Ferdinand was quick to see the new importance he had assumed in the struggle of the nations, and eager to push his advantage to the utmost. From the very outset he was wooed most assiduously by his old friend Austria, and by Germany through Austria. On the other hand his traditional friendship with France, and the deep obligation of Bulgaria to Russia and Great Britain, caused the Allied Powers to regard the position with some complacency. The hostility of all the Balkan States to Turkey, and therefore to the Teuton Powers, was assumed, though it appears to have been recognized from the outset that Ferdinand would set a price, even upon his neutrality.
But Ferdinand was already committed to a scheme which promised him far more than he could expect from his French friends and their allies. The service demanded was no small one, for he had not only to appear in arms on behalf of the Central Powers when the appointed time came, but before then he had to destroy the trust of the other Balkan States in the justice and the cause of the Entente Powers.
To this end it was necessary to retain the confidence of France, Great Britain, and the Powers allied to them. The task was no easy one, since his duplicity was a matter of notoriety; and he had need to preserve a very specious air to cover the real cunning of his plans. How far he went in his double dealing it is not yet possible to say; but it is certain that he must have gone to extreme lengths to win the confidence and trust of the Entente diplomatists in the face of the warnings that were showered upon them.
The demands he made as the price of his friendship were for concessions at the expense of his neighbours, Serbia and Greece. Serbia was to yield 6,000 square miles of that part of Thrace which was wrested from Turkey in the Balkan war. The demand was an unconscionable one, for in the territory he wanted was a considerable section of the railway that linked Belgrade to Salonica, and formed the only outlet that Serbia possessed to the sea. That link was to be entrusted to the acknowledged enemy of Serbia, the Czar of Bulgaria.
It is not very pleasant to reflect that Serbia was forced to consent to this demand by her allies. The use made by Germans of the incident, and of the pressure that had to be applied to Serbia, was a very deft one. Rumania and Greece were told that they were mere pawns in the game, and that the Powers of the Entente would willingly sacrifice them to their own desire to retain the friendship of Bulgaria.
Greece was soon to have a practical illustration of the German argument, for Ferdinand, emboldened by his first diplomatic success, then demanded a strip of Greek territory on the Ægean, including the Greek seaport of Kavalla. Greece strenuously objected, but was told that she must give way and that it was only due to Bulgaria. “What did we tell you?” whispered the Germans in Greek ears, and were justified of their previous insinuations.
It has never been disclosed whether Ferdinand asked for instant delivery of this territory, or whether the compliance with his demands was followed on his part by the signing of a treaty with the Entente Powers. It would have been like the disregard Ferdinand had always shown for “scraps of paper” if he had committed Bulgaria to a pact which he had already broken when it was signed. For at this time, when by some means he had won the trust of the Entente Powers, he had actually entered into treaty obligations with their enemies.
Who can measure the duplicity of this man? It is certain that the trust reposed in him by both sides was very great, and that in the end he was certain to betray one or the other. That he had already chosen to betray the Entente is fairly certain, for already the expedition against the Dardanelles had been launched, and he well knew that its success would mean the total extinction of his long-cherished scheme for obtaining possession of Constantinople.
With Germany and Austria, on the other hand, he was dealing with Powers lavish of their promises. To them, and to Turkey also, a free passage through Bulgaria had now become vital. They were at a standstill in the western area of war, and their great effort against Russia was now expending itself. The only outlet offering was to the east and south, and to that outlet the assistance of Bulgaria was imperative. So Germany promised far more than the Entente Powers could give, and Ferdinand sold himself to the biggest bidder.
It was a dangerous game he played, for the success of the attempt on the Dardanelles would have made it impossible for him to carry out his arrangement with his friends the Huns. The failure of that enterprise, on the other hand, allowed him to break his obligations to the Entente Powers, after they had strained the loyalty of Serbia, Greece and Rumania, in trying to meet his demands.