But for six months the agitation continued. It was put forward as a theory that the only chance for the Transvaal was to employ Chinese labour. The supporters of the Rand lords hailed the theory with delight, as if it was something new, something that they had never imagined before. Clearly this was the direction in which prosperity lay. They must have Chinese labour. Then shares would go up, dividends would become enormous, and everybody would be wealthy and happy. The Transvaal would be something like a Mohammedan heaven, with Great Britain as an annexe. White men were to pour out to the colonies—not to labour on the mines, for that work was only fit for Chinamen; besides, white men it was said could not do it—and the Rand was to be prosperous and life was to be a veritable bed of roses. Was England to be denied the fruits of her victory? For what had the war been waged if the Transvaal was to be left a barren, unproductive corner of the Empire? Were the fruits of victory to be Dead Sea apples?
By such arguments did they appeal to the British public. The dummy figure of despair and ruin that they had set up served a very useful purpose. It frightened the monied classes into the belief that their investments were not secure. It frightened the patriots into thinking that the war had been waged in vain. Few people troubled to make inquiries as to whether the statement of the Rand's impending ruin was true or not. There certainly was a slump in Kaffir shares. This was held to be indicative of the state of the gold industry. It apparently did not occur to anybody that just as Kaffir shares were made to fluctuate during the war—when the mines were not being worked—so they could be made to slump if only the Rand lords wished.
In six months they convinced the majority of the House of Commons, they convinced the Government, and they even made Lord Milner eat his own words. His dispatches began to take on a garb of gloom. In August they were of the mitigated grief shade; in September the shade darkened; in October it was more than half mourning; in November it had become black; in December it was as black as the Egyptian plague. His lordship talked of crises; of what would happen unless some noble, national sacrifice was made to save the sinking ship. Chinese labour was the only cure for the deplorable condition of the gold industry in the Transvaal!
Meanwhile, a Labour Commission had been appointed, a mission consisting of ten persons, eight of whom were known to be in favour of the introduction of Asiatic labour. This Commission was authorized to find out whether a scarcity of Kaffir or white labour existed, but was forbidden to answer the question which was in the minds of all, whether it would be proper or desirable to introduce Chinese labour.
The agitation proved successful, and it was decided to import Chinese labour. The grave disasters attendant on the impending crisis Lord Milner insisted in his dispatches in December 1903 had to be met.
It is curious, of course, to compare the statement of Lord Milner in December 1903 with his statement in June 1903. In June the output of gold was 237,000 ozs., and according to Lord Milner everything was satisfactory. The production of gold, in his own words, was greater than in 1895 or 1896. Six months later, in December, the output was 286,000 ozs., an increase of 49,000 ozs. Yet, according to Lord Milner, the prosperity of the gold industry was in inverse proportion to the output of gold! Two hundred and thirty-seven thousand ounces per month was prosperity in June; 286,000 ozs. in December was grave disaster, and the rest of it. Moreover, in those golden days of June 1903 there were 59,400 Kaffir labourers working on the mines. In that dark, cheerless December, when the output of gold had increased 49,000 ozs., and the gold industry was rapidly sinking back into the pit of gloom and disaster, the number of labourers employed was 68,800, being an increase of 9400—or 15 per cent. Moreover, in this terrible, deplorable month the production of gold was greater than it had ever been before, except during that period between the beginning of 1898 and the commencement of the war. As to the question of labour, the production per labourer per month in December 1903 was 4 ozs. of gold. In 1899 it was only 3·4 ozs.; that is to say, it had been increased by the use of machinery by one-seventh, so that six labourers in December 1903 were equal to seven labourers in the golden period before the war. Actually, therefore, those 68,800 labourers were doing the work of 80,262 labourers, and were doing it at wages 33 per cent. less than they were before the war. But this was not prosperity. The dividends were not large enough.
The report of the consulting engineer of the Consolidated Goldfields still rang in the ear of the Rand lords. "Cut down the wages 33 per cent. and you will add two and a half millions to the dividends."
An unlimited number of Kaffirs would not come to the mines under these conditions; they would not submit to bad wages as well as bad treatment. White men would combine to manage the country and to take the political power out of the hands of the Rand lords. "If we could replace 20,000 workers by 100,000 unskilled whites," said one of the directors, "they would simply hold the government of the country in the hollow of their hand; and without any disparagement to the British labourer, I prefer to see the more intellectual section of the community at the helm."
Hence the gloomy picture painted of the gold industry in that December 1903. Hence the slump in the Kaffir market. Hence that cry that native labour would not come and that whites could not do the work. Hence that more ominous cry that Chinese labourers must be employed. The Transvaal was not to be for Englishmen. It was to be governed by the intellectual genius of Mr. Rudd and his bevy of German Jews and non-British Gentiles. Even if white labour was economically possible the Rand lords did not want it. It was possible—it was economical. But they wanted labour that would be voteless and subservient!