Gortschakoff clings to Sebastopol—Inactivity of the Allies—D'Allonville's Expedition to Eupatoria—Destruction of Taman and Fanagoria—Expedition to Kinburn—Description of the Fortress—Its Capture—Resignation of Sir James Simpson—Explosion of French Powder Magazine—Naval Operations—The Fleets in the Baltic—The Hango Massacre—Coast Operations—Attack on Sveaborg—Results of the Action—What the Baltic Fleet did—Russia on the Pacific Coast—Petropaulovski blown up—Insignificant results of the Campaign—The Russian Position in Asia—The Turks left to their Fate—Incompetency of the Sultan's Generals—Foreigners in Kars—Want of Supplies—Defeat of Selim Pasha—Battle of Kuruk-Dereh—Colonel Williams sent to Kars—Fortification of Erzeroum and Kars—Situation of Kars—Williams's objects—Mouravieff arrives—His Expeditions towards Erzeroum—The Blockade begins—Relief is slow—The Assault of September 29th—Kmety's success—The Tachmasb Redoubt—Attack on the English Lines—Victory of the Turks—Omar's Relief fails—Sufferings of the Garrison—Williams capitulates—Terms of the Surrender—Reflections on the Siege.
IMMEDIATELY after the fall of Sebastopol the Russians resumed the work of fortifying the north side. If, for a moment, they entertained the notion of retiring to Simpheropol, that moment must have been very brief. Prince Gortschakoff had long studied the habits and customs of an allied army under two or three Commanders-in-Chief. He knew well the benefits he derived from a divided command in the camp of his adversaries. He knew also the strength of his mountain position; and if, indeed, he thought of retreating inland, that thought must have been suggested, not by any fear that he should be forced, but by a fear that he might not be able to feed his diminished host. Placing his cavalry on the Belbek, where water abounded, he took up a long line with his infantry and Cossacks, stretching from the high table-land above Fort Constantine, along the Inkermann and Mackenzie ridges to Aitodor in the heart of the mountains above the Baidar valley. New batteries sprang up by magic among these rugged bluffs, and in a few days the Russian front of defence was as powerfully organised as ever.
At this time the Allies had nearly 200,000 men in the Crimea; including upwards of 10,000 horsemen, and a very numerous and efficient force of field artillery. Having so vast an army, one is astonished to find that no effort worthy of the name was made to strike another blow at the main body of the enemy. The French did, indeed, place their right wing, 33,000 strong, with 54 guns, in the valley of Baidar, with a larger force and more guns on the Tchernaya, backed by a powerful reserve, exclusive of the Imperial Guard on the plateau. But this demonstration, made as early as the 11th of September, did not in the least deceive Prince Gortschakoff. It was manifest that no threatening movements of troops, no amount of marching and countermarching between Balaclava and the Baidar passes, would induce him to budge a foot. He knew that to reach him through the mountains his adversaries could only show a narrow front, and thus obtain no advantage from numbers; and that to assail the Heights of Mackenzie, they must advance under a terrible fire to force rugged passes and deep defiles. So he did not change his ground, much less run away. What he dreaded was a decided advance from some point of the coast upon his lines of communication—from Kaffa or from Eupatoria, or from the mouth of the Alma—but whether it was that the allied generals could not agree, or that the Governments of Paris and London thought enough had been done, or whether it was that Marshal Pélissier did not wish to risk his laurels, or whether the season was held to be too far advanced for the accomplishment of large enterprises, certain it is that none were undertaken. For ten days after the fall of the place the only change in the relative situations of the two armies was that the French occupied more ground.
At the end of that time there was a delusive symptom of more extended activity. General d'Allonville, with his division of horse, embarked at Kamiesch, for Eupatoria, on the 18th of September. Arrived there, he took the command of the whole force, namely, 17,000 Turco-Egyptian infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 48 guns. Expectation ran high in the camp, especially as the allied fleets went to sea on a cruise along the coast, reminding observers of the experimental trips made in August, 1854. But there was very little danger in the air. General d'Allonville, with the force at his disposal, was strong enough to raise the blockade of Eupatoria on the land side, but not strong enough to move far from the place, or hazard his line of retreat for a moment. He found a well-disciplined Moslem force at Eupatoria. The Turkish general, Ahmed Pasha, had employed the summer in training these battalions, and the French general was pleased to find such excellent infantry under his orders. But he felt 20,000 men were too few for the execution of any great scheme, and it is doubtful whether, had he been disposed to march inland, his superiors before Sebastopol and in Paris would have permitted the risk involved. He therefore confined himself to the simpler task of driving away the Russians, and giving his cavalry officers the chance of winning a cross and ribbon. The expedition was brilliantly successful. The pursuit was kept up for some miles, and the French cavalry had the satisfaction, not only of routing the Russian horse, but of carrying from the field six guns, twelve caissons, a forge, 169 prisoners, and 150 horses. This brilliant operation relieved Eupatoria from the too pressing attentions of the Russian horse.
