Cassell's History of England, Vol. 6 (of 8) / From the Death of Sir Robert Peel to the Illness of the Prince of Wales

by Anonymous

In the middle of September matters had come to a crisis. On the 22nd news arrived at Paris, in the shape of a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour, stating that the Porte was apprehensive of a "catastrophe," in consequence of the excitement among the Turkish population. The lives and properties of Europeans, and even the throne of the Sultan, were, in the opinion of the Grand Vizier, in danger. M. de la Cour also reported that he and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in order to afford protection to the Europeans, had ordered up four steamers from Besika Bay. This was very vague and indefinite news. It was alarming, because it was indefinite. No account of the affair was sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and the British Government, to whom the news was reported, were compelled to rely upon the view of M. de la Cour. What should they do? The French Government, always eager for a movement of the fleet, at once proposed that in addition to the four steamers the whole of the united fleet should be directed to proceed to Constantinople. Count Walewski was instructed to request from Lord Clarendon an immediate decision, and was further to state that the Emperor's Government regarded the advance of the fleets as "indispensably necessary." The British Government agreed "without hesitation" to a course which Lord Palmerston had been urging for weeks, and orders went out at once from both capitals to Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin. This was undoubtedly a serious step, as by the treaty of 1841 the Powers were prohibited from sending fleets within the Bosphorus in time of peace. Had the Government waited for the usual despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, they would have seen that the danger reported by M. de la Cour disappeared very rapidly, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in describing the circumstances, took a cooler view of the dangers and did not even suggest the advance of the fleet. It may be doubted whether the British Government did not act with as much precipitation as M. de la Cour. For it cannot be denied that this fresh move of the fleet—a move so decisive, so completely pledging the two Powers to the defence of Turkey, and so irritating to Russia—lessened the chances of peace, if any were remaining.

At this time there were two contemporaneous sets of incidents going on which influenced largely the course of events. The scene of the one set was Olmütz; that of the other, Constantinople. Throughout the summer the Czar had not neglected to court the German Powers of all dimensions. At some of the smaller Courts his influence was supreme. At the larger, after the first shock occasioned by the discovery of Prince Menschikoff's designs, he attempted to recover the ground lost, and did recover it in a great degree. September afforded him an opportunity of exerting his direct personal influence upon the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. The Austrian Emperor, ambitious of military distinction, had assembled about 50,000 men in a camp at Olmütz, for purposes of field exercise on an extensive scale. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia resolved to be present on the occasion, not only to witness what they had seen before—a fine military display—but to discuss the affairs of the East, the Czar hoping to gain thereby. It was here that the Czar disclosed a new plan of action. The Four Powers were to take upon themselves to transmit to the Porte "a declaration founded upon assurances given by the Emperor of Russia." Count Buol and Count Nesselrode drew up a draft of the note, and sent it to the other Powers. This was a very notable document. The Czar wished to make the Four Powers his sponsors at the Porte; and, in fact, as Lord Cowley observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, convert the Four Powers into the advocates of Russia. But it was open to more serious objections. In the first place, its terms were ambiguous. In the second place, its value, as far as it had any, was neutralised, if not quite destroyed, by the famous interpretations placed by Count Nesselrode upon the Vienna Note. The plan gave Russia the advantage of two documents, contrary to each other, which she might use as she pleased. When the project was submitted to the French Government the Emperor would not decide what he would do. He thought it might be sent to the Porte; but he could hardly recommend it, and he desired first to know the opinion of the British Government. No one could be more careful than the Emperor Napoleon not to commit himself to any course alone. The British Government decided at once. They rejected the project, because in no circumstances would they recommend the Porte to accept the Vienna Note; because it would be useless, as the Turks would not accept it; because Count Nesselrode's analysis of that note left no doubt that Russia intended through the note to establish rights and influences she never before possessed in Turkey; because "no settlement was possible by notes requiring explanations, and accompanied by vague assurances." Thus this last Russian scheme fell through, and Austria again, now siding with Russia, advised the Western Powers to abandon Turkey. The fruit of the Czar's visit to the Emperor at Olmütz was this further separation of Austria from the Western Powers.

