FROM THE PAINTING BY THOMAS M. HEMY.
BY PERMISSION OF MESSRS. HENRY GRAVES & CO. LTD., PALL MALL, S.W.

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And here, at the beginning of December, 1852, we find the origin of that now famous demand for a protectorate over all the Greek Christians in Turkey, which, when advanced by Prince Menschikoff, led at once to war. The claim purported to be based on the Treaty of Kainardji, but that treaty expressly limited the Russian Protectorate to two chapels—one in the Russian Legation, the other a chapel to be built in Galata. This baseless demand irritated the French, frightened the Turks, and filled the English with apprehension. But it was not then pressed. Another incident occurred, showing the critical temper of the time. The Porte was at war with the tribes who inhabit Montenegro. Austria, affecting to see danger to herself in the continuance of a contest so near her frontier, sent Count Leiningen to Constantinople, with a peremptory demand for the cessation of the war. It is not improbable that this was a Russian project; for the Czar felt, or affected to feel, that Austria would do all he desired in the Eastern Question; and no sooner was the Austrian demand made, than he supported it. But the Porte, beset by enemies, determined wisely to satisfy Austria, and thus to deprive Russia of any pretext for hostilities on that score. Russia was baffled, but not diverted from her purpose; for the Emperor now began to be impassioned, to feel the sting of French rivalry, and to commit himself almost too deeply to recede. In vague, but menacing terms, he declared that the Porte should be required to fulfil its engagements with him, and to that end he set troops in motion. "It was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force," and he prepared for a violent struggle. Two corps d'armée, above 100,000 men, were ordered to march towards the frontier of the Turkish empire.

It was an anxious moment for statesmen; but the attention of the great European public was not turned towards the East. In England the strife of parties had led to the downfall of the Tories, and to the undisguised joy of the Czar Nicholas Lord Aberdeen became the head of a new Cabinet. The Emperor conceived vast hopes of support from the new British Government, with several members of whom, on his visit to England, he had discussed the Eastern Question; the British public looked for social reforms from a composite Cabinet which unquestionably included in itself the ablest servants of the State. If the people thought of danger, it was danger from France, for the Prince-President, to the intense indignation of the Czar, had made himself Emperor; and a desire to see a completion of economical reforms was mingled with a determination to look to the defences of the nation. Ministers were not, and could not be, blind to the perils which threatened peace; but, as will be seen, they placed an unfounded reliance on the personal honour of the Emperor Nicholas, and they did not appreciate the provocative policy of France. Yet whatever qualms of apprehension they may have felt, they carefully kept to themselves, and even so late as April, 1853, Lord Clarendon assured Parliament that as regarded Turkey there was no danger of the peace of Europe being disturbed.

Yet between the 1st of January and the 30th of April the British Government had become possessed of facts which should have clouded their sanguine anticipations. For the conflict, hitherto confined to Constantinople, was transferred for a time to Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, and did not improve by its extension. Lord Cowley suggested direct negotiations between France and Russia. The suggestion was adopted, but it only served to embitter the relations between the two Courts, and it was open to the objection that it took out of the hands of the Porte a question which nearly concerned its sovereignty. This was met by the device of requesting the Porte to sanction such an arrangement as the two Courts might recommend in common. It had no other result than the exchange of sharp observations between Count Nesselrode and General de Castelbajac. For Russia had determined on a totally different course. The Emperor resolved to treat directly with Turkey, and obtain from the Porte his demands.

The real policy of the Czar was steadily developing itself. It was on the 4th of February, 1853, that Count Nesselrode informed Sir Hamilton Seymour of the intention of the Czar to send Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople, and at the same time gave assurances that the Prince would be provided with instructions of a conciliatory nature; and that "although bred to arms," the negotiator was "animated by intentions the most pacific." A few days later Count Nesselrode again declared that the Prince's instructions, though "necessarily vague," were moderate; and he volunteered the further information that there would be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any privileges which they might have acquired since the year before. Subsequent events showed what this studied moderation and vagueness were intended to cover, and how the Czar was aiming at larger game than the privileges conferred by the acquisition of keys and the affixing of stars at the Holy Places. At the same time, the Russian Government, preparing for a grand coup, resolved not to prosecute further the direct negotiation with France opened at St. Petersburg, but to transact the business in hand at Constantinople. For the great conflict, the scope of which none but the Russians foresaw, all the Governments prepared.

England, at the end of February, directed Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to proceed to Constantinople by way of Paris and Vienna. The Earl of Clarendon had succeeded Lord John Russell at the Foreign Office, although the latter still remained in the Ministry. It was Lord Clarendon's duty to draw up the instructions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; they were broad and wise; they left the diplomatist a large discretion; they entrusted to him the power of ordering Admiral Dundas to hold his fleet in readiness; but at this stage of the dispute, the Ambassador was not to direct the admiral to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from her Majesty's Government. Although Austria had interfered between the Porte and Montenegro, she had told the British Government that she would not depart from her conservative policy in the East; and although France had thrust the Porte into so deep a peril, she had in the opening of 1853 officially stated that she regarded her interests in the East as identical with those of England, and it was everywhere given out that the two Western Powers were acting in concert. To carry out her objects in the East, France sent, as successor to M. de Lavalette, M. de la Cour, a mild diplomatist, who had none of the fiery qualities of his predecessor, and who was not likely to quarrel with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The British Government believed it could neutralise, by moral influence, the evils springing from the action of France and Russia, and thus, by imposing moderation on both, stave off a catastrophe involving all. But at this juncture, as Russia grew more menacing, France grew more moderate: indeed, for some time to come she hardly appears in the quarrel at all: the original question of the Holy Places fades rapidly out of sight, and a new one arises, in which the opponents are Russia and Turkey, with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as the supporter of the Sultan. In fact, France, supposing her ruler desired war, had no need to stir a finger, for the rage of the Czar had got the better of his judgment, and he was bent on working out his will.

The Emperor Nicholas, knowing that he was about to enter upon a very hazardous policy in the East, sought, on the 9th of January, 1853, an apparently accidental meeting with Sir Hamilton Seymour, at the palace of the Grand-Duchess Helen. His object was to convey to Sir Hamilton his opinion how very essential it was, especially at that moment, that Russia and England should be on the best terms. "When we are agreed," he said, "I am quite without anxiety as to the West of Europe; it is immaterial what others may think or do. As to Turkey, that is another question: that country is in a critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble." Five days later the Czar told Sir Hamilton that, in the event of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. "The Principalities are," he said, "in fact, an independent State under my protection: this might continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So again with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can, then, only say, that if, in the event of the distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession." Here, then, was a disclosure implying the kind of understanding which the Czar desired to arrive at; and it need not be said that the British Government adhered to its old views, and declined to be a party to any such understanding. But these conversations had one effect—they created in the minds of the British Ministers a baseless confidence in the honour of the Czar.

It was just as the Porte, yielding to the advice of England, had satisfied the Austrian demands touching Montenegro, and just as the question of the Holy Places seemed to be dying away, that Prince Menschikoff, at the end of February, landed at Constantinople. Attended by his showy suite, but himself plainly attired, the Prince went to the Porte and presented himself to the Grand Vizier. One of the Sultan's household then invited him to visit Fuad Effendi, the Foreign Minister, whose offices were next to those of the Turkish Premier. But the Prince said he should not, as Fuad Effendi had broken faith with the Emperor; and, having put this slight on Fuad, he passed by the line of troops and the very door of the Minister, which had been opened to receive him.