The Russians were very well informed of the state of things on the Turkish side; they knew that the Allies, engaged so deeply in the Crimea, would not spare any European troops for service in Asia; and that, for reasons of his own, the French Emperor would not consent to the employment of the best Turkish troops and Omar Pasha, the best Moslem general, in Armenia. This made them bold. At the end of May General Mouravieff had assembled 35,000 men and sixty-four guns at Gumri; and in the beginning of June he crossed the Arpa-Chai, and encamped on Turkish territory. General Williams, hearing this, set out at once from Erzeroum, and on the 7th of June arrived at Kars. He did not appear a moment too soon. Vassif Pasha had proposed a retrograde movement on Erzeroum, and Mouravieff had pitched his camp on the Kars-Chai, eight miles north-east of the town. The presence of Williams inspired the garrison with fresh courage, and ended all doubts in the mind of the Pasha. The Kars army was destined to stand by Kars to the last.
The Russian general was a skilful soldier. As soon as he moved out of Gumri and took post at Zaim, about eight miles north of Kars, he halted, and sent out strong detachments to Ardahan and Tchildir among the mountains on his right flank, with the double object of collecting or destroying stores and ascertaining whether the Turks at Batoum were preparing to assist their comrades at Kars. He soon found that the Batoum army was not likely to trouble him, and such was his correct estimate of its value, that for the rest of the campaign he scarcely troubled himself about the doings of that force. Accordingly, on the 14th of June, he drew nearer to Kars, and being powerful in cavalry, he, on that day, drove the whole of the Turkish horsemen watching the valley back upon the entrenched camp.
Mouravieff had inspected the approaches and defences fronting the road to Gumri, and, satisfied that he could not break in on that side, he quitted his camp on the 18th, and, marching in order of battle, crossed that road within sight of the garrison, but far out of range, and encamped on the south side, about four miles from the town. This cautious mode of going to work showed that the general feared to risk an assault. He seemed to be feeling his way about the fortress, but in such a manner, that, although he respected the Turks behind earthworks, he clearly had no fear of them in the field. Posted now close to the road to Erzeroum, his cavalry threatened the direct communications with that place, and forced the couriers of the garrison to take a wide sweep to the north through the mountains, in order to carry the despatches to Erzeroum. From his new camp his cavalry went forth and secured or wasted several small magazines which the reckless idleness of the Turks had left exposed. For a few days heavy falls of rain suspended all movement, but as soon as the rain ceased, the Russian general once more, under cover of a great display of force, reconnoitred the south or town side. The Russian officers thought their general was about to attack. The Turks were on the alert, and every parapet and battery was manned. But at the end of an hour the Russians countermarched and returned to their camp. This was on the 26th of June. Mouravieff had made up his mind that he would lose too many men in risking an assault, and knowing that the Turks could not act in the field, he determined to starve them into submission. On the 29th he divided his army into two parts, leaving one to watch Kars, and proceeding with the other himself over the mountains towards Erzeroum. The movement of Mouravieff on to the Erzeroum road had already induced Vely Pasha to retire from Toprak-Kaleh to Kupri-Keui, so as to place himself between Mouravieff and the capital of Armenia. The Russian general's object, however, was not Erzeroum. He had learned that there was a Turkish magazine in an exposed situation at Yeni-Keui. It was of the last importance to the garrison of Kars, and its stores ought long before to have been moved into that camp. There were two months' supplies at Yeni-Keui. Upon these Mouravieff pounced with the swoop of an eagle, and what he could not carry away he destroyed. A second expedition, which caused great alarm, followed in August.
During this expedition of General Mouravieff towards Erzeroum, General Brunner, commanding the besieging army, advanced against the town defences on the 8th of August. He brought up large masses of infantry, cavalry, and guns, with the object of enticing the Turks out of their lines. Not only did he fail, but he managed to get within range of the ordnance in the south-west redoubt, called Kanli Tabia, and suffered a severe loss in killed and wounded, including a general. This was the last experiment on the plain; the enemy thenceforth turned his attention to the western heights; and, seeing this close scrutiny, Colonel Lake completed his defences on that side. At the end of August Mouravieff returned to the camp. The approaches to Kars were more closely watched than ever. Desertion began in the garrison, and was not stopped until some men, caught in the act, were shot. The garrison now began to be pinched for food. The men were on three-quarter rations in the middle of August, on half rations in the first week of September. Forage could no longer be cut outside. The stores of barley had come to an end. All the cavalry were, therefore, sent away, and many scores managed to pass the Russian pickets, but some hundreds were taken. The plan of capture by blockade was slowly securing success. The Russian grasp grew tighter; the garrison weaker. The appeals of General Williams for aid were in vain.
