SAVAGE WARFARE.—In Savage Warfare the inherent difficulties of fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical courage of the savages. Discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and judgment in the application of the Principles of War, are required to overcome these added difficulties. A vigorous offensive, Strategical as well as Tactical, is always the best method of conducting operations in Savage Warfare, and for the purpose of Protection vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other form of warfare. At Isandhlwana (January 22, 1879) the British camp at the foot of Isandhlwana Hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a Zulu Army, 10,000 strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and yet in the evening of the same day 120 all ranks (40 sick being included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of 4,000 Zulus at Rorke's Drift. In the operations after the fall of Khartoum a desert column under Major-General Sir J. McNeill was surprised in dense bush while constructing a zeriba at Tofrik (March 22, 1885), but after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the Mahdist Arabs were driven off with more than 1,000 killed. In the operations in Upper Egypt against the invading Mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led to the Battle of Toski (August 3, 1889) and resulted in the defeat and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the Anglo-Egyptian force under General Sir F. W. Grenfell. At the beginning of the Christian Era three well-disciplined Roman legions were decoyed into the fastnesses of the Teutoberger Wald (A.D. 9) and there attacked and annihilated by the Cherusci, a Saxon tribe, under their king Arminius, and this defeat of Quintilius Varus is included by Sir Edward Creasey among the {157} "Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." Fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes is frequently the task of British troops in East and West Africa, while the Indian Frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. In "Field Service Regulations" (Part II.), 1921, the peculiarities of various savage races by whom the Outposts of the British Empire are liable to be assailed are carefully noted.
IN CIVILIZED WARFARE.—The military history of Europe and America abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. In all ages woods and villages play an important part in war. They form natural magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. The fact of their being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as objectives in the Attack or as boundaries in the Defence, and in all operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. Their situation is also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. In Position Warfare the wood and the village are of the highest importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually supporting tactical points. The names of woods, large and small, and of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in reports on the fighting on the Western Front in the Great War as the scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there are 67 references to copses, woods, and forests in Marshal Haig's Dispatches. It {158} appears, however, to be generally admitted that close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour Delaying Action rather than a protracted Defence, and in Position Warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the Attack on account of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of movement.
There are many instances of successful Delaying Action in woods and villages. Some of the characteristics of such fighting were exemplified in the Franco-Prussian War. At the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18, 1870) the Bois de Vaux, on the left of the French position, induced Marshal Bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning movement on the other flank. During an attack through the Bois de Vaux a Prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. At the earlier Battle of Spicheren (August 6, 1870), however, two battalions maintained their order and cohesion in Pfaffen Wood, and by moving through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. A tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified at the same battle. Other Prussian troops had captured Gifert Wood and the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood. At the Battle of Worth (August 6, 1870) two French battalions held up the attack of 18,000 Prussians for over an hour in the Niederwald, although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching from a captured wood was then experienced by the Prussians, as the farther edge was kept under heavy fire by French troops in the neighbouring Elsasshausen Copse. A decisive counter-attack cannot usually be organised in such warfare, although Lee managed to employ 17,000 troops for that purpose with complete success at the Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-6, 1864). Local {159} counter-attacks, however, are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the Niederwald, at the Battle of Worth, several spirited counter-attacks were made by the 96th French Regiment.
Villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure in all battles as local centres of resistance. One of the most spirited defences of a village took place at the Battle of Sedan (September 1, 1870) when a heroic struggle was maintained by French marine infantry in the village of Bazeilles, and after the white flag had been hoisted over the Fortress of Sedan the fight was stubbornly maintained at the village of Balan, the second line of defence of the Bazeilles position. Visitors to the battlefield of Sedan are shown a little inn with the title, A La Dernière Cartouche, in commemoration of the struggle. A highly successful Night Attack was made by the French on the village of Noisseville (August 31, 1870), the normal difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise and the darkness.
THE ATTACK ON WOODS.—The opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved. Flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range. Supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. Machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support, the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on {160} stockaded defenders. Small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards, while machine guns and Lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. During the German counter-attacks at Cambrai (November 30-December 4, 1917) Tanks were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of Gauche Wood, acting in co-operation with dismounted Indian cavalry of the 5th Cavalry Division and with the Guards' Division; but although they reached the outskirts of Villers Guislain they were forced to withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns. At the Battle of Messines (June 7, 1917) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in Fanny's Farm. Generally speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach. During the fighting for the interior of the wood "reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on account of the liability to counter-attack. Touch must also be kept, to avoid loss of direction. In the advance from the captured position great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position. It may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge. If the fire position is to be carried by direct assault, or if {161} it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood (care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood.
DEFENCE OF A WOOD.—The outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and Lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and strengthened emplacements. The perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. Lines of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. The second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and Lewis guns, and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack. If the wood is too far from the Outpost Zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation. In most cases, an attacking force will be harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by fighting patrols, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns.
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THE ATTACK ON VILLAGES.—There are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood. In the fight for the outer edge, the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover of fire from machine guns and Lewis guns.
The second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. All captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads, close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure. Light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and machine guns and Lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street. The Tank is at its best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as a principal.
In the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. In issuing from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required.