The Annual Register 1914 / A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1914

by Anonymous

A Boer rebellion instigated by Germany is the outstanding fact of the year in the South African Union. It was, however, confined to a section of the rural population, and, thanks to the loyalty and energy of General Botha and his supporters, was suppressed by the end of December. Authority for the statement that the origin of the revolt is to be sought in German intrigue is to be found in the proclamation of martial law throughout the Union, though this was not issued until October 12. The first overt act of treachery was known on the 8th, when Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Maritz, commanding the force in the North-West of the Cape Province, being suspected by the Government, was relieved of his command and ordered by his successor, Colonel Conraad Britz, to come in and report to him. He replied, according to Lord Buxton's despatch to the Secretary of State, that "all he wanted was his discharge and Colonel Britz must come himself and take over his command." Colonel Britz sent Major Ben Bouwer to take charge. Maritz made him and his companions prisoners, but then sent him back alone with an ultimatum to the effect that unless the Union Government "guaranteed to him that before 11 o'clock on Sunday morning, October 11, they would allow Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller to meet him where he was, in order that he might receive instructions from them, he would forthwith make an attack on Colonel Britz's forces and proceed further to invade the Union." Major Bouwer reported that Maritz had German guns and a German force with his command, that he held the rank of General commanding the enemy troops, and that he had sent as prisoners into German South-West Africa all of the Union officers and men who had refused to betray their oath. Major Bouwer had also seen an agreement between Maritz and the Governor of German South-West Africa "guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a Republic, ceding Walfisch Bay and certain other portions of the Union to the Germans, and undertaking that the Germans would only invade the Union on the invitation of Maritz." He had also been shown German telegrams and helio messages dating from the beginning of September, and Maritz boasted that he had ample guns, ammunition and money from the Germans and that he would over-run South Africa. On these facts, and presumably on others not disclosed by the Government, the proclamation justified the imposition of martial law under three heads: (1) "a widespread secret propaganda" by Germany "to seduce citizens of the Union and the officers and members of the Defence forces of the Union, from their allegiance and to cause rebellion and civil war"; (2) that Maritz and a portion of his forces "had shamefully and traitorously gone over to the enemy" and with the enemy forces "had invaded the northern portions of Cape Province"; and (3) there was "grave reason to think that the Government of German South-West Africa had, through its numerous spies and agents, communicated with and corrupted also other citizens of the Union under the false and treacherous pretext of favouring the establishment of a Republic in South Africa." Therefore it was "necessary to take effective measures to protect and defend the interests of the Union and its loyal and law-abiding citizens against these insidious and treacherous attacks from within and without and to that end to declare martial law."

That being the evidence of a German plot to seduce the Boers from their allegiance, the optimistic news from South Africa between August 4 and October 12 was discounted by events. Scanty as the news was it gave the impression, at least until mid-September, that though the Hertzogite party in Parliament opposed military attack upon the German territory, Dutch patriotism was sound. The line taken by General Hertzog was that the Union should commit no act of aggression; and there were some supporters of General Botha who had to be won over by their leader to the view that a neutral attitude was impossible. The Government had at once made up their minds to act with the Imperial authorities. In reply to the King's Message to the Dominions they declared that "the Message had been received with great enthusiasm and deep loyalty in all parts of the Union" and that His Majesty's subjects there were "firmly resolved to fulfil their sacred duty of assisting with all resources at their disposal to bring the terrible war which has been forced on His Majesty to a speedy and successful conclusion." But this resolve was not universal in Parliament or in the country. The sacred duty was disputed by the Hertzogites, and General Botha's lead was apparently accepted with reluctance by some of those who were opposed on other grounds to General Hertzog. It seems to have been assumed that as the Germans had not then attacked, non-intervention was the preferable course. This issue was, however, brought to a head on September 12 by a declaration by General Botha in the Senate that South Africa, being part of the Empire, could not remain neutral, and that the Government had therefore decided to accede to the request of the Imperial authorities to occupy for strategic reasons certain parts of German West Africa. "The Government had come to this decision (according to The Times report) because they wished to preserve the name and reputation of South Africa for uprightness. They were under the British flag and had all the freedom they could have.... Let them assume their responsibilities in the fullest sense of the word. It had been stated that the reports of the German invasion of the Union were baseless, but he declared with authority that the Union had been invaded. Their English-speaking friends must not expect quite the same enthusiasm amongst the Dutch-speaking section about the war as among themselves. There was not, however, the slightest disloyalty, and even among those who perhaps were least enthusiastic, there was no idea of preferring to live under the German flag." In saying that "there was not the slightest disloyalty" General Botha was probably affecting to ignore reports to the contrary and refraining from attaching any sinister significance to the parliamentary action of the Hertzogites, or to those among his own supporters who deemed it impolitic and unnecessary to take the offensive against the Germans. On September 15 General Beyers, Commandant General of the Union Defence Forces, resigned his post. In a letter to General Smuts, the Minister of Defence, he complained that Parliament should by resolutions have confirmed the decision of the Government "to conquer German South-West Africa without any provocation towards the Union," and asserted that the majority of the Dutch-speaking people decidedly disapproved of crossing that frontier. He cited the resignations of three English Ministers (p. [173]) as evidence that there was a minority in England not convinced of the righteousness of the war with Germany: "It was said that war was being waged against the barbarity of the Germans. He had forgiven, but not forgotten, all the barbarities perpetrated during the South African War.... At this critical moment it was made known in Parliament that their Government was granted a loan of 7,000,000l. by the British Government. This was very significant."

