Heavy Artillery
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300 —
" " (9.2 in) 13,000
Super-Heavy Artillery
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 —
" " (12 in.) 28,200 —
" " (14 in.) 35,600 —
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000
Weapon Maximum Range (Yds.)
Light Artillery H.E. Shell Shrapnel
Pack Guns (2.75 in.) 5,800 5,500
Pack Howitzers (3.7 in.) 5,900
Horse Artillery Guns (13 pr.) 8,500 6,400
Field Guns (18 pr.) 9,500 6,500
Field Howitzers (4.5 in.) 7,000
Medium Artillery
Medium Guns (60 pr.) 15,500 15,300
Medium Howitzers (6 in.) 10,000
Heavy Artillery
Heavy Guns (6 in.) 19/20,000 19/20,000
Heavy Howitzers (8 in.) 12,300
" " (9.2 in) 13,000
Super-Heavy Artillery
Super-Heavy Guns (9.2 in.) 24,500 24,500
" " (12 in.) 28,200 26,100
" " (14 in.) 35,600 —
Super-Heavy Howitzers (12 in.) 14,300
" " (18 in) 23,000
The maximum range of Medium Mortars is 1,500 yards;
of Light Mortars 700 yards.
{174}
CAREY'S FORCE.—During the Second Battle of the Somme "a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies, army troops companies, field survey companies, and Canadian and American Engineers, had been got together and organised by Major-Gen. P. G. Grant, the Chief Engineer to the V. Army. On March 26 these were posted by General Grant, in accordance with orders given by the V. Army commander, on the line of the old Amiens defences between Mezières, Marcelcave, and Hamel. Subsequently, as General Grant could ill be spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his force to Major-Gen. G. G. S. Carey. Except for General Carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle. . . . On March 28 our line from Marcelcave to the Somme was manned by Carey's Force, with the 1st Cavalry Division in close support. . . . On March 29 the greater part of the British front south of the Somme was held by Carey's Force, assisted by the 1st Cavalry Division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw. In rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the V. Army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches).