THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
Attitude of the German Powers—The Lines at Boulair—The Campaign on the Danube—The Siege of Silistria—It is raised—Evacuation of the Principalities—The British Fleet in the Black Sea—Arrival of the Allied Armies—A Council of War—The Movement on Varna—Unhealthiness of the Camp—An Attack on the Crimea resolved on—Doubts of the Military Authorities—Despatch to Lord Raglan—Lord Lyndhurst's Speech—Raglan's reluctant Assent—The Expedition sails—Debarkation in the Crimea—Forays of the French Troops—Composition of the Allied Armies—The Start—The first Skirmish—St. Arnaud's Plan—Slowness of the British—Battle of the Alma—Menschikotf's Position—The Disposal of his Troops—Final Arrangements of the Allies—A British Blunder—Partial Failure of the French—The British Advance—Evans's Division—Exploits of Sir George Brown—Lord Raglan on the Hill—The Duke of Cambridge hesitates—Attack of the Vladimirs—Crisis of the Battle—Final Advance of the Allies—St. Arnaud declines to pursue.
THUS by a series of complex events, beginning in 1850 with the restless interference of the French, met with corresponding readiness by Russia, who, out of a political quarrel with the French Emperor, developed a large and aggressive design against Turkish independence—a series of events which culminated in 1854—the Czar found himself at war, not with Turkey only, but with France and Britain. And what was the attitude of the German Powers, whose arms and influence should have exercised so great a pressure in this quarrel? The offence committed by Nicholas was an offence not only against Turkey, but against Europe. By Europe, no doubt, it should have been met and defeated, and the common disturber should have been punished, if need were, by the common force. But, although Britain and France were prompt in pledging themselves to meet force by force, the German Powers would not pledge themselves to more than the meeting of force by diplomacy. The concert was incomplete. Austria was more willing than Prussia to adopt strong measures; but Austria did not do more than take up a negative and neutral position during the winter and spring of 1853-4. Yet she could not evade the danger which grew every day; and, therefore, on the 9th of April, Austria—Prussia going with her so far—signed, in common with the Western Powers, a protocol taking note of the existence of war, and declaring that the summons addressed to Russia was "founded on right;" that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was and remained an essential condition of peace; that means should be found of bringing that empire within the European system; and that the Four Powers would not enter into any arrangement with Russia, or any other Power, which did not accord with these principles, without previously deliberating in common. So far there was union; but there was no union in arms. Yet the very requirements of the protocol were those which, as every fact had shown, Russia would not agree to without an application of adequate force. A wide chasm separated the Western from the German Powers—the gulf of war.
The Allies do not appear to have entered on the war with any very definite notions. Britain and France formed an alliance together, and then allied themselves with the Sultan. In defending the Sultan, they were to defend a fundamental principle of European policy in the concrete, and they were to take no advantage to themselves by the act. But their earlier notions were limited even from the defensive point of view. They determined to secure a line of retreat for their ships, and a base of operations from which, in the event of the Turkish army being driven over the Balkan, they could effectively defend Constantinople. At this time there was existent an exaggerated dread of Russian power. The Czar was so strong, the Sultan so weak, so men thought, that it was deemed possible the Russians might force both the Danube and the Balkan by the rapid marches of an overwhelming force, and thus confront the Sultan in his capital. To provide against this, and also to cover their weakness, the Allies determined to land their troops at Gallipoli at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Therefore, as the allied troops began to arrive in March and April, they were employed in throwing up entrenchments, known as the lines of Boulair, extending from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora. It was in the camps near Gallipoli that the whole of the French and part of the British army were organised for active service; but while they were assembling there, the Turks were fighting so manfully on the Danube, and so effectually thwarting Russia, that the lines became useless, and the Allies found it needful to take post on the northern instead of the southern slopes of the Balkans.