For another incident had occurred during those momentous five days. It was about the time when the conferences at Olmütz began, and when, at the urgent request of the French Government, Britain agreed to issue orders for the fleets to enter the Dardanelles—that is, about the 23rd of September—that the Porte learnt the refusal of Russia to accept the modifications of the Vienna Note. The Sultan could bear the suspense no longer. Notwithstanding the advice of the envoys of the Four Powers, he summoned his Grand Council to meet on the 25th and 26th and determine the question of peace or war. Hearing this, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe made a last effort to prevent war. He begged Reschid Pasha to prevail on the Council, whatever might be its decision, to allow time for one more appeal to the Four Powers, on the basis of their concurring in the Porte's interpretation of the Note. It was in vain. The Porte saw no safety but in war. The Council met. One hundred and seventy-two distinguished Turks obeyed the summons of the Sultan, and unanimously agreed, on their first meeting, that the Vienna Note could be by no means accepted without modifications; and at their second, they adopted a report to the Sultan, recommending that Omar Pasha should be directed to summon Prince Gortschakoff to quit the Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of the summons, that a refusal should be regarded as a declaration of war, and that thereupon war should be declared. Within three days the Sultan assented to the report, and the necessary instruments for executing the measures resolved on were prepared by the 4th of October. A form of summons was forwarded the next day to Omar Pasha, a manifesto to the Empire was issued, and a formal appeal for aid was sent to the Western Powers. Thus the irrevocable step was taken, and war was certain.

There was scant time for further negotiations. Nevertheless, although Lord Stratford de Redcliffe regarded the chance of averting war as hopeless, so desirous was he of preserving peace that he proposed another mode of extricating all parties from their difficulties. It embraced the alternative of a new note or arbitration. But although looked upon favourably in England, the Austrian Government would not take it into consideration. As the Cabinets of London and Paris, said Count Buol, had not thought proper to support the Austrian plan—that is, the Czar's astute scheme—the Austrian Government could not support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's plan, especially at a moment when the Porte was declaring war against Russia. There was, for the time, an apparent breakdown in the whole diplomatic machinery; but nevertheless the British Cabinet still persevered in the work of framing notes, and Austria and Prussia did not fail to give advice which could not be accepted, while Russia and Turkey prepared for war.

At this period the conduct of the Turks made a favourable impression on Europe. The manifesto of the Sultan was sensible and temperate, and still left open a door to negotiations. A spirit of self-devotion, unaccompanied by fanatical demonstrations, showed itself among the highest functionaries of the State. The Ulemas offered a large sum of money, and the Sultan, with reluctance, gave consent to the raising of a loan. The Egyptian Viceroy prepared to send ships and troops; the Grand Vizier and the leading Ministers gave many horses for the service of the artillery; men were forthcoming, and troops were constantly on the march for the Danube and the Georgian frontier. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, taking a comprehensive view of the merits of the quarrel, and of the interests at stake, justified the Turks in having recourse to arms. "Having," he wrote on the 28th of September, "witnessed the whole course of pretension and intimidation to which the Sultan and his Ministers have been subjected, and the conciliatory though firm consistency with which so many vexatious proceedings have been met, I may be allowed, while lamenting the necessity for war, to admire the gallant and orderly spirit which has prevailed, with slight exceptions, in all the proceedings of this Government." On the 9th of October the summons of Omar Pasha reached Prince Gortschakoff at Bucharest; and on the 10th he answered that he was not empowered to treat of peace or war, or the evacuation of the Principalities. This reply the Porte considered as constituting a state of war. The Anglo-French fleet was in the Dardanelles, and the admirals had instructions to defend the territory of the Sultan, but their power to operate in the Black Sea was limited. The Western Powers were as yet committed only to a policy of resisting any aggression of Russia. The German Powers declared themselves neutral, and Austria, deeply interested in the issue, assumed for herself the character of mediator.

The first anxiety of the British Cabinet when they learnt that the Sultan had determined on war, was to prevent the outbreak of actual hostilities. But this was no easy task, though the Russians professed moderation. On the 14th of October, Count Nesselrode, in these words, described the then position of his country:—"War," he said, "has been declared against us by Turkey; we shall, in all probability, issue no counter-declaration, nor shall we make any attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded arms, only resolved to repel any assault made upon us, whether in the Principalities or on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing; so we shall remain during the winter, ready to receive any peaceful overtures which, during that time, may be made to us by Turkey: that is our position." On no account would he take the first step. That, Turkey must do. But if Austria thought she could induce the Turks to take it, and the Maritime Powers to accept an Austrian proposition, Austria might proceed. Acting on this suggestion, and finding the British Cabinet eager to negotiate once more, Count Buol renewed the lapsed conference at Vienna. But while these industrious diplomatists were engaged in their work, and had even prepared bases of negotiation which were formally embodied in a protocol, to which the Porte agreed, events had occurred, followed by acts on the part of the Western Powers, which helped to frustrate their benevolent designs, and put an end, for a time, to their abounding use of the pen. The Turks had won victories; the Russians had exacted vengeance; the Western Powers had determined to occupy the Black Sea.

