Count Tisza.
Count Tisza might have done much to save his country from ruin; instead, he preferred to see the subject-races oppressed. He considered that a war that would enable the Government to thin out the Slavs, by letting them fight one against the other, the soldiers from within the Empire against those without, would secure the supremacy of the Magyars. He failed to comprehend that the Magyars were to be thinned out in their turn to make way for Germans who wished to exploit the rich treasures of Hungary and exhaust her mineral wealth.
Count Tisza was a gambler accustomed to play with gentlemen; when he played at statesmanship with the German Emperor he did not count upon his adversary using loaded dice.
The very uprightness of his character prevented his suspecting others. The man in the street suspected Kaiser Wilhelm; the Premier did not.
The Hungarian aristocrat had never been “up against life”; he had no instinct to guide him. He fondly believed that he was twisting the Kaiser round his finger and using him for his own ends. These ends were the glorification of Hungary, for Tisza is a patriot to his finger-tips. Unfortunately, he was deeply imbued with the sentiment that a king cannot commit meannesses. He placed the Kaiser on the same level as a Hungarian noble.
CHAPTER XX
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AS A MILITARY AND NAVAL POWER
In 1907 Austria-Hungary, where conscription is in force, had an army of about three million men when fully mobilised. These men were of excellent physique, since they were selected as the most promising material among a number of men fit for service. Every year when the annual contingent of recruits came up for service, a larger number were passed as “fit” than could be put into training. About a third of the “fit” were sent home; they were selected by lot, and although they were not called upon to serve immediately, they were under the obligation to do so when required. Thus there was a large second line of untrained men fit for service and ready to be called up when necessary. The high standard of efficiency resulted in only the very best material being selected; there were many among the rejected who could be called to the colours in time of necessity.
Besides this, the military authorities pursued a definite policy. They were willing to grant exemption to the city man who could be usefully employed in clerical work in war time, and devoted their energies to training the peasant for actual fighting.
All this resulted in the official figures of the available men giving no real estimate of the numbers that were actually available.
Much money and attention were devoted to the minor branches of the service. Armament factories were increased and flying fields established in connection with all the army corps headquarters. The preparations for a possible war, while being carried on with great energy and at great expense, were somewhat delayed by an incurable habit, peculiar to the Austrians, of giving great attention to branches of the service that were anything but essential. Experiments were made in ski-running on the Alps in winter. Small companies of men were frequently lost in the Tyrol while trying to cross difficult ground. It was felt in the country generally that the attempts to get over the glaciers and snowfields might just as well have been made in summer, when there was not the same danger from avalanches, and even if war with Italy were inevitable, ski-running practised within view of the Italian frontier was not likely to calm Italian susceptibilities. Aviation, which had long been recognised as the war weapon of the future, was quite neglected. The Government refused to purchase the necessary airships. The Austrians, with all their mechanical genius, were not able to make the motors for aeroplanes. Austrian inventors had to obtain motors from France before their airships could fly. The conservatism of thought and methods which made the Austro-Hungarian Government neglect the air service, led them to misread the signs of the times, and to allow the fleet to sink to a mere nothing. Although they were building up the fortifications along the Austro-Hungarian frontier, a queer optimism made them count upon Italy’s help in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile they worked up their land fortifications. The Austro-Hungarian naval ports are models of what Nature can do in the way of natural defences. Cattaro is practically impregnable from the sea side. The gulf winds in and out, and the approach to the city can be defended at every turn. The military and naval authorities felt quite secure of Cattaro, and it was only in the Annexation year, when there was trouble with Montenegro, that it was discovered that the cannon on the summit of Mount Lovcen could be fired right into Cattaro. The boundary line between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro runs close to the summit of the mountain. The Austrians considered that it would be very easy to capture the top of the precipitous mountain should war break out between the small country and themselves, but it was a very serious offset to the value of Cattaro. There was a large choice of suitable naval ports along the coast besides Cattaro. The only consideration that made a selection difficult was the question of railway communications with the interior.