When it grew certain that war would ensue, the Emperor Nicholas reinforced his army in the Principalities, and raised it to the strength of about 150,000 men, including an immense force of cavalry, and no fewer than 520 guns. Against this mass the Sultan could barely array a nominal force of 120,000 men, and a number of guns far inferior to that of his foe. The bulk of the Russians were in Wallachia, posted in detachments from Kalafat to Galatz. Their plan of operations was to concentrate a mass of troops opposite Silistria, to hold in check the Turks at Kalafat, on one flank, while on the other they invaded the Dobrudscha. It was then intended that the main body should cross the Danube at Kalarasch, and joining the troops coming up the river upon Silistria, invest and capture that fortress. This done, they hoped to capture or mask Varna, and forcing Shumla, debouch through the passes of the rugged Balkans upon the plains of Roumelia. Marshal Prince Paskiewitch had been appointed to command the army, and such is assumed to have been his plan of operations. But the plan was essentially vicious. They could not fail to lose men in the pestiferous Dobrudscha. So long as the Turks held Kalafat the Russians were never secure on that flank. Then, assuming that they kept the Kalafat army at bay, and even captured Silistria, it was in the highest degree improbable that they could force Shumla, and impossible that they could take Varna, so long as the allied fleets held the Black Sea. Nor were these the only dangers incurred by the Czar. The plains of Wallachia lie between the ridges of the Carpathians and the Danube. On their northern slopes Austria was collecting a formidable army. Austria, though not resolved to fight, was growing more menacing in her language and in her attitude. It was true that she trammelled herself by a treaty with Prussia, laying down the march of the Russians on the Balkans as a casus belli. But Russia had no security that circumstances might not occur to produce a change in Austrian councils, or that the very success of her preliminary movements might not bring Austria to act. And if she acted, she would move across the Russian line of communications, and the mere threat to do that would almost ruin the Russian plan.
Nevertheless the first operations were successful, and on the 20th of May Prince Paskiewitch crossed the Danube, and inspected the attack on Silistria. He brought with him Prince Gortschakoff, who took the command of the besieging force. It so happened that two Englishmen, Lieutenant Butler and Lieutenant Nasmyth, travelling for pleasure, had entered Silistria, and had volunteered to aid in the defence. They took their posts in the advanced works, and their presence and bearing produced such an effect on the Turks that the latter never thought of yielding, but fought with a steadfastness and devotion equal to any troops in the world. After the failure of the seventh and last assault the Russians began to mine. By sap and mine they had taken the place in 1829. They fell back upon the old methods. Unable to storm over the low rampart, they sought to blow it up from below. Here again the British officers frustrated them, for they caused the Turks to cut a fresh entrenchment in rear of the first; and, if need were, another behind that, and then another, but always, whatever happened, to stand fast and fight with them. The Turks did as they were bidden, and their coolness under fire, and indifference to danger, provoked the warm admiration of the British officers whose confidence was so liberally repaid. And thus the siege went on.
The investment was so imperfect that General Cannon, an Englishman in the service of the Porte, contrived to pass between the Russian covering armies, and enter the place, to the great joy of the besieged. In the meantime the enemy had come so close that a Turk dared not speak above a whisper without drawing upon himself a Russian bullet. It is to a remark in too loud a tone that the death of Lieutenant Butler is attributed. He was speaking to General Cannon, when a Russian bullet, passing obliquely through the earthwork, gave him a wound, of which he died. Shortly afterwards General Cannon, obeying, it is supposed, an order, withdrew from the fortress with the troops he had brought, and carried Lieutenant Nasmyth with him, but left behind another British officer, Lieutenant Ballard. The middle of June had now arrived. The siege had lasted five weeks. The Russian army had lost thousands of men from disease as well as wounds, yet, except that their works were close to those of the Turks, nothing had been gained. They resolved to abandon the enterprise. On the 22nd of June they opened a tremendous fire on the place from all their batteries. When daylight dawned on the 23rd the Turks became aware that the trenches were tenantless, and soon saw that the bulk of the army had repassed the bridge, and had encamped about Kalarasch. The siege was at an end. A fortnight later a chance reconnaissance, which brought Omar Pasha across the Danube at Giurgevo, induced Gortschakoff to attack him with another army. But the Turks, supported by British gunboats, beat off the Russians at every point, and Gortschakoff in despair evacuated the Principalities. The object of the campaign was won.
ZOUAVES LOOTING A VILLAGE IN THE CRIMEA. (See p. [40].)