the steep path from Magdala to the saddle of Islamgyé, and thence to Selassyé, where the King still was. Here Mr. Rassam had a final interview with him. Theodore acknowledged that he had behaved ill to the envoy, but said that it was through the conduct of bad men.
Early on the following morning (Easter Sunday, April 12th) Theodore sent down a letter to Sir Robert Napier, the object of which was to do away with the effect of the defiant letter of the previous day, and to request the acceptance of a present of cows. According to Abyssinian ideas, the acceptance of a present would mean that the receiver was satisfied and granted peace to the giver. This letter on reaching the camp was translated by the bearer from the Amharic into Arabic and from Arabic by Mr. Rassam into English. Sir Robert Napier afterwards declared that he authorised no answer to be given that could have led Theodore to believe that he accepted one jot less than the terms of his first demand; and he ordered a letter to be prepared (which, however, was never sent), accepting the cows provisionally, upon the understanding that Theodore would surrender himself as well as all the Europeans. At the time, he verbally authorised Mr. Rassam—or the latter so understood him—to accept the present of cows. Theodore, upon hearing that his gift had not been spurned, was overjoyed. He believed that life and honour were now safe and that the victorious general would not require of him the intolerable humiliation of a personal surrender. He sent down the present, consisting of 1,000 cows and 500 sheep, being all the live stock that he had in his possession; and in the course of the afternoon he sent down all the remaining Europeans and half-castes, fifty-seven in number, with their baggage, to the British camp.