The German scholar’s Memorandum contains some very interesting evidence showing: (a) that the Armenian leaders, far from engaging in an anti-Turkish conspiracy either before or during the war, were entirely loyal to the Turkish Government, in fact so loyal that this was made a cause of complaint by some of the Turkish opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress; (b) that the policy finally adopted with regard to the Armenians was originally opposed by some of the members of the ruling party, but when so adopted was a deliberate policy of extermination; (c) that the acts of resistance on the part of the Armenians, which are relied upon as an excuse for their treatment, were isolated acts due in each case to particularly grave provocation; that, in every instance except that of Zeitoun, they were later in date than the beginning of the deportations, and were in fact provoked by the fear of suffering the fate which had already overtaken neighbouring Armenian communities [see historical summary in blue book]; (d) that some of the other excuses put forward are so much at variance with the well-known facts that they could only deceive persons unable or unwilling to ascertain the truth.

As regards the loyalty of the Turkish Armenians, it is shown by extracts from leading papers, circulars sent out by the ecclesiastical dignitaries and by the “Dashnakzagan” (the only influential party organisation of the Armenians), as well as by several official announcements of the Turkish Government or of its agents, issued as late as August, 1915, that that loyalty was not only the policy declared by the Armenian leaders and carried out by the bulk of the population, but that it was also fully acknowledged by the authorities.

In a letter dated the 26th February, 1915, written by Enver Pasha to the Armenian Bishop of Konia, the former says: “I avail myself of this opportunity to tell you that the Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman Army conscientiously perform their duties in the theatre of war, as I can testify from personal observation. I beg of you to communicate to the Armenian people, whose perfect devotion to the Ottoman Government is well known, the expression of my satisfaction and gratitude.” Several other testimonies of a similar kind are quoted in the Memorandum.

In the days of Abd-ul-Hamid the “Dashnakzagan” were closely allied with the Committee of Union and Progress, and several of the members of that Committee received considerable help and protection from the Armenians. Those among them, whose sense of gratitude was not entirely destroyed by racial fanaticism, were therefore inclined to oppose the sinister schemes of their less scrupulous colleagues. These schemes, however, were the natural result of the tendencies which had gradually gained the upper hand in the Committee of Union and Progress, which Committee, as is well known, had met with considerable opposition in some powerful sections of the Turkish population, and for the sake of removing that opposition had been driven into a policy of Pan-Islamism. This policy had already been proclaimed in a report presented to the Congress of the Young Turk party held in 1911, on which occasion it was urged that “sooner or later the complete Ottomanisation of all Turkish subjects must be carried through, but that it was clear that this object could never be obtained by persuasion, and that the force of arms would have to be resorted to.” The nationalities in the said report are declared to be a “quantité négligeable”; they might keep their religion, but not their language.

The first symptoms of the fact that the advocates of the policy of “thorough” against the Armenians had overcome the resistance of their more scrupulous colleagues appeared on the 18/31 March, 1915, when the press organ of the “Dashnakzagan” was suppressed. On the 12/25 April 235 leading Armenians were arrested in Constantinople and deported. The excuse given by Talaat Bey to Vartkes, one of the Armenian members of the Ottoman Parliament, shows: (1) that the destruction of the Armenians had then been definitely decided on; (2) that no act of disloyalty on the part of the Armenians could have been adduced for the justification of this decision. These are Talaat’s words: “In the days of our weakness you put your knife to our throat by raising the question of reform. For that reason we will now avail ourselves of our present favourable situation, for the purpose of scattering your people to such an extent that for the next fifty years all thought of reforms will be driven out of your heads.” Vartkes thereupon said: “Then it is the intention to continue the work of Abd-ul-Hamid?” Talaat laconically replied, “Yes.” As pointed out by the author of the Memorandum, the movement for reform referred to by Talaat had for its only object the protection of the life and property of the Armenians against the attacks of Kurdish brigands; the reforms had been stipulated for by Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and had been constantly supported by the Great Powers, including Germany, which last named power had been specially active in that behalf during the year 1913.

The Constantinople arrests were soon followed by the deportations in the provinces and many acts of violence. The two members of Parliament, Zohrab and Vartkes, were arrested shortly after the interview of the latter with Talaat; they were deported and murdered. Thenceforth the policy of extermination manifested itself in all its nakedness. One of the principal officials in the Turkish Ministry of Justice said to an Armenian: “There is not sufficient room in this Empire for you and ourselves; it would be unpardonable recklessness on our part if we did not use this opportunity to clear you out of the way.” Some members of the Young Turk Committee even showed their hand more openly by declaring that “all foreigners must disappear from Turkey, first the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Jews, and finally the Europeans.” One of the Ministers of State boasted that he would have attained in three weeks what Abd-ul-Hamid failed to accomplish in thirty years.

The excuses brought forward in a number of successive official statements made by the Turkish Government for the purpose of stifling the consciences of their wilfully credulous German Allies are summed up in the Memorandum. The substance of this summary appears from the following statement, in which the contrast between the accusation and the real facts is pointed out under each head:—

1. One Garo Pasdermadjian, a Russian Armenian, is vaguely alleged to have joined certain volunteer corps in the district of Erzeroum. (All the positive acts ascribed to him are connected with the doings of the Russian Armenians.)

2. Two Armenians are alleged to have—on the instigation of the British authorities—caused a train in Cilicia to go off the rails. (In the Turkish official statement dated 4th June, 1915, in which this accusation is made, a preliminary observation appears, to the effect that the Armenians “of Cilicia had done no act which could have disturbed the public peace and order, or could have necessitated any repressive measures”).

3. The Commanders of English and French warships are accused of having placed themselves in communication with Armenians of Adana, Alexandretta, and other places on the coast, for the purpose of inciting them to rebellion. (No evidence is produced as to this accusation, and it is not even alleged that the attempt complained of had any success.)