August the 8th was to be the first real occasion of its use by us and the first ambitious attack by the British Army for 1918. There were few in the 3rd Division who did not realise this, scanty as was the information possessed by any but very senior officers as to the concentration of troops, tanks, and guns, and more particularly as to the elaborate precautions taken to disguise such preparations as the move of the Canadian troops to the Somme area.

The task of the 3rd Division was to initiate the attack on a front of some two miles immediately South of the Somme, and to penetrate about 2½ miles. Through it would then pass the 4th Australian Division covered by mobile artillery. A similar programme was to be carried out by the 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions on the Villers-Brettonneux sector to the South; south of them were the Canadians, and then the French. The 1st Australian Division arrived from the north on the eve of the battle, and was Corps Reserve in the early stages. The British Division holding

the line north of the Somme was to swing forward its flank along the river. No preliminary bombardment of the enemy positions was to take place, and the commencement of operations was to be in effect a surprise attack delivered under a heavy barrage.

This was the first occasion in which the five Australian Divisions were engaged together in an offensive action.

The preparations as far as Engineers were concerned were not elaborate. Various dugouts required for headquarters and medical posts had to be hurried to completion, but no trench work was required, as the approach routes to the assembly position for the attacking troops were overland. Four tracks were cleared and carefully marked by the 11th Field Company, two starting near Fouilloy, and two near Hamelet, and, as already mentioned, the bridge demolition arrangements were partly dismantled. Owing to the depth of the proposed attack it was not considered advisable to form Engineer dumps in the existing trench system; instead, a system of dumps on wheels was devised. The Pontoon wagons of the three Field Companies were collected and loaded with a variety of stores, including a number of simple shelters for erection under suitable chalk banks, and delivery points were selected in the territory to be captured. The 11th Field Coy. made 50 bank shelters and 500 signboards.

Much depended on the early repair of all roads leading forward into the enemy territory. This work was undertaken by Corps, who withdrew two Field Companies and the Pioneer Battalion from the 3rd Division for this purpose, leaving the 11th the only Company under Divisional command. Two companies of the 2nd Australian Pioneers were lent to the Division for the operation, and under these circumstances the Field Company was necessarily widely distributed. No. 1 section was allotted to the 9th Brigade, which was to attack on the right, and No. 2 to the 11th Brigade on the left; No. 3 was in reserve (as was the 10th Brigade, which held the whole divisional front before the battle), and No. 4 had the special task of looking for sources of water supply.

Very heavy rain fell two or three days before the attack, and threatened to interfere with the work of the tanks, but the 7th was fine and warm, and the chalky soil dried very quickly. The rain was really very helpful, as it served to hide the gathering forces from enemy aviators. By the 7th all was ready; long rows of tanks sheltered under hedges, guns of all calibres lurked in every suitable position, and men and horses rested quietly within the shade of groves of trees.

The evening before Z day saw Company Headquarters and 1, 2, and 4 sections established at a dugout and bivouac near Hamelet, but during the night the various parties moved forward to a trench near Hamel. Just at “Zero hour” (4.20 a.m.) a thick mist arose, and it was through this natural screen that the attack

pushed forward, and that the various parties of Sappers groped their way to their various tasks soon after.

The results of the day’s fighting are too well known to need mention, but the cheapness of the victory may be gauged by the losses of the Company—which were—none at all. The dumps on wheels moved forward under Lieut. Matters to their appointed destinations early in the morning; Nos. 1 and 2 sections built shelters for various headquarters in the new captured divisional area, and No. 4 located several old wells and started putting them in order, and also constructed, out of salvaged materials, a most useful horse-watering point at Gailly Lock on the Somme. A number of Germans surrendered to the sappers, but as they were considered to be “second hand,” they were carefully searched for pistols and such-like souvenirs and turned adrift to find their own way to the rear. One subaltern of the Company was approached in mist by a Boche who was tugging violently at something in his pocket. Thinking it was a pistol, the officer drew his revolver, but the German’s hand came forth with nothing more menacing than a tin of bully beef, which he handed out as a peace offering. It was a great day for souvenirs, and the sappers collected quite an arsenal of German automatic pistols, daggers, and such-like coveted articles.