Of these two portions, the Troops to hold the position consist of infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points. This line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened points by relieving the pressure on the front line. Their work completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve, and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control, or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the attacking force. At Talavera (July 27, 1809) a portion of the British force followed up the repulsed French columns too far, and being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy and retired in disorder to the position. At the battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862) two brigades emerged from the Confederate position and drove Meade's division of the Army of the Potomac out of their lines. But they rushed on with reckless impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. Local counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders, exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.
The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack and is held for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force, in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success. But the assumption of the grand offensive should not be confined to the General Reserve alone. Commanders of sections of the defence who are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it. Every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "To initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure, with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("Field Service Regulations," vol. ii. (1920)).
That the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the battle of Spottsylvania (May 12, 1864). General Hancock's Corps (from Grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of Lee's entrenchments in the Wilderness of Virginia; 20,000 men had assaulted and captured the Salient, taking 4,000 prisoners; they then pressed forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into the Confederate position. "But Lee, recognising the weakness of the Salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed about half a mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were suddenly brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could neither make their orders {94} heard nor form their men for another rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tremendous counter-attack. Every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these 20,000 men were driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the Confederates recaptured their first position" (Henderson).
He will select positions for the Artillery, in consultation with the commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the Decisive Counter-Attack. The increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture.
He will divide the position into sectors, each garrisoned by a distinct unit, under a definite commander. The mutually supporting tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.) will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the units in times of need. The units from which such groups are formed will usually be complete sections.
He will decide the position of the General Reserve. This will be the locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the General Reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main {95} attack while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. As surprise is essential to success, the position of the General Reserve should be concealed as long as possible. The position of the General Reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. At the Second Battle of the Somme (March 21, 1918) the intentions of the German commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "As by this time (i.e. the evening of March 21) it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the British front were put into immediate execution. By drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
He must decide the position, and to some extent the action, of the Cavalry. Before defensive action in a War of Manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. During the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted fire action. After the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit. In case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. A position near a flank will usually be occupied.
There have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted. After the Combat of Roliça (August 17, 1808) General Delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. At Chancellorsville (May 3, 1863), and on the first day of Gettysburg (July 1, 1863), a handful of United States {96} cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster. At Königgratz (Sadowa), (July 3, 1866), the charges of the Austrian cavalry drove back the Prussian Horse and enabled Benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. At Rezonville (August 16, 1870) von Bredow's Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge the French batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed Prussian infantry. The charge was successful and the time was gained, but as at Balaclava (October 26, 1854) there were few survivors from "Von Bredow's Todtenritt" (death ride). After the battle of Le Cateau (August 26, 1918) and during the Retreat from Mons, the British cavalry, under General Allenby, effectively held off the enemy and enabled the British troops to move unmolested. During the great German offensive in the spring of 1918 the withdrawal of the troops at Cugny (March 24, 1918) was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the 16th Cavalry Brigade, which broke through the German line, taking over 100 prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. During the retreat in that area units of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry. "Without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the French reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . . The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).
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He must select a rallying place in rear of the main position from which to recapture the front line, as General Lee recovered the "Salient" in the Wilderness of Virginia.