Cassell's History of England, Vol. 6 (of 8) / From the Death of Sir Robert Peel to the Illness of the Prince of Wales

by Anonymous

HOOSEINABAD GARDENS AND TOMB OF ZANA ALI, LUCKNOW. (From a Photograph by Frith & Co., Reigate.)

CHAPTER XV.

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).

Defect of the Delhi Fortifications—The Batteries are constructed—An effective Cannonade—The Plan of Attack—The British Advance—Nicholson's Column—The Cashmere Gate exploded—Entry into the City—Campbell's Column—Nicholson mortally wounded—Failure at the Lahore Gate—Cavalry and Artillery save the Situation—A Lodgment in Delhi—Excesses of the Troops—The British possess the City—Capture of the King—The Princes shot—Significance of their Fate—Effect of the Fall of Delhi—Greathed's Column—The Relief of Agra—Affairs at Lucknow—Weakness of the Defences—The Garrison—Character of the Attack—Effort against the Redan—Explosion of Mines—The Daily Wear-and-Tear—Inglis's Report—Sir Colin Campbell at Calcutta—Havelock superseded by Outram—Position of Havelock's Army—Eyre's Exploits—Havelock crosses the Ganges—Combat of Mungulwar—Battle at the Alumbagh—The Plan of Attack—The Charbagh Bridge is won—Under the Kaiserbagh—The Goal is reached—The Scene that Evening—Havelock's Losses—Outram determines to remain—Energy of the Indian Government—The Force at Cawnpore—Sir Colin to the Front—Kavanagh's daring Deed—The Canal is crossed—Capture of the Secunderbagh—Sortie of the Garrison—The Relief accomplished—Campbell retires on Cawnpore—Death of Havelock.

THE crisis in the siege of Delhi had now arrived. Although the Sepoys had shown some skill and some enterprise in defence of Delhi, our engineers, scanning the place, had long seen that they had committed a capital fault. We were forced to assail the north front of the city, because we were tied to the plateau and the ridge, by the fact that our line of communications lay in rear of the ridge, and because we could not establish any base of supplies in any other quarter. Now, the fortifications on this side consisted, starting from the Jumna, on our left, of the Water Bastion, the Cashmere Bastion, and the Moree Bastion. A curtain wall, loopholed for musketry, but not pierced or prepared for guns, connected each bastion with the other. The consequence was that guns were mounted only on the bastions, and not on the curtains; and the effect of this was that we were enabled to erect a line of batteries strong enough to silence the guns on the bastions and breach the curtain walls. Had the mutineers possessed an engineer of ordinary faculty, he would have seen the use to which the curtains could have been put. He would have caused a thick rampart of earth to be piled up behind the curtains. On these he would have mounted guns drawn from the magazine—there were 200 new pieces in store—and thus the whole of the north front, from the Moree to the Water Bastion, would have been one bristling line of batteries. Fortunately for us the enemy did not find this out until it was too late. It was not likely that an engineer so accomplished as Colonel Baird Smith would overlook the capital defect of the enemy. He did not; and his plan of attack, executed by Captain Taylor, took ample advantage of the opportunity afforded by the negligence of the foe.

The active operations of the siege began on the 7th of September. That night it was resolved that the right battery, No. 1, should be completed and armed. It was an immense undertaking, but was successfully accomplished.

As soon as it was light the mutineers in the Moree and along the curtain beheld with indignant astonishment the newly built battery, and opened upon it with a destructive fire, under which it had to be finished, gun after gun opening as it was got into its place. The effect of our fire was soon manifest, for by the afternoon of the 8th the Moree was a silent heap of ruins. Nevertheless, at intervals throughout the bombardment, the enemy sticking to the Moree, now and then opened fire from a gun until it was knocked over. On the same day, the 7th, a strong force had surprised and occupied Ludlow Castle, and the Koodsia Bagh, a garden to the left of it, and under the Water Bastion. It was in this quarter that the real siege batteries were to be constructed, and the work had been commenced on the right with the double object of crushing the Moree, and drawing off the attention of the enemy from the Cashmere Gate and Bastion. On this side four batteries were speedily made, all under a heavy fire, for they were within musketry range, and the broken ground between the batteries and the place afforded excellent cover. There were two batteries in front of Ludlow Castle, an array of eighteen guns; a mortar battery in line with them, but farther to the left; and a fourth battery near the customhouse, within 150 yards of the Water Bastion. Until all was ready the embrasures were masked with gabions, and when the time came to open fire, these were removed by volunteers, who for the time were exposed to the enemy's shot. These were great and successful operations, and without native labour could not have been accomplished. But the natives worked well for pay, and readily plied the spade and pick under a searching fire. The losses were heavy, but the work was very urgent.

