CHAPTER X.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
Winter of '55—Napoleon's Shiftiness—Visit of the Czar to the Crimea—State of the British Army—Sufferings of the French—Destruction of Sebastopol—The Armistice—Signs of Peace—Views of Austria and Russia—And of the Emperor Napoleon—Britain acquiesces in Peace-Walewski's Circular—Austria proposes Peace—Buol's Despatch—Nesselrode's Circular—The Austrian Ultimatum—Russia gives way—The Congress fixed at Paris—The Representatives of the Powers—The Queen's Speech—Speeches of Clarendon and Palmerston—Views in the German Diet—Meeting of the Congress—The Armistice—An Imperial Speech—The Sultan's Firman—Prussia admitted to the Congress—Birth of the Prince Imperial—The Treaty signed—Its Terms—Bessarabia and the Principalities—The Three Conventions—The Treaty of Guarantee—Count Walewski's Four Subjects—The Declaration of Paris—International Arbitration mooted—The Kars Debate—Debates on the Peace—General Rejoicings—Cost of the War—Execution of the Treaty—The Principalities—The two Bolgrads—First Presentation of the Victoria Cross.
THE expedition to Kinburn, the destructive raid of the Allies into Taman and Fanagoria, the unfruitful marches and counter-marches from Eupatoria towards Simpheropol, closed the military operations of 1855. The French—who had taken military possession of the beautiful valley of Baidar, and had pushed their outposts to the summits of the ridges leading towards the Belbek—withdrew to the inner slopes, and contented themselves with watching the main roads, both towards the north and towards the east and south. The Sardinians remained in their old quarters. French divisions still occupied the mamelons covering the bridge over the Tchernaya, supported by their own and the British cavalry. The Highlanders were above Kamara, but the bulk of the British army was on the plateau in the old position. There, also, was at least one-half of the French, including the Imperial Guard, who, however, embarked early in the month of November for France. In the course of November 18,000 French troops went home, and they were relieved by fresh troops amounting to 11,162. But the British Cabinet had learnt with dismay that Napoleon had decided upon withdrawing 100,000 men from the Crimea; further, that the Parisians were demanding that France should be compensated for her losses by advantages in Northern Italy, or the left bank of the Rhine. Obviously no dependence could be placed upon an uncertain ally and a shifty monarch.
NAPOLEON III.
(From a Photograph by Messrs. W. and D. Downey.)
Although the Allies in December had upwards of 200,000 men in the Crimea—the French alone boasted of 141,476 men—undoubtedly a longing for peace had sprung up in some quarters soon after the fall of Sebastopol. This the Russians knew. Confident, therefore, that the Allies would not undertake any large operation, and knowing winter to be at hand, they held their ground. Moreover, their Emperor had visited his gallant army. Quitting St. Petersburg in September, soon after the fall of his cherished city in the south—the stepping-stone from Nicolaief to Constantinople—he proceeded to Moscow. In his addresses to his army he still imitated the language of his father; and, while he praised his gallant soldiers as they deserved to be praised, while he frankly confessed that Russia had been severely tried, he boldly claimed for his cause the support of the Deity, and declared his steadfast resolve to defend orthodox Russia, who had taken up arms for the cause of Christianity. After another visit to Odessa, the Czar, passing through Nicolaief, went forward by Perekop to Simpheropol, where he arrived on the 8th of November. To reach his army he had travelled sixteen hundred miles through his own territory, and had been nearly two months on the road. By the 12th of November he had reviewed the army in the Crimea, looked on the ruins of Sebastopol, the wrecks of his fleet, the camps of his enemies. No doubt his presence cheered the soldiers who had borne so much at his bidding. For those who had defended the lines of Todleben he provided a silver medal, to be worn at the button-hole with the ribbon of St. George. The medal bore the names of Nicholas and Alexander, and, said the Czar to his soldiers, "I am proud of you, as he was.... In his name, and in my own, I once more thank the brave defenders of Sebastopol." But in spite of his pride in his soldiers, the heart of the Czar must have been sad, for he was a kindly man, and the aggressive policy of his father—the consequences of which he could not escape—had cost Russia 500,000 men. The Czar returned to St. Petersburg by rapid journeys, arriving there on the 19th of November. The Czar had seen for himself; and when he reached his capital on the Neva he was, perhaps, in a better frame of mind for receiving those peace propositions which Austria was already seeking to frame.
The Allies had begun to make ample preparations for the winter. The weather in 1855-6 was very different from that which had beset them twelve months before. They also were differently situated: they were triumphant, and in a secure position. They had the resources of Sebastopol, in wood and stone at least, wherewith to defend themselves against the cold and the rain. They had huts and plenty of tents. The British had abounding supplies of the warmest clothes of all kinds, and most ample rations—fresh meat and bread three days a week, and pork and biscuit on the other days. The troops had plenty of time for drill, though they were still called upon to perform hard work in road-making. Thus they were employed all day, without being overworked. Their health was so good, that during this winter the average of the sick was lower than among the troops at home. Some regiments did not lose a man—some were less fortunate; but the most afflicted regiments did not lose more than two per cent., and it was rare indeed that the sick exceeded four per cent. of the whole force. No army was ever more cared for, or thrived more under good treatment. And so it really grew stronger as the weeks glided away, until, when the spring came, Sir William Codrington had under his orders a healthy, well-drilled force of 70,000 men, ready for any enterprise, and well provided with all those means and appliances which were wanting in 1854.
Not so our French Allies. Their system broke down. Their losses from typhus in the first three months of 1856 are something fearful to contemplate. An epidemic broke out in the French camp in January, and from that time to the end of March 40,000 Frenchmen died from disease. More than 5,000 died in the transports or men-of-war on their way from the Crimea to the Bosphorus. In the Crimean hospitals their men died at the rate of between 200 and 250 per day. In the hospitals on the Bosphorus the rate was hardly less. The effective force of the French army on February 1st was 143,000 men. On the 30th of March it was 120,000, of whom only 92,000 were present under arms. These figures are official, showing a loss in two months of 23,000 men, and they do not account for 28,000 men not present under arms. But the other returns, on which the statement of the vast losses mentioned are based, are also official, with this advantage, that the latter are medical, the former military returns, such as it was deemed inexpedient to make public. Throughout the war the French understated their losses from disease and defective arrangements. In 1854-5 they suffered nearly as much as the British; but there was no free press in France, and no free Parliament, to make known the sufferings and privations of the soldiers.