This is the bulwark of the south coast of Finland, and, if the enemy's soldiers did their duty, it was quite beyond the reach of any fleet, no matter how powerful or numerous it might be. Built on rocky islands, facing a shallow and treacherous sea, it was plain, even to the eyes of a tyro in military science, that Sveaborg, though it might be bombarded, could not be taken without the aid of a land force. The allied fleet arrived off Sveaborg on the 6th and 7th of August. Admiral Dundas and Admiral Penaud had no troops under their orders. They had determined not to assail the place with ships of the line, but to rely upon their gunboats and mortar vessels to set fire to the buildings and blow up the magazines of the enemy. The British had sixteen, and the French five gunboats. The British had sixteen, and the French five mortar vessels. Beside these there were several ships of the line, frigates, and corvettes; but, on the whole, it will be seen that the gun and mortar boats did the work. Two days were spent in preparations. The small vessels with which it was intended to fight were placed in position. They were ranged in curving lines, the French in the centre. The mortar vessels were anchored; the gunboats were directed to protect them, and to keep constantly in motion. On an islet Admiral Penaud constructed a battery for four mortars, nearly opposite Gustavswert, and this formed the centre of the line. Two gunboats, armed with Lancaster guns, were directed to fire at the three-decker barring the channel into the harbour. Two ships of the line and a frigate were detached to cannonade Sandham, and a frigate and two corvettes were sent to occupy the attention of a body of troops on the island of Drumsio, on the extreme west.
The action began about seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th of August. The fire of the guns and mortars was to be pressed to the fullest extent deemed proper by the officers in command; and as soon as the accuracy of the range was tested the whole mass of ordnance afloat began and sustained a most rapid fire. The Russians estimated that thirty shells per minute fell into their batteries. At first they replied with great spirit, but although the range of their heavy guns extended far beyond the allied lines, yet they were unable to do any damage, either to the passive mortar vessels or the restless gunboats. While the action was raging in the centre the detached ships were busy on the flanks, especially off Sandham, where the liners were engaged in a combat with earthen batteries, on which they could make little impression. Within three hours after the beginning of the bombardment in the centre the incessant hail of shells within the fortress had told with effect. The fire, so brisk before, now began to slacken. The Russian gunners could not hit the small boats of the Allies, while they were exposed to a crushing fire. About ten o'clock the Russian buildings were on fire. Soon a loud report showed that a magazine had been pierced, then another and another. The third explosion, about noon, was very destructive. When it grew dark, and the gunboats had been recalled, and the mortars ceased to fire, the boats of the fleet, fitted with rocket-tubes, ran in nearer to the fortress, and poured forth their incendiary missiles till the flames rose to the height of a hundred feet, swaying to and fro in a brisk breeze.
The mortars and guns went nearer to the place at daylight on the 10th, and resumed their destructive labours. It was observed that the three-decker had been removed from the channel between Gustavswert and Bak Holmen. Three times she had been on fire. Although the garrison were beset by the flames of their burning barracks and stores, yet on the 10th they opened a more sustained fire than on the preceding day. The operations, however, were of the same character, and they produced the same effects, except that the explosions ceased. Again at night the rocket-boats were called into play, and this time the mortars were steadily active all night. By the morning of the 13th the admirals considered that enough had been done—that, in fact, they could do no more; neither destroy the forts nor touch the squadron they sheltered. The place was gutted, but "the sea defences in general were little injured," as the admiral reported. We had inflicted this loss on the enemy at a cost to ourselves of one officer, Lieutenant Miller, and seventeen men wounded. The enemy, on the contrary, lost heavily in men and material. According to the British Minister at Stockholm, the loss in men was not less than 2,000. Every magazine in the place was destroyed; also immense stores of rope, cordage, tar, and other naval supplies. The incessant activity of the admirals and captains had swept the enemy's commercial marine from the sea, had taken many ships, had destroyed vast stores, had kept a large body of troops employed, had harassed all the accessible parts of the coast, had shown the British and French flags to the enemy in his capital, and had gutted a first-rate fortress, with an insignificant loss to themselves. To do more—to take Cronstadt, and conquer Sveaborg—would have required an army equal to the reduction of Finland, an enterprise which would have put a severe strain on the resources both of France and Britain, and one that might yet have failed: for the seasons in those regions fight on the side of Russia, and if these heavy blows could not have been struck in six months, the fleet and army must have decamped, under penalty of being frozen up and destroyed.