In accepting his resignation General Smuts pointed out that the plan of operations decided upon had been recommended by General Beyers, and the officers who were to carry it out were appointed on his advice. It was well understood between them that he (General Beyers) was to take chief command in German South-West Africa. Yet he (General Smuts) never received the impression that resignation was intended, though he knew General Beyers entertained objections against the war. He rebuked General Beyers for his "bitter attack" on Great Britain, and for having first communicated his resignation in a letter of political argument to the Press. "The attack was not only entirely baseless but the more unjustifiable coming as it does in the midst of a great war from the Commandant General of one of the British Dominions. Your reference to barbarous acts during the South African War ... can only be calculated to sow hatred and division among the people of South Africa." After further castigation of General Beyers, General Smuts characterised the insinuation about the loan of 7,000,000l. to the Union Government "as of such a despicable nature" that it needed no comment. "It only shows to what extent your mind has been obscured by political bias." General Smuts could not conceive anything more fatal and humiliating for the Dutch-speaking people than a policy of lip-loyalty in fair weather and of neutrality and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress. He was convinced that the people would support the Government in carrying out the mandate of Parliament, and would fulfil their duty to South Africa and to the Empire.

By that time, September 15, a strong German force had advanced on Raman's Drift (on the Orange River) and had garrisoned a blockhouse commanding the drift. Thus the report of an invasion early in August was confirmed. A force of South African Mounted Rifles under Colonel Dawson crossed the waterless region and captured the blockhouse. On the next day the Germans, who were in force in the Uppington Kopjes within the British side, attacked the Union frontier post at Nakob and overpowered the small garrison. Swakopmund, on Walfisch Bay, had been seized, without resistance, by Union forces coming by steamer, and on the 19th Lüderitzbucht, midway between Walfisch Bay and Capetown, had also been surrendered to the Union, after the enemy had destroyed the wireless station there. The Union successes on the coast were counterbalanced by German captures of frontier posts. General Botha decided to take the field himself against the enemy and made a call for volunteers. The response was reported to be all that could be desired, particularly in the district where General Beyers had influence; but, in the language of Lord Buxton to the Secretary of State, "ever since the resignation" of General Beyers "there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces on the north-west of Cape Province" under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz. What was wrong has been told in the opening paragraph; whether General Beyers was a party to the conduct of Maritz at this time may be judged by the use of his name by Maritz and by the circumstances of his resignation. Of Maritz it was reported that, after serving in the South African War, he had taken service with the Germans, and had fought for them against the Herreros. Returning to the Union he was said to have made himself conspicuous by ostentatious dislike of the Germans. On the outbreak of war he was given a commando of irregulars on the strength of his knowledge of the frontier. He was believed to have 500 men with him near Uppington. One effect of the rebellion was to rally opinion to the support of General Botha and to demonstrate that the bulk of the Dutch population had little sympathy with Maritz. Recruiting was vigorously stimulated. On the other hand there was evidence of a seditious propaganda among the backveld Boers, notwithstanding very drastic regulations under the proclamation of martial law, which included in the definition of sedition opposition to the policy of hostilities against the enemy. The rebellion appeared to have profoundly stirred the people. On the native population it had no discernible and immediate effects. As Minister for Native Affairs General Botha sent a message urging on them prompt obedience and cheerful submission to the restrictions of martial law.

According to a correspondent of the Cape Times, who had been travelling in German West Africa just before the war, the Germans had a force of 10,000 mounted infantry and artillery, many machine guns and sixty-six gun batteries. They had also a Camel Corps of 500 for use in the desert region. The correspondent saw 192 guns at Keetmanshoop and described the country as being dotted with police posts, with two guns in each and manned by artillerymen. Railways and roads had been made to facilitate the invasion of the Union and this account of the enemy suggested long and costly preparation for war.

