Although the Expenditure provided for showed a total increase of 3,287,000l. the increase in the Imperial Expenditure was only 690,000l. The increase under military charges, due mainly to continued rise in the price of food and fodder and to the provision for the extra pay of officers in British regiments granted by the Home Government, accounted for 487,000l. of this total. The estimated Imperial surplus of 1,280,000l. was not more than should be held in reserve as a margin of safety to meet unforeseen calls, but it was proposed to make grants from it to Local Governments amounting to 240,000l. in all, of which 100,000l. would be for the improvement of communications in Burma, and 100,000l. for Education and Sanitation.
Ways and Means.—The capital requirements for 1914-15 were estimated at 12,000,000l. for railways, 1,200,000l. for irrigation, 700,000l. for Delhi, 700,000l. for repayment of India Bonds, 3,200,000l. for outlay from Provincial balances, and 100,000l. for Local Loans, Imperial and Provincial—giving a total of practically 18,000,000l.
The assets by which these requirements would be met were 4,600,000l. to be taken from balances, 1,300,000l. forming the Imperial surplus, 3,300,000l. representing the Rupee loan of 5 crores, 6,200,000l. sterling borrowings, 1,800,000l. of unfunded debt, 700,000l. from famine insurance allotment and minor items. Total 17,900,000l.
The Rupee loan of 5 crores was the largest hitherto raised in India, but it was warranted by the success which had attended the last loan, and by the fact that the price of rupee paper in England stood higher than that of the sterling loan.
Sir William Meyer gave a full account of the proceedings of the Imperial Delhi Committee constituted on April 1, 1913, and the progress that had been made in the work on the new capital. The question of expense was dealt with in great detail by the Viceroy in his speech closing the session on March 24. His Excellency admitted frankly that the estimate of 4,000,000l., mentioned in the Government of India's despatch of August 25, 1911, to the Secretary of State, was based on insufficient data. A most careful and complete estimate had now been framed by the Delhi Committee and was under the consideration of the Government of India. Subject to modifications that might be made, the total cost amounted to 5,113,620l., to this another million should be added to provide for contingencies and unforeseen expenditure. The strictest economy and supervision would be exercised over all branches of the work, and some returns might be expected. The Government of India was of opinion that, even if the estimate were accepted in full, the total cost of the new capital would not exceed 6,000,000l. This would be spread over a period of twelve years from the commencement of the work in 1912.
In presenting the Budget in its final form on March 21, the Financial Member stated that the changes in the figures of the Statement originally laid before the Council were small and unimportant. The net result in the Revised Estimate of 1913-14 was to raise the Imperial surplus by 159,000l. and to reduce the Provincial deficit by 139,000l.
As regards the Budget for 1914-15, it was now expected that the Imperial surplus would be less than the original Estimate by 24,000l., and that there would be a small reduction in the Provincial deficit.
Under Ways and Means there was no material change in the original figures. It was calculated that on March 31, 1915, the cash balances would stand at twelve and one-third million pounds sterling in the Indian and at about five millions in the Home Treasury.
(2) FAMINE.
In reviewing the state of the area affected by famine at the close of 1913 it was observed that, although there was a considerable amount of distress, the stage of actual famine had hardly been reached, but, if the winter rains failed, the prospect would be very serious. They did fail to a very great extent, and the little rain that fell only slightly mitigated the existing distress. In his speech in the Legislative Council on March 24 the Viceroy observed that the state of things, though serious, was not nearly so bad as in the famine of 1907-8. There were also other circumstances which tended considerably to improve the situation. The people had enjoyed a series of good harvests in previous years and in the present year there was a prospect of an excellent spring harvest in the Punjab. Past experience had enabled the Government to deal with famines far more efficiently, suspensions and remissions of land revenue had been promptly and generously granted, advances to agriculturists had been made on a large scale, arrangements had been carried out for securing a supply of fodder, and the railway rates for its carriage had been reduced. There had also been a great improvement in the spirit of the people themselves; they were more hopeful and self-reliant, and more ready to move to other districts in search of work. There was still a large class of the population which had to be supported by gratuitous relief, but the number seeking employment on relief works was far less than in previous famines.