On the Pacific coast there was an important, although to a great extent an ineffectual, campaign. Russia, driven on by a desire to reach the open sea somewhere, had pushed her settlements from Siberia down the great river Amoor, which enters the Gulf of Tartary opposite the northern end of the Japanese island of Saghalien. At Castries Bay, on the coast of this tract, they had built a town called Alexandrovsk, and still farther south they had a settlement, named after Constantine, at Port Imperial, or Barracouta Bay. In short, before 1854, and still more so afterwards Russia was bent on making a solid establishment on the Pacific, as an outlet to Siberia and as the base of a Pacific fleet. She had also a town and forts at Petropaulovski on the coast of Kamschatka, and, before the war, in Aniwa Bay, at the south end of the island of Saghalien. Here was the nucleus of a strong position on the Pacific, and it gave Russia great influence both in Pekin and Yedo. More than this, it threatened British supremacy in the Eastern seas.
No attempt on the mouth of the Amoor was made in 1854. But in 1855 the allied squadron was strengthened, both on the China and Pacific stations. There were five steamers—one French, the others British—and twelve sailing vessels, four of which were French. The total guns of the squadrons amounted to 480. Admiral Bruce and Admiral Fournichon commanded the Pacific squadron, Admiral Stirling the China squadron. On their side the Russians had augmented the fortifications at Petropaulovski, and had erected new works, and assembled a strong garrison, on the Amoor. But their naval force was of no value; they had only seven vessels, mounting ninety guns; of these four were in the beginning of the year at Petropaulovski. Two British steamers arrived off this place on the 14th of April, but while they were waiting for the squadron the Russians cut a channel through the shore ice, and, favoured by a fog, escaped on the 17th and reached Castries Bay. When, at the end of May, the allied squadron arrived, the place was found to be abandoned; there were only three Americans there. They consequently destroyed the batteries and burnt the Government stores. Admiral Bruce sent one ship to join Admiral Stirling, and with the rest returned to the American coast.
Admiral Stirling, in the meantime, had detached Commodore Elliot with three ships—a frigate, and two steamers—into the Gulf of Tartary. He found the Russian vessels which had escaped Admiral Bruce, in Castries Bay; but he did not attack them, judging the disadvantages to be too great. Yet the weight of metal was in his favour; his ships were free to fight, being unencumbered, while the enemy was deeply laden with the garrison, the inhabitants, and the stores of Petropaulovski. However, Commodore Elliot decided not to risk an action. Instead of that, he sent a steamer for reinforcements, and while he was waiting for them, the enemy got away. At the time it was supposed he had escaped by some inner channel leading to the Amoor, but no such channel exists. The Russians went by the sea under the noses of their opponents. Commodore Elliot returned to the southern shore of Saghalien, where he found two British and two French ships. After some delay Admiral Stirling, taking with him five British vessels, steered for the Sea of Okhotsk. Although the British ships remained cruising off the Russian coasts until late in October, they effected nothing remarkable. The opportunity of striking a blow at the colonisation of the Amoor was lost.
Meanwhile, what was the position of Russia in Asia? "The cession of the Asiatic fortresses, with their neighbouring districts," wrote Lord Aberdeen in 1829, in commenting on the Treaty of Adrianople, "not only secures to Russia the uninterrupted occupation of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, but places her in a situation so commanding as to control at pleasure the destiny of Asia Minor. Prominently advanced into the centre of Armenia, in the midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the keys both of the Persian and the Turkish provinces; and whether she may be disposed to extend her conquests to the East or to the West, to Teheran or to Constantinople, no serious obstacle can arrest her progress." Assuming that the Western Powers did not interfere with the execution of the march to the West, every year sufficed to show the soundness of the conclusions to which Lord Aberdeen came in 1829; and although the presence of the allied fleets in the Black Sea did offer a serious obstacle in 1854-5, yet that was an accident, which only for a time diminished the value of the Russian position in Armenia. Without the aid of a fleet the Russians were still very formidable. The strong fortress of Gumri not only barred the road to Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, but commanded the plain of Kars. The fort of Akalzik shut out the Turks in Kars from direct communication with the seaport of Batoum. The tracing of the frontier of the province of Erivan placed Russia within a couple of marches of Bayazid. Both sides in 1854 knew the value of the prize for which they were contending. The Turks owed the preservation of Anatolia to the energy and courage of a Hungarian and a few Englishmen. The Russians sent one of their best generals to command on that frontier, and had not the European officers stopped him by holding Kars until they were on the brink of famine, that general would have carried the flag of Russia to Trebizond.