Obviously the military situation was difficult enough for General Botha without the complication of internal rebellion. Thus far it seemed, on such news as the censorship permitted to come through, that Maritz stood alone. On October 26 it was announced that he had been completely defeated at Kakamas, was wounded, and had fled into German territory. Colonel Britz sent to Pretoria an agreement which Maritz had asked him to sign. It was a pact between the Governor of German South-West Africa, as representing the Emperor, and traitors prepared to declare the independence of South Africa. The German Emperor undertook to take all possible measures to get the independence of any State or States of the Union recognised under the terms of peace. On the other side, the middle of the Orange River was to be the boundary between German South-West Africa and the Cape Province. Maritz had himself entered into this agreement. It was reported that before the engagement of the 26th, Maritz, being hard pressed, had offered to surrender on condition of a free pardon for himself and his followers, the Germans with him to be sent across the border. No reply was made. On the 27th many of Maritz's followers surrendered.

At the moment of the collapse of his commando rebellion broke out in the Northern Orange Free State and in the Western Transvaal. On October 28 the Union Government announced "with deep regret" that "at the instigation of certain prominent individuals," burghers in these districts had been "misguided enough to defy the authority of the Government and to make preparations for armed resistance and rebellion." Armed rebellious commandoes, under the authority of General Christian de Wet in the Orange Free State, and of General Beyers in the Western Transvaal, were in existence. The town of Heilbron had been seized and the Government officials imprisoned. A train had been stopped at Reitz and armed citizens of the Defence force seized and disarmed. "The very great majority of the citizens in every province are thoroughly loyal," said the Government statement, "and detest the very idea of rebellion." The Government had been aware of the rebel preparations and had "spared no efforts to preserve the peace without bloodshed." They called upon all loyal citizens to be on the alert and give the Government every assistance. "Citizens who have been, for some reason or other, guilty of disobedience under the Defence Act"—continued the announcement—"need not fear any action against them on that ground on the part of the Government so long as they remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the authority of the Government of the Union." The former Commandant-General of the Union forces had thus taken the field, in concert with General Christian de Wet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Orange Free State forces during the three years' war. De Wet was one of the signatories to the peace of Vereeniging, and had since held Ministerial office. Action had preceded the issue of the Government statement, for there was published on the 29th a telegram from Lord Buxton to the effect that General Botha had on the 27th searched out Beyers' commando and "driven them in headlong pursuit the whole of the day, capturing eighty of them fully armed." The engagement took place near Rustenburg and was a flight, not a battle. "General" Kemp—one of the names mentioned by Maritz—escaped into the Lichtenburg district, where there appear to have been many rebels under a Boer named Claussen; but the gathering here was put to flight by a force under Colonel Alberts. In the Calvinia district also there were bodies of rebels, who, however, made no serious fight against Colonel van der Venter's forces. General Botha followed the rebel commandoes to Zoutspansdrift and they were there again scattered. Early in November the Minister of Defence stated that the Maritz rebellion was over and in the Transvaal the movement was then quite insignificant. Only in the northern district of the Free State had the rebellion "assumed certain dimensions." On October 29 De Wet had entered Vrede with a body of rebels and addressed the townspeople in front of the Dutch Church. He spoke of "the miserable, pestilential English" and described the attack on German South-West Africa as a dastardly act of robbery. "Some of my friends," he was reported to have said, "have advised me to wait a little longer until England received a bigger knock, but it is beneath me and my people to kick a dead dog." He ordered the commandeering of supplies and threatened obstructives with the sjambok. At another place he was reported as saying: "I am going through to Maritz, where we will receive arms and ammunition, and from there we are going through to Pretoria to pull down the British flag and proclaim a free South African Republic." On November 12 it was announced that General Botha had got into touch with De Wet's forces and soundly defeated them. The rebels numbered 2,000. There were losses on both sides, but the rebels did not make a serious stand. They lost 255 prisoners here, among them Commandant Muller—also named in Maritz's message—and most of their transport.

