Night Assaults.—Night Assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation. It is an established tactical principle that "when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault." These conditions are frequently so unfavourable in Position Warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of daylight. During the Battle of the Somme (July 1-17, 1916) a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about 4 miles. The troops moved out in the early hours of July 14, for a distance of about 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of July 13-14. The whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m., when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage. They swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond.
On the night of February 10-11, 1917, the 32nd Division attacked and captured 1,500 yards of trench {149} line at the foot of the Serre Hill. The division formed up after dark and the attack began at 8.30 p.m., the objective was captured, and at 5 a.m. a determined counter-attack was repulsed. The capture of the Vimy Ridge by Canadian troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on April 9, 1917: and the British victory of Messines (June 7, 1917) to an assault launched at 3.10 a.m. In the latter case the Wytschaete-Messines position, "one of the Germans' most important strongholds on the Western Front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt over a mile in depth, and the Germans had omitted no precautions to make the position impregnable" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). Nineteen deep mines under this position were fired at 3.10 a.m., and this was the signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried out under intense artillery protecting fire. By nightfall of June 7 the whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over 7,000 prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the II. Army, under General Sir H. C. O. Plumer. During the German offensive in 1918 a counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the village of Villers Brétonneux. The attack was launched at 10 p.m. on the night of April 24-25. By daybreak the village was surrounded, and by the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of 1,000 prisoners. Among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the Allies in July, 1918, was a highly successful night attack by the 2nd Australian Division, on a front of about 2 miles, south of Morlancourt (June 10, 1918). At 4.35 a.m. on May 12, 1864, one of General Ulysses Grant's Corps, under General Hancock, assaulted "the Salient," part of General Robert Lee's entrenchments in The Wilderness of Virginia (Spottsylvania). 20,000 men were assembled and a night advance was made, {150} directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night, with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. The assault was ordered for 4 a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until 4.35 a.m. When the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. The assault resulted in the capture of 4,000 prisoners and inflicted losses with the bayonet of over 2,000, with a total loss to the assailants of about 2,000. This manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole corps to a Position of Assembly within 1,200 yards of the hostile outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of 20,000 troops. The captured salient was afterwards retaken by the Confederates by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see Battle of Spottsylvania).
Owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the attacking movement, Night Assaults do not now carry the same comparative advantages over Daylight Attacks as was the case before the introduction of Smoke. Hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special tactical localities. But by employing Smoke only two elements of Surprise can be achieved. The direction and weight of the blow are concealed, but the appearance of Smoke will warn the enemy to expect an attack, and the time of the blow is thus revealed. Smoke will probably be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and Outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a similar nature, in order to gain advantages {151} for further operations in daylight. When more important assaults are made, a larger force than a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a wide front. A Night Assault was delivered by two Federal brigades on the Confederate bridgehead at Rappahannock Station (November 7, 1863). One of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the Confederate position and cut off the retreat. Upwards of 1,500 of the defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the bridgehead. In the Second Afghan War, General Sir F. Roberts marched up to the high passes leading out of the Kurram into the interior of Afghanistan, with a column of 3,200 all ranks and 13 guns. He was opposed by the Amir's force of about 18,000 men with 11 guns at Peiwar Kotal (December 2, 1878). Sir F. Roberts detached the greater part of his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the Afghan position and attacked at daylight. The Night March and subsequent attack were completely successful. The enemy was defeated with great loss and all his guns captured, the British losses being 20 killed and 78 wounded. Tel-el-Kebir was an example of a Night March in battle formation of a force of 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 60 guns, to attack an entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a prolonged fire action. It resulted in a victory which decided the Egyptian campaign, and added the Nile Valley to the British Empire. Sir Garnet Wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the troops reaching a position, varying from 300 to 900 yards distance from the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the march. The Egyptian Army, under Arabi Pasha, fought steadily, and again and again renewed the fight, after falling back {152} within their entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position captured. The British loss was only 459 all ranks, and the Egyptians lost upwards of 2,500 killed and wounded, the remaining 23,000 being dispersed or captured. A daylight advance and assault of so strong a position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a cost to the attacking troops. In the South African War there were two examples of the unsuccessful Night Attack. Major-General Gatacre essayed a Night March followed by a Night Attack upon the Boers' position at Stormberg (December 10, 1899), but he was misled by his guides in unknown ground and was himself surprised by the Boers and forced to retire with a loss of over 700 officers and other ranks. On the following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road. In a Night Attack on Magersfontein Hill (December 11, 1899) the Highland Brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its Brigadier (A. G. Wauchope) and 750 officers and other ranks. In the later stages of the South African War, however, Night Marches followed by Raids were employed with marked success, particularly in the Eastern Transvaal in November and December, 1901.
Except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be necessary to choose Positions of Assembly and of Deployment, and to precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead and on the flanks, within 100 yards of the following troops. On arrival at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for the various units. A scout from each Forward Platoon can thus mark the inner flank on which his Platoon will rest, and the direction of the whole line will be assured.
The troops will usually advance, during the earlier {153} stages, in shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached. Owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no greater rate than 1 mile an hour can be counted on. When several objectives are in view a corresponding series of Positions of Assembly and Deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various advancing forces do not converge.
Owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should wear easily distinguishable badges. If hostile patrols are encountered it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be similarly treated.
The risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be provided against, and Engineers or Pioneer Infantry should be present for removing such obstacles. If fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost certainly end in disaster.
In order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action is required, until the Position of Assembly is reached; but before the troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation to be adopted at the Position of Deployment. In addition to this information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles involved, {154} there are certain axioms which must become "rules of thumb" with all ranks:—
Fire must not be opened without orders.
Magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber.