The new members were Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord John Russell, Colonial Secretary; Mr. Vernon Smith, India Board; the Earl of Harrowby, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; while Sir Charles Wood, quitting the India Board, became First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Carlisle went to Ireland in the room of Lord St. Germans. The object of the original movers in this business had now been accomplished: the Peelites had been driven out of the Government altogether. So much of the home history of England it seemed needful to introduce here. We must now return to the Crimea, and endeavour to describe what really happened there, and show how far the popular outcry was justified.
CHAPTER VI.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
State of the Army—Food, Clothing, and Shelter—Absence of a Road—Want of Transport—Numbers of the Sick—State of the Hospitals—Miss Nightingale—Mr. Roebuck's Committee—Military Operations—The French Mistake—Improvement of the Situation—Arrival of General Niel—Attack upon the Malakoff Hill approved—The Russian Redoubt constructed—Attacks and Counter-Attacks—Death of Nicholas—Todleben's Counter-Approaches—The 23rd of March—Raglan and Canrobert disagree—The second Bombardment—Egerton's Pit—Night Attack of General de Salles—The Emperor's Interference—Canrobert's Indecision—The Kertch Project—Orders and Counter-Orders—Recall of the Expedition—It is finally abandoned—Arrival of the Sardinian Contingent—The Emperor's Visit to Windsor—The Emperor's Plan of Campaign—It is rejected by Raglan and Omar—Resignation of Canrobert.
THE state of the army in the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann was most painful. The troops had to preserve their own existence, and to defend the ground they occupied in the face of a watchful enemy. Their base of operations, their source of supply, was Balaclava; and the road, or, rather track, from that place to the camp was a mere quagmire. As we have already stated, the numbers of the army were inadequate to the work imposed upon them, and the suffering they endured arose in a great part from that cause, but not entirely. The men were not "starved," as stated at the time. Up to the middle of November no army had ever been better fed. The rations were large and varied, and the troops received them just as regularly as if they had been at home. After November, parts of the extra rations were not always delivered; but not a day passed on which the men did not obtain a good supply of the necessaries of life. But then it was said they were not clothed. Now, although the Government did not anticipate that the army would winter in the Crimea, they did, in the summer, make provision for supplying that army, which must winter somewhere, with winter clothing. The requisitions were made upon proper departments as early as July. The ships freighted therewith sailed from England in October, and of these the Prince only was lost. When the news of that calamity arrived in England, while Lord Raglan had sent to Constantinople for warm clothing, the Duke of Newcastle issued fresh orders at home, and saw that they were executed. There never was a time after the end of November when there was not more warm clothing at Balaclava than the means at the disposal of the army could carry to the front. In the same way there was a deficiency of shelter. The troops, when covered, were covered only by single canvas, except in some rare instances where old campaigners had made themselves imperfect huts out of stones and branches of trees. But from the end of November there was a large quantity of wood at Balaclava. It was the same with fuel. There was always charcoal to be had at Balaclava by those who could fetch it. Moreover, there were enormous magazines of provisions and large herds of cattle at Constantinople. Nor were forage and chopped straw ever deficient; and even the supply of hay, which had to be sent all the way from England, was only interrupted for a short time. So that the supplies of these essentials—food, clothing, shelter, fuel, forage—were duly provided for the army. Private benevolence had come in to supplement public exertion; and Balaclava, in the winter, was choked up with luxuries and essentials.
But there were two things which had not been provided, and these were also essentials. No road had been made; and, in the absence of a road, no transport able to overcome the tremendous difficulties of the transit from Balaclava to the camp had been collected. Here were the sources of the greater part of the suffering and loss endured by the army. What was called the road was a mere track across the open country. While the fine weather lasted, it was hard and sound. When the rain fell continuously, it broke up; that is, became a strip of deep mud, varied by deep holes full of water, impassable to carts and waggons, passable only by men and horses with great labour and fatigue. But why not repair it? The thing was tried and failed. Turks were employed to mend this road, but they could not do it. The truth is that the road required to be made; that is, built upon a good foundation, and kept in order by constant attention. Why was this not done? For a plain and sufficient reason. It is usual for an army to find its own labourers. An army makes its own roads, builds its own bridges, erects its own batteries, constructs its own depôts. The army in the Crimea was too weak to make a road from Balaclava to the front, and no one had sufficient resource to send for labourers from England.