The mortars had been in steady play from sunset on the 10th, and on the 11th the breaching battery of eighteen guns opened with such effect on the Cashmere Bastion, and the curtain between it and the Water Bastion, that the guns on the former ceased to reply, and the latter came clattering down in huge cantles. The shot shook down the wall, the shells tore open the parapets. Hour by hour the breach grew wider. The right of the Cashmere Bastion and the left of the Water Bastion were crumbling away under the ceaseless blows. But these were not given without a sharp return of fire. The mutineers covered their whole front with a trench, and lined it with infantry. They brought light guns on to the ramparts. They skilfully planted a battery to the left of the Moree in such a position that it took the right and centre batteries in flank, and could not itself be seen by any gun of ours; while across the Jumna there was a second battery, which enfiladed the left, though with less effect. In spite of all this our troops worked their guns with unfaltering steadiness. For three days this went on incessantly; the big guns firing by day, the mortars shelling the breaches and parapets all night. On the 13th there were two great breaches in the walls. If these were practicable, it was determined that the place should be assaulted forthwith, as the Sepoys were at length engaged in piling up earth behind the curtain connecting the Moree and Cashmere Bastions in order that they might line the wall with heavy guns. The engineers—no officers were called upon to do more, or answered the call better, than the officers of this corps—were ordered to examine the breaches, and reported that the attempt was quite feasible.

The general had already drawn up his plan of assault. The chief engineer advised that it should be delivered at daybreak the next morning. His advice was adopted, and accordingly the welcome order went through the camp, and roused the soldiers for an encounter they so sternly desired. In order to capture the city, the general formed five columns. Of these, the first, under Nicholson, consisted of the 75th Foot, the 1st Fusiliers, and the 2nd Punjabees. It was to break in at the Cashmere Bastion, through the breach. The second, under Brigadier Jones, consisted of the 8th Foot, the 2nd Fusiliers, and the 4th Sikhs. This column was directed to enter the Water Bastion breach. The third column, under Colonel Campbell, of the 52nd, consisted of the 52nd Foot, the Kumaon Battalion, and the 1st Punjabees. To them was entrusted the duty of rushing in at the Cashmere Gate after it had been blown open. The fourth column, under Major Reid, the constant and gallant defender of the Hindoo Rao's house, was formed of a detachment of British, his own Ghoorkas, and part of the Cashmere Contingent. They were to carry the suburb of Kishengunge, the enfilading battery under the Moree, and, if possible, the Lahore Gate. The fifth column, under Brigadier Longfield, formed the reserve. The whole force did not exceed 5,000 men.

Before daybreak the first three columns and the reserve moved down from the ridge towards Ludlow Castle and the Koodsia Bagh. Just before reaching the former, Nicholson marched to the left and Campbell to the right of Ludlow Castle, while Jones led his men into the jungles of the Koodsia Bagh. The whole then lay down under cover, while the 60th Rifles in advance took post in open order within musket-shot of the walls, their duty being to fire on the mutineers on the parapets of the curtain flanking the breaches. It was now seen that the enemy had improvised defences in the breaches during the night, and the batteries once more opened on them to clear away the obstructions, and to shake the courage of the Sepoys. The Rifles springing up with a cheer, and moving forward, was to be the signal for the batteries to cease firing, and for the columns to go in simultaneously. Presently the dark forms of the 60th rose from their cover; their cheering shouts were followed by the crack of their rifles; a burst of musketry from the walls replied with a steady vigour; the columns emerged, and each went as straight at the object before them as the ground would permit. With throbbing pulses, but firm, quick tramp, they swept along. So the columns closed with the enemy who had kept them at bay four months.