Such being the importance of the frontier, it is not surprising that the British Ministers watched with anxiety the progress of hostilities in that quarter; and with all the more anxiety because they were comparatively powerless to render aid. It required all the energies of Britain to maintain an army in the Crimea. She could not send troops, but she could send officers. France might have spared a force, but France had no wish to protect the Turks in Armenia, and had she done so we should have looked with jealousy on her efforts. There was the Turkish army under Omar Pasha, which, after the Austrians entered the Principalities, was, at least in the spring of 1855, comparatively useless. But here again France stepped in, and would not consent to the employment upon the Armenian frontier of the only efficient general in the Sultan's service. Therefore the struggle in Asia Minor was carried on by the Turks alone, with the aid of a few European soldiers.
The Turkish Pashas on the Russian frontier drew supplies and pay (when they could get it) for 40,000 men, but they never commanded a force so large. The difference they put in their own pockets. Corruption and peculation and frauds of all kinds characterised the conduct of the greater part of these Turkish officers quite as much—and that is a high estimate—as their incapacity and cowardice. The true policy of the Turks in Armenia would have been to wage a defensive war. In that course they would have found in the nature of the country a great ally; and if they had preserved the frontier intact, they would have done the Sultan and the common cause good service. But the Turkish leaders had that kind of impetuosity which accompanies incompetence. As soon as the war broke out they began to assail the enemy. A party from Batoum captured Fort Nicholas, just across the frontier, by surprise. This was not a bad move, for it stimulated the ardour of the soldiers. Unfortunately, the ambition of the Pashas was stimulated also. The commanders on the Kars frontier took the offensive, and began to engage the Russian outposts. The Commander-in-Chief was Abdi Pasha. He had been educated in the military schools of Austria, and had some talent and knowledge, yet this was marred by constitutional inactivity and slowness. His second in command was Ahmed Pasha, an incompetent man, who shone in the intrigues of the Turkish ante-rooms. The Russians were posted at Baindir and Akisha. Learning the amount of their force at the former place, Abdi Pasha sent against them a body of troops superior in number, who, falling upon them unawares, routed them and drove them headlong into Gumri. At the same time Ahmed Pasha had moved upon Akisha. His movements were slow, and the enemy, being prepared, inflicted upon him a severe repulse. Learning this, Abdi Pasha ordered his subordinate at once to retreat upon Kars. Ahmed Pasha would not obey nor disobey. It is a convincing proof of his stupidity that he divided his forces, sending part back to Kars, and remaining with the rest within reach of the enemy. Prince Andronikoff, who commanded the Russians, saw his opportunity, and seized it with great spirit. He quitted his entrenchments and offered battle. Nothing loth, the Turk stood to fight. He was still superior in numbers. He was able to show an equal front, and at the same time to outflank his opponent. Nevertheless the Russians utterly routed their foes. The troops hurried back to Kars in confusion. They were "a mere rabble." The Russians did not pursue, otherwise Kars might have fallen in 1853. The untoward conduct of Ahmed ruined the whole campaign. Nor were the destructive powers of the Pashas limited to action in the field. In the winter they allowed the army to rot in Kars.
It was now the spring of 1854, and the Western Powers were just sending troops to the East. Through the long winter there had been a few Europeans at Kars, and to these the army owed everything. There was the Englishman Guyon, who had carved himself a name on the records of the Hungarian War of Independence. There was George Kmety, a Hungarian leader of valiant Honved battalions in 1848-9, and, like Guyon, driven into Turkey when Russia, throwing her sword into the scale, turned it in favour of Austria. Kmety was an excellent soldier, and although an infantry officer, he took in hand and made great use of the Turkish irregular horse, with which he covered the front, and guarded Kars for months from all chance of falling by a coup de main. These two, until the arrival of Zarif, the new commander, were the principal supports of Turkish power.