The Government issued a proclamation calling upon all rebels to surrender voluntarily, and saying that all persons who did so would not be criminally prosecuted but allowed to return to their homes on condition that they took no further part in rebellion, and gave no information or assistance to rebels, and did and said nothing likely to disturb the peace. But the amnesty would not apply to those who had violated the rules of civilised warfare. All rebels who did not surrender forthwith would be liable to be dealt with according to the rigour of the law. The notification was signed by General Botha and was an appeal to good sense rather than a menace. On November 8 a rebel commando believed to be under the leadership of an ex-Major on the Union Defence Staff, was heavily defeated some thirty miles west of Warmbaths, the rebels losing 120 killed and wounded. At Winburg (Nov. 9) De Wet is alleged to have behaved with brutality towards the Mayor. He had lost his son in a fight a few days earlier and seemed to be out of control. The rebels looted the chief store. His commando numbered about 2,000, and were frequently harried by the Union forces. Meanwhile Beyers was severely handled to the south of the Vaal River, east of Bloemhof, and in an engagement on December 7 lost 364 prisoners, besides killed and wounded. It is impossible to keep count of the commandoes; the cables during November are too scanty and confusing. The rebel forces were daily suffering attrition by captures and surrenders and minor fighting. On December 2 Colonel Britz reported that he had captured De Wet at a farm at Wartenburg, 100 miles east of Mafeking. De Wet had crossed the Vaal as a fugitive on November 21, but had got together a small commando. Though pursued by motor cars, he managed to escape hither and thither for several days, until his commando was broken up and he was run to earth by Colonel Britz. There were four others in the farm where he took refuge. Finding themselves surrounded they surrendered. De Wet was taken to Pretoria. With his capture the Free State rebellion collapsed. The operations directed by General Botha had brought in over 800 prisoners.

In the Transvaal Beyers was caught and his force driven towards the Vaal at Greyling (Dec. 7). Beyers and others tried to cross the Vaal, and were fired on. Beyers was seen to fall from his horse, but managed to grasp another by the tail. He was next seen drifting down stream, shouting for help. His body was recovered. Lord Buxton reported that the rebellion was everywhere practically at an end. A few small bodies might continue to give a little trouble. De Wet, Muller, Wessel Wessels, as well as other leaders (including three members of the Union Parliament and members of the Provincial Councils) had been captured or had surrendered. Beyers was dead and Maritz and Kemp—the latter erroneously reported captured—had joined the Germans. About 7,000 rebels had been captured or had surrendered—an official figure which for the first time gave a clue to the extent of the rebel movement. General Botha issued a statement on December 9. He said that "the speedy and successful termination of what promised at one time to be a formidable and widespread rebellion, led by some of the best known South Africans," was due to the energy and ceaseless efforts of the forces in the fields. He then thanked them on behalf of the Government and people of South Africa. "Our sacrifices in blood, treasure and losses of population have been considerable, but I believe they are not out of proportion to the great results already achieved or which will accrue to South Africa in coming years. For this and much more let us be reverently thankful to Providence, which has once more guided our country through the gravest perils, and let that spirit of gratitude drive from our minds all bitterness caused by the wrongs suffered and the loss and anguish which has been caused by this senseless rebellion." He spoke of the rebellion as "a quarrel in our own South African household," and urged the cultivation of a spirit of tolerance and "merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those misguided people, many of whom took up arms against the State without any criminal intention and without any clear perception of the consequences of their action. While just and fair punishment should be meted out, let us also remember that now more than ever it is for the people of South Africa to practise the wise policy of forgive and forget." Their next duty was to deal with the German danger and make it impossible for German South-West Africa to be again used as a base from which to threaten the peace and liberties of the Union. "I hope and trust the people will deal with this danger as energetically as they have done with the internal rebellion."

During the rebellion little information had been forthcoming about the situation on the frontier. Presumably the Union forces had been sufficiently engaged in suppressing the rebellion, the extent and gravity of which are measurable by General Botha's language when the peril had been surmounted. What activity the Germans displayed, if any, in co-operation with the rebels was not disclosed by the authorities. The position of affairs as it presented itself to General Botha was thus described by him in an interview given on December 17: "In suppressing the rebellion the Government have had the most hearty co-operation of both races. Let us have the same co-operation in German South-West Africa. The undertaking before us is difficult, but if we all do our duty it will be carried to a successful conclusion. Now that German territory has become a refuge for Maritz and the other rebels it is more than ever necessary that we should persist in our operations there. We cannot tolerate the existence of a nest of outlaws on our frontier, a menace to the peace of the Union." In that interview General Botha paid a warm tribute to General Smuts, whose "brilliant intellect, calm judgment, amazing energy and undaunted courage had been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of trial." His own services to the Union and to the Empire cannot fitly be appraised until events have fallen into perspective; but the language applied to General Smuts, generous and eloquent as it is, would be inadequate as an expression of gratitude for the labours of General Botha. To review the events of the rebellion is to wonder whether South Africa would not temporarily have ceased to be a British Dominion in 1914 had not General Botha given a strong lead in loyalty and policy, and had the frustration of the German plot fallen to a man less influential than himself with the Dutch-speaking people or to one less skilful in military generalship.