In July, 1856, the question of intervention or non-intervention was fully discussed in Parliament, in connection with the affairs of Italy. Read in the light of subsequent events and of later occurrences, and with a view to pending eventualities, the debate is full of interest. The subject was introduced by Lord Lyndhurst, who, in the course of an eloquent and argumentative speech, expressed the warmest sympathy with Italy, while exposing and denouncing the horrible oppression under which she groaned. He declared, that of all military tyrannies, that of Austria was the most galling and odious, as shown not only in Italy, but in her Danubian provinces. In Italy she had, in violation of the Treaty of Vienna, not only usurped the government of the Legations, but had taken possession of the Duchy of Parma, and kept the whole country in a state of siege, subjecting the population to martial law. Her excuse was, that when she could remove her garrisons without danger of insurrection she would do so. Lord Lyndhurst showed, with admirable clearness, the effect of this plea. A bad Government produced dissatisfaction, disturbance, possibly insurrection. That ended in invasion by the military force of a neighbouring Power, which necessarily increased the dissatisfaction and the tendency to revolt; so that, according to the Austrian argument, the occupation of the disaffected districts by a foreign military force could have no termination. "In adverting to the state and prospects of Italy," continued the noble and learned lord, "it was impossible to avoid speaking of the proceedings of the Neapolitan Government; nothing could exceed its infamous conduct. The same infamous system of tyranny and oppression—founded on no law, not even the law of arbitrary government—described by Mr. Gladstone some years since, was at this very moment pursued with greater secrecy, and, in the present political trials, carried on now, as then, in disregard of every principle of justice and in violation of every feeling of right." Lord Lyndhurst contended that there were cases in which it was the bounden duty of foreign Governments to interfere in the internal affairs of another State, and if there ever was such a case, it was Naples. The king of that country denied the right of Britain to interfere, and had positively refused to give any explanation or reply to the remonstrances addressed to him. Yet Britain declined to use her power. From this Lord Lyndhurst could draw but one conclusion, which was—that there was a feeling at Naples that there was some backwardness and lukewarmness on the part of France to co-operate with us in the objects we had in view. "This, then," he said, "is the state to which we are reduced. We threaten a foreign Government, declaring that its conduct is infamous and atrocious, and that we require it to be changed; they refuse to listen to our remonstrances, and we sit quietly down and take no further steps. What, then, has become of the power and prestige of England?"
Lord Clarendon, then Foreign Secretary, stated that urgent remonstrances had been addressed to the King of Naples, in the most friendly spirit, pointing out to him the danger of the existing state of things to the stability of his throne, and suggesting the establishment of a better administration of justice, a general amnesty for political offences, and a system of government that would secure the confidence of the people. But he did not believe that until the joint pressure of Britain and France could be brought to bear in all its force, the desired amelioration of the condition of the Italian people would be obtained; and he declared that that was a matter which Government had as much at heart as Parliament or the people. The Marquis of Clanricarde remarked that it was clear from the statement of Lord Clarendon that the King of Naples had taken a stand upon his own absolute independence, and had treated with contumely the attempt of her Majesty's Government to meddle with the affairs of his territory. The Marquis of Lansdowne expressed a hope that the existing system of foreign interference in Italy would be ultimately got rid of; and he trusted that, if ever British interference should become necessary, the war would be vigorously conducted, so that it might be speedily ended.
In the House of Commons also, at the same time, the Italian question was debated. Lord John Russell moved that an Address be presented to her Majesty for copies or extracts of any recent communication which had taken place between Government and the Governments of Austria, Rome, and the Two Sicilies, relating to the affairs of Italy. He called attention to the nature of the declarations made at the Paris Conference, reading the statements made by Count Walewski, Lord Clarendon, Count Buol, and Count Cavour; and then referred to the Austrian occupation. That occupation was the result of bad government. It had existed seven years, and the government was worse. What prospect was there that it would ever be better? Austria was taking fresh precautions to perpetuate the oppression. Without advocating interference with the internal affairs of foreign States, he maintained that, at whatever risk, we were bound to support the King of Sardinia. We should nourish the growing spirit of Italian independence. "I remember," said Lord John Russell, "very long ago, having had an interview in the Isle of Elba with the first Napoleon. The Emperor talked much of the States of Italy, and agreed in the observation which I had made that there was no union among them, and no likelihood of any effectual resistance by them to their oppressors; but when I asked him why Austria was so unpopular in Italy, he replied it was because she governed not with the sword [this was probably not a reflection which Napoleon I. would make], but that she had no other means of governing except by the stick. I believe, sir, that that is the secret of the whole disfavour with which Austria is viewed in Italy."
Lord Palmerston observed that at the Paris conferences the representative of Austria held out no expectation that her consent would be obtained to the cessation of foreign occupation in Italy. Her Majesty's Government felt that that cessation was an object of European interest. If disturbances broke out in Naples, the King would apply to Austria for assistance, and complications would thence arise that would endanger the peace of Europe. But with regard to Naples, as well as to Rome, he did not despair. The King of Sardinia, having associated himself with Britain and France in the war which had just closed, had a right to support and protection against an unprovoked attack. Britain and France were bound by the ties of honour to assist him to the utmost.