Not that they were unheeded; not that generals, diplomatists, ministers, emperors did not write and talk about the straits of the Kars army, and about plans for its relief. As early as June—but that was a thought too late—we read of plans for the relief of Kars. The British Government felt all the importance to British interests of a stout defence at least of Armenia. They knew that Russian success would diminish their influence in Persia, and possibly shake their power in India. Precisely for that reason the French Emperor was indisposed to aid in or consent to any timely or reasonable plan. As early as July it was proposed that an expedition should sail for Redout Kaleh, on the Mingrelian coast, and landing there, should so threaten Kutais and Tiflis that Mouravieff, alarmed, would be compelled to quit Kars in order to defend the heart of Georgia. But the British Government did not approve of this plan, preferring the direct advance of a relieving army from Trebizond upon Erzeroum. The British had raised a Turkish contingent under British officers; but Lord Clarendon would not consent to its employment, on the ground that it was not fit to cope with Russians in the field. Omar Pasha proposed to take his own troops from Balaclava, and others gathered up from Bulgaria and Batoum, and land at Redout Kaleh. To this the French Emperor would not consent, on the ground that they could not be spared from the Crimea. As the matter grew more urgent the plans for the relief of Kars increased; but the obstructions to the formation of the army were so great, Governments could agree upon so few points, that weeks—nay, months—passed, before the relieving army could be formed and sent across the Black Sea. Thus Kars and its gallant defenders were left to strive with two deadly foes—a tenacious Russian general and starvation.
THE REPULSE OF THE RUSSIANS AT KARS. (See p. [141].)
General Mouravieff had heard of the projected advance of Omar Pasha's troops from Batoum, as he was told, and of another relieving army from Erzeroum, upon Kars; and believing the reports, resolved to assault Kars on the 29th of September. This led to a conflict which claims and deserves a high place among great military actions. The Russian general had the command of more than 30,000 men. He selected for attack the heights to the westward, which General Kmety occupied with a garrison of 6,450 men, whereof 5,270 were infantry. These heights he resolved to surprise by an assault at daybreak on all points, while a diversion was made on the town side. The garrison, however, were on the alert, and gave the enemy a warm reception. The Russian left column, exposed to a heavy fire of artillery, marched steadily on. Neither the round-shot, nor, as it came nearer, the grape-shot, and then the musketry, converging upon its head, and searching its flanks, nor the rocky ground it traversed, stopped the majestic march of these noble troops. For half an hour it was tormented with shot, and yet it still moved forward. When about a hundred yards from the works, the head of the column, its patience exhausted, opened fire, but still without halting. On it came. General Kmety now brought up fifty rifles of the Sultan's Guard, and formed them parallel to the head of the column. It was now enveloped in fire; nevertheless, these stubborn Russians pressed up to within ten yards of the ditch. That was the limit of their advance. Brave men as they were, they could bear no more; they slowly turned, and slowly fell back on their guns. The Turks had exhausted their ammunition, and the men were flinging stones at the retiring foe. The artillery was deficient in grape-shot. The Turks had no horsemen. The enemy was beaten; he might have been destroyed. In the track of the column lay a thousand corpses, and from the pouches of their dead enemies the Turks, leaping over the parapets, replenished their empty pouches.
At this moment of victory Kmety learned that Yarim-ai-Tabia, on his left, had been captured; that the Tachmasb lines had been turned, and that Hussein Pasha, in spite of a dogged resistance, was shut up in the Tachmasb redoubt. To rally his men, Kmety called out that the foe was in the rear; and at this call they ran back to their ranks. Sixteen Russian guns, drawn up in the rear of the extreme left of the Tachmasb lines, now came into action and pounded the Turks; but General Williams and Mr. Churchill, from Yassif and Tek-Tabias, brought a heavy cross-fire to bear upon these guns, and drove them away. At this time Kmety had reached Yusek-Tabia, and organising a column of assault, fell on with the bayonet, and cleared the breast-works of Yarim-ai. The Tachmasb redoubt was now quite surrounded. The enemy were massed on all sides, and so close that the grape from the redoubt made horrible havoc. The Russian artillery on the exterior front were throwing shells, but more burst among their own infantry in the tents than in the redoubt.