As soon as the fifteen days of grace accorded by the Porte to Prince Gortschakoff had expired, and while Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was urging the Sultan to defer hostilities, Omar Pasha began the war. Drawing together large forces at points so widely separated as Widin and Turtukai, a place between Rustchuk and Silistria, he resolved to pass the Danube in two columns, with the apparent design of marching on Bucharest, where Prince Gortschakoff had his headquarters. On the 28th of October the Turks threw a large body of men over the Danube at Widin, and occupied Kalafat, which they at once entrenched and armed with heavy guns. This secured them a passage over the river on the flank of Prince Gortschakoff's line of occupation, and it diverted attention for a moment from operations at Turtukai. It was here that the Turks obtained their first success in the campaign, and startled Europe and enraged the Czar by beating his troops at Oltenitza. During eleven days Omar Pasha held his ground. Diplomacy forbade him to advance, and perhaps it was as veil for him that it did. Prince Gortschakoff came down with the largest force he could collect; but he did not venture to make an attack on the strong Turkish lines. Rain, however, descended, and the Danube, and the island, and low left bank became flooded and unhealthy; and Omar Pasha, without being molested, withdrew his guns and his troops to Turtukai. At the same time a small force which had crossed from Silistria, repassed the river; but Omar Pasha knew too well the value of his entrenched camp at Kalafat to give up that also. On the contrary, he reinforced the garrison, and left that thorn sticking in the side of the Czar. He also held several islands in the Danube, and jealously watched the enemy from the Dobrudscha; but his main army he put into winter quarters. Both sides were suffering from the sickness incident to all campaigns, and more especially to winter campaigns, and it is probable that at this time fully one-tenth of the troops on each side were non-effective. Nevertheless, in January, Omar Pasha won a further advantage at Zetati. The effect of the operations of the Turks on the Czar was immediate. He ordered the troops of Osten-Sacken and Lüders to march towards the Principalities; but their divisions did not arrive until the end of December.

Nor was his activity confined to the valley of the Danube. He determined to show his strength in the Black Sea. The Turks had been active on the Armenian frontier, and had greatly harassed the Russian outposts, but without obtaining any marked success. Schamyl was also spurred forward by the calamities which had befallen his old foe; and hence it was resolved to increase the army in the Caucasus and in the Transcaucasian countries to 180,000 men. The Czar seems to have believed that the Turks were reinforcing their posts on the shores of Anatolia, and sending arms and ammunition to the Circassian tribes. This he resolved to prevent. He was anxious, also, to strike some blow at sea which should hurt the Turks; and thus in November the Sebastopol fleet went forth to scour the Euxine. The Turks were indeed imprudently eager to employ their fleet. Before the allied squadrons had entered the Bosphorus, the Turkish Ministers ordered four line-of-battle ships and ten frigates to enter the Black Sea. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe becoming aware of this, set about preventing it, and he caused the Porte to be informed that until the enterprise was abandoned he would not order up the remainder of the allied squadron. He would not, he said, be drawn into the wake of the Porte; and he caused Reschid Pasha to be told that, if he wanted the support of the Allies, he must be content to respect their opinions. The Turkish Ministers appeared to comply with his earnest request, but in reality they left a light squadron between the Bosphorus and Trebizond, and hence it happened that, while the allied fleets were in Beikos Bay, ready at any moment to move into the Black Sea, the Russians were able to fall upon the Turks at Sinope.

The Russian squadron went out from Sebastopol about the middle of November, steering for the Asiatic coast, and so disposed as to intercept any Turkish ship proceeding from Constantinople to Trebizond or Batoum. On the 20th they captured a Turkish war steamer, and one or more Turkish merchant ships. The news of these captures reached Sinope, where a Turkish squadron lay, and its commander for a moment indulged in the notion that he would go out and fight the Russians. Better counsels, however, prevailed, and he remained in port. On the 23rd the enemy's fleet, seven sail of the line and two steamers, hove in sight ten miles from Sinope; and the next day part of this squadron looked in at the Turks, but did not attack. From the manner of their proceeding, it might be judged that the admiral doubted whether he should attack, and that before doing so he obtained some order from Prince Menschikoff at Odessa. Such was the case. The British Consul at Samsoun, and the Turkish admiral, sent off news of the presence of the hostile squadron to Constantinople, but it did not reach the Porte in time to prevent the calamity which followed. On the 29th Nachimoff had received his orders, and had rallied the whole of his squadron. On the 30th, while the Porte and the ambassadors were consulting, Admiral Nachimoff sailed into the port of Sinope, and signalled the Ottoman squadron to surrender. The superiority of the Russian force would have justified compliance, but the Turks answered the summons by opening fire. Thereupon the Russians ranged up, and firing shot and shell, not only into the ships but into the town, soon set both on fire. The seven poor Turkish frigates and three corvettes, whose heaviest guns were only twenty-six pounders, were no match for the line-of-battle ships which poured in broadside after broadside of heavy shot and Paixhan shells. Nearly 4,000 men had perished! One steamer alone escaped and fled to Constantinople. Having completed the task of devastation, and repaired damages, the Russian fleet sailed back to Sebastopol.