2ND DIVISION, SIR DE LACY EVANS.—1st Brigade, 41st, 47th, 49th, Brigadier Adams; 2nd Brigade, 30th, 55th, 95th, Brigadier J. Pennefather.
3RD DIVISION, SIR R. ENGLAND.—1st Brigade, 4th, 50th, 38th, Brigadier J. Campbell; 2nd Brigade, 1st, 44th, 28th, Brigadier Eyre.
4TH DIVISION, SIR G. CATHCART.—1st Brigade, 20th, 57th, Rifle Brigade 1st Battalion, 50th, Brigadier Goldie (who, with 57th, had not arrived); 2nd Brigade, 21st, 63rd, 46th, Brigadier Torrens.
CAVALRY, THE EARL OF LUCAN.—4th Light Dragoons, 8th and 11th Hussars, 13th Light Dragoons, and 17th Lancers, Brigadier the Earl of Cardigan.
ARTILLERY, Colonel Strangways. ENGINEERS, Brigadier Tylden. Adjutant-General, Estcourt; Quartermaster-General, Airey; Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan.
The French preparations were completed by the morning of the 18th. They had far less to land than the British. The weather was no real obstacle to the landing of infantry, or even of stores; but it materially delayed the debarkation of the horses; and independently of the artillery and baggage animals, and chargers for the staff of all the divisions and brigades, the British had to land 1,100 troop horses. In spite of his knowledge of all these facts, Marshal St. Arnaud grew impatient of the delay. On the following day the British were ready. The troops arose from their damp beds at an early hour on the 19th, and paraded in marching order. Much time was still spent in accommodating the baggage and stores of so many thousands to the limited number of carts at the disposal of the Commissariat. Everything not indispensable in a military point of view was left behind. There was so much scattered on the beach, that Sir George Cathcart had to part with his only brigadier, Torrens—for Goldie had not arrived—and also part of his division; and Lord Lucan had to detach the 4th Light Dragoons from his weak brigade of cavalry to guard the beach, and see all the stores, and tents, and baggage safely on shipboard. Time wore on, the sun was high in the cloudless heavens before the word was given to move. It was about nine o'clock. Marshal St. Arnaud, according to the French writers, had then been two hours on the march.
The French were the first to cross the river Bulganâk. When our troops came up, the French had halted in position and were at rest. But it was our lot to fire the first gun. The divisions were crossing the river when the Cossacks showed themselves on the slope which ascends from its bank. The cavalry were ordered to look after them; and as they retired over the ridge, Lord Cardigan followed. As he descended into the next valley, he found himself face to face with a tolerably strong force of horsemen. The skirmishers on each side began firing; but, as the Cossacks did not come on, Lord Lucan ordered our squadrons to retire alternately. Suddenly the enemy opened fire from horse artillery, and kept it up pretty smartly upon the British, now halted, waiting for the guns. They had not to wait long, for over the ridge came bounding Maude's troop of horse artillery. Famous for rapidity, our gunners instantly came into action, and replied to the enemy with such spirit and accuracy that the Russians quickly ceased firing, and sheered off over the next ridge. By this time the Rifles and part of the leading divisions had crowned the ridge in rear of our cavalry; and our horsemen, with a loss of five wounded, and the guns together with the infantry, returned to the position on the Bulganâk, where they rested for the night. The Russians were a reconnoitring party, strong in infantry, which kept out of sight. The cavalry present could not have been less than 2,000. Some of them visited the French, but were driven off by the artillery. So ended the first day's march. The Allies bivouacked on the south bank of the Bulganâk; and, in order to guard against a flank attack, the British divisions faced to the eastward, that is, nearly at right angles to their line of march.