Mr. Disraeli could not understand why the question of Italy was introduced into conferences and protocols if all that was intended to be done was no more than diplomatic action. Nothing could be more irrational, he said, than to address violent representations to Austria, with a view of terminating the occupation of the Roman States, unless France was also prepared to quit them. Their "admonitions," without fleets or armies, to the ruling Powers would set Italy in flames. It was said that the case of Naples was exceptional, but why was it exceptional more than the case of Austria or Russia, except that those were strong Powers and Naples was a weak one? But it was not only a contest between worn-out dynasties and an intelligent class that was going on in Italy; there were the secret societies which did not care for constitutional government. "Rome is not far distant from Naples. The passage from Naples to the States of the Church is not difficult. You may have triumvirs again established in Rome; the Pope may again be forced to flee. What will be the consequences of that? The two great Catholic Powers of Europe—France, whose Emperor boasts in these protocols of being the eldest son of the Church, that ally with whose beneficent co-operation Italy is to be emancipated, and Austria—will pour their legions over the whole peninsula. You will have to withdraw the British fleet; your admonitions will be thrown into the mud, as they deserve; and your efforts to free Italy from the occupation of foreign troops will terminate by rendering the thraldom a thousand times more severe, and by aggravating the miseries of the unfortunate people, whose passions you have fired and whose feelings you have this night commenced to rouse. If they were not prepared," he said, in conclusion, "to interfere in Italy with fleets and armies, let them abstain from stirring up the passions of the people—a policy that would only aggravate the thraldom of Italy, and might lead to consequences still more fraught with disaster to Europe." Lord John Russell, in reply to Mr. Disraeli, said, "that as to secret societies, a despotic Government, supported by foreign troops, was not likely to put them down. Those things acted upon one another. There were secret societies, therefore there was foreign occupation. There was foreign occupation, therefore there were secret societies. The people resorted to secret societies because there was no other mode of stating their grievances." The motion was negatived without a division.
In consequence of the discussions which took place during the Paris conferences with regard to the state of Italy, Britain and France despatched earnest remonstrances to the King of Naples, in order to induce the Government to mitigate the system of oppression under which his subjects groaned, and to adopt a course of policy calculated to avert the dangers which might disturb the peace that had been recently restored to Europe. These friendly remonstrances were scornfully rejected by the infatuated monarch, in terms which left no alternative with the Western Powers but to withdraw their missions from his Court. The fact was announced in the Queen's Speech at the opening of the Session in 1857, and led, of course, to Conservative attacks upon the Administration for their interference with the domestic concerns of another country.
The maintenance of the Anglo-French Alliance despite the tortuous courses to which the Emperor was addicted, was due to the peculiarly close relations of the two Courts, and the friendship that existed between Lord Palmerston and the French Ambassador, Count Persigny. Persigny's Imperial master, however, was regarded by the Prime Minister with but little confidence. In particular his notable scheme for dividing the Sick Man's heritage through the occupation of Tunis by Sardinia, Morocco by France, and Egypt by Britain was rejected at once. How could Britain and France, Lord Palmerston contended, who had just guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire, proceed like the partitioners of Poland, to strip the Sultan of his outlying dominions? Besides, we did not want Egypt; all we wished was that the country should not belong to any other European Power, and that we should have a free passage across it. It was undoubtedly distrust of the Emperor which induced Lord Palmerston to oppose the construction of the Suez Canal scheme, which he did with such insistence that the Sultan's firman was not granted until after his death. His public reasons, which were much ridiculed at the time, were that the canal would never be made, that even if it was made, it would not pay, and that by rendering Egypt virtually independent of the Porte, it would impair the integrity of the Turkish Empire. His private objections, as given in a letter to Lord John Russell, were far more statesmanlike. They were that a canal open to all nations would deprive Britain of the commercial monopoly with the East which she at present possessed, and that "it required only a glance at the map of the world to see how great would be the naval and military advantage to France in a war with Britain to have such a short cut to the Indian seas, while we should be obliged to send ships round by the Cape."
CHINESE OFFICERS HAULING DOWN THE BRITISH FLAG ON THE "ARROW." (See p. [169].)
The most momentous debates in the Session of 1857 were connected with the affairs of China. They resulted in the defeat of Lord Palmerston's Administration, which was followed by the dissolution of Parliament. It was a seemingly trivial incident in a remote part of the globe that led to these important consequences. Sir John Bowring had been appointed British Consul in Canton in 1849. In 1854 he was appointed her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in China and Governor of Hong Kong. While he occupied this position he came into hostile collision with the Imperial Government. On the 8th of October, 1856, a lorcha named the Arrow, which bore the British flag, was boarded by Chinese officers, for the purpose of arresting some of their countrymen charged with piracy. The British flag was torn down, and twelve out of a crew of fourteen were carried off prisoners. Sir John Bowring in vain endeavoured to obtain redress for this outrage. The Imperial Commissioner Yeh paid no attention to his remonstrances, or only returned evasive answers. Menaces being equally unavailing, the matter was referred to the British admiral, Sir Michael Seymour. Troops were obtained from India and Ceylon, and Sir John Bowring, on his own responsibility—without any authority from the Government at home—made war upon the most ancient and extensive empire in the world. The forts along the river were one after another attacked and reduced. The public buildings in the city of Canton were shelled. A large fleet of war-junks was destroyed, and the city lay defenceless under our guns.