EVACUATION OF SEBASTOPOL. (See p. [127].)
At the other extremity of the Crimea an expedition, organised at Kertch, had crossed the Straits, and had occupied and destroyed Taman and Fanagoria; but it would have been more to the purpose had the allied generals seized Kaffa and Arabat, and threatened the road over the Putrid Sea at Tchongar, whence the enemy derived large quantities of supplies. Instead of this they adopted a different plan. The navy had long desired some opportunity of doing service. Now it happened that the Emperor Napoleon had invented or adopted certain floating batteries cased with iron, and was anxious to test their quality in actual war. It happened also that there was a fort isolated and exposed to attack whereon the experiment might be tried, and a further stress put upon the enemy. It was the fort of Kinburn on the estuary of the Dnieper that the Allies designed to capture. It might have been assumed that their aim in so doing was to pave the way for an advance in force either upon Kherson or Nicolaief; but Prince Gortschakoff knew as well as the Allies that it was too late in the year to make the attempt even; and thus the expedition to Kinburn only served the purpose of testing the worth of the new floating batteries, and seizing another material guarantee, which, when the time for negotiation came, would prove useful. In the first week of October upwards of 7,700 infantry embarked on board the French and British men-of-war. There were thirty-eight ships in the French squadron, and thirty-four in the British. The former included the three floating batteries, Dévastation, Tonnante, and Lave. The British had six, the French four ships of the line; the former were under Sir Edmund Lyons, the latter under Admiral Bruat. General Bazaine commanded the French land forces. After a demonstration before Odessa, on the morning of the 14th of October the ships got under steam, and made for Kinburn, where they anchored off the spit the same evening.
Kinburn, as we have said, stood on the southern shore of the estuary of the Dnieper, and formed, with Oczakov, the defence of those waters. It was a regular fortress, built almost on a level with the sea. The northern face looked up the spit, the southern along the road that led to Kherson and Perekop; the eastern looked on to the estuary, and the western on to the Black Sea. Thus it presented four strong casemated faces, and north and south were deep ditches, supplied with sea water. It mounted fifty-one guns, but they were only 18-pounders and 24-pounders. To the southward there was a small village, and some large stacks of wood. To the north there were two batteries—one called the Point Battery, mounting eight, the other called the Middle Battery, mounting eleven guns. These were connected by a deep covered way, and their guns commanded the channel, which, inside the spit, ran along near the shore. There were in these works some 1,500 men, under General Kokanowitch.
The Allies had arrived, determined to capture the place. Their plan was to land their soldiers to the south, thus investing the fortress on that side, and preventing any force from Kherson from relieving the besieged; then to place their ships, gunboats, and floating batteries on both sides of the fortress and its outworks, and thus overwhelm them with a concentrated and concentric fire. The troops landed on the 15th, the British being the first to step ashore. As soon as they were assembled, lines of defence were marked out, and working parties began to ply the spade and throw up entrenchments in the sand. The British were entrusted with the task of showing a front on the Kherson road, which ran along the spit, while the French moved up towards Kinburn. The guns of the enemy at once opened upon the French, who replied with musketry and field artillery. This combat continued. The fleets could not take part because the sea was too rough, and night fell upon the scene, leaving the fleet in the offing and the troops ashore. On the 17th the wind had fallen; the sky was clouded, but the sea was calm. Then a movement began in the fleet. The gunboats and mortar vessels steered for the positions assigned them, some going southward to fire on the south-westerly angle, others steering northward to double the point and range along the inner side. The floating batteries were carried in nearer to the fort, until they were within about 700 yards of the south-west angle. The frigates went forward towards the batteries on the spit, one line on the Black Sea side, the other in the estuary. The Hannibal, line-of-battle ship, took position opposite the extreme northern end of the spit, and raked its defences. The Russians defended their post with energy; but they were overmatched. The interior of the fort was soon in flames. Part of the garrison ran out into the dry ditches for shelter, but here they were exposed to French musketry and grape-shot. In order to terminate the contest the gunboats went closer in, and the line-of-battle ships, steaming up in line abreast, brought their guns to bear upon the torn and shattered and smoking ramparts. The Russian guns were now completely silenced. The batteries on the spit continued to fire a gun here and there, but five hours' cannonade and bombardment had placed Kinburn fort hors de combat. Seeing this, and not wishing to prolong a useless engagement, Admirals Lyons and Bruat made the signal to cease firing. They then summoned the garrison to surrender. General Kokanowitch complied. The next day the Russians blew up the fort at Oczakov, thus leaving the Allies in full possession of the estuary of the Dnieper and of the mouth of the Bug. But the capture of Kinburn was the only solid piece of work done by this expedition.