During the evening Marshal St. Arnaud visited Lord Raglan, whose headquarters were in a posthouse on the Bulganâk. What passed at this interview is painfully uncertain. It is said that the French marshal brought with him a plan for attacking a position he had not seen; that he proposed to turn both flanks; one division of his own army and the Turks sweeping round the Russian left, and the whole of the British round their right, while the remainder of the French fell upon and demolished the centre. It is said also that Lord Raglan did not assent to or dissent from this plan, yet that the French marshal left with an impression that it was to be executed. How he came by the impression, one can never know; but this one can know, that Lord Raglan ought not to have allowed Marshal St. Arnaud to leave him with any doubts on his mind. He ought to have distinctly explained that he could assent to no plan until he knew what was to be attacked. He ought to have said in plain language—and he could use plain language—that the plan of a battle must be determined by the nature of the enemy's position, the number of troops by which it was held, and the mode in which they were distributed. The allied commanders were seven miles from the enemy. Neither had seen him, nor his position, nor how he held his position. In these circumstances the proceeding of Marshal St. Arnaud was absurd; and in plain, but polite language, he should have been told so.
The dawn of the 20th of September was soft, balmy, and sunny. The troops were afoot early, and soon under arms. Far away on the right the smoke above the cliffs showed that the war-steamers were on the alert, and prepared to work on that flank. Next to the sea, in execution of that part of the marshal's plan not open to objection, General Bosquet, about six o'clock, began to lead forth his division in two columns, followed by four Turkish battalions. He moved on for an hour, and then halted, just as the centre should have moved, to be followed by the British. But the British were not ready. It is said they should have been in line about seven. Whence arose the delay? Some of it must, no doubt, be set down to the constitutional slowness of the British temperament; some to that imperfect concert which is the bane of a divided command. The remainder was caused, undoubtedly, by the fact that the British, in consequence of the arrangements made overnight, had to effect a great change in their array before they could begin to march. Then, that the two armies might be in close proximity, so as to present an unbroken front, the whole had to move obliquely to the right. These evolutions necessarily took up a great deal of time.
Prince Menschikoff was the Commander-in-Chief of the naval and military forces of the Czar in the Crimea. It seems that Nicholas did not believe the Allies would venture upon the daring exploit of invading that peninsula, or else that their rapidity of movement, slow as it seemed to lookers-on, anticipated the arrival of his reinforcements; or he may have thought that British and French armies and navies would not long act in concert, and that some incident would bring about the abandonment of the expedition. If so, he miscalculated the strength of will of those who held in their hands the public forces of the Western Powers—the Emperor and the British people. At all events, the Czar had comparatively few troops in the Crimea—perhaps not altogether 50,000 men, including the sailors and marines. These troops, in the early days of September, were partly encamped at different places around and to the north of Sebastopol. By the 14th the lights of the fleet were visible from the heights of the Alma. He might take up a position on the left flank of the line of march the Allies would be compelled to follow, and thus force them to quit the sheltering sea-coast in search of him; or he might take up the strongest position he could find across the road they must follow, and thus try to impede their march until reinforcements could reach him from Odessa. By adopting the former plan he could have evaded an action or accepted one far from the sea, for the Allies would not have dared to pass him, and thus he might have played with them until reinforced. But he adopted the second plan, believing that he had found a position which he could hold for several weeks. That position was on the south bank of the Alma, fifteen miles from Sebastopol; and on this point he directed the march of every disposable bayonet, sabre, and gun. It was indeed a strong position. Facing the north, the left seemed secured from attack by the steepness of the cliffs; the centre afforded excellent ground for artillery on its terraces and knolls, and the dips in the hills might be used to conceal the defenders; on the right the Kourgané height overlooked all, and bending backwards, offered protection to that flank. The lower slopes were quite open, and fell down to the river with sufficient rapidity to try the fortitude of an assailant, and yet not so abruptly as to deprive artillery of a full command of the ascent, the river, and the plain beyond. There was one path up the cliff practicable for infantry, and where the precipice ended there were two up which guns could be got with great difficulty. Beyond this troops of all arms could pass the stream and ascend the position. On a point of the highest ground, to the west of the post road, and about two miles from the sea, stood a tower, unfinished, for war had interrupted the workmen, called the Telegraph station, as the peak became known as the Telegraph Hill. The strength of the position lay in the wall of cliff, the steep open downs to the east and west of the road to Sebastopol, and in the river, with its high banks and enclosures. Its weakness lay in its extent, compared with the number of troops at Prince Menschikoff's disposal.