The Annual Register 1914 / A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1914

by Anonymous

The Report again gives a disturbing account of the increase of crime, despite the new Arms Act. Lord Kitchener points out that the main responsibility for public security rests with the Mudirs and hints that if there is not a better discharge the system must be considered.

A strong light on the social condition of Egypt was thrown by the Report of the Judicial Adviser (Sir Malcolm McIlwraith) for the year 1913. Crimes and serious misdemeanours showed a continuous increase. Poverty was not the cause. Food and shelter were within reach of all. Cold was unknown. Habitual charity was such that the terrors of complete destitution were not to be found. But rapacity and greed were rife and had been stimulated by economic conditions and the rise in the standard of living. Emulation in extravagance was a cause of crime, thirst for revenge a still more potent cause. Murder on the spur of the moment was common in Egypt, especially in the south. A change in the temperament of the people, such as education might be expected to produce, could alone diminish the number of these murders. In past times communal responsibility was enforced, but with the advance of civilisation repression had to be confined within the law. Far from having a particular interest in the suppression of crime, the Fellah knew from experience that to volunteer evidence often entailed long absence from work and exposed him to the danger of retaliation by friends of the accused. He therefore showed strong disinclination to have anything to do with criminal law and administration.

Touching the creation at the close of 1913 of the Ministry of Waffs Lord Kitchener says that the Ministry is assisted by a Council which includes the Sheikh El Azhar and the Grand Mufti of Egypt, the highest dignitaries of the Mohammedan religion. The other members are Moslems. The new organisation was expected to result in an improved administration of the funds and properties of the religious trusts. The ill-effects of yet another low Nile caused some uneasiness as the year passed. The economic disaster of war was met for the time by a general moratorium. Since August 4 there has been a strict censorship in Egypt.

Lord Kitchener made a tour of the Sudan in January and his report was thus written with fresh knowledge. So far as is known there have since been no untoward developments, though in March Major Conry, in charge of an Arab battalion, lost his life in an encounter with a party of outlaws on the Atbara River. The Report speaks of 1913 as an uneventful year except for the Imperial guarantee of a loan of E. 3,000,000l. for the development of the Sudan as a cotton-growing country. The Nile flood was the lowest known in the Soudan for a hundred years. The area cultivated was 2,303 feddans as against 1,937,000 in 1912. There was a decrease in the area of cotton, due entirely to climatic reasons, "not to the indifference of the natives, among whom there is a marked revival of interest in all forms of agriculture." At the Tayiba demonstration station, which is now being managed by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate on a commercial basis, the cotton yield was good and the quality of a high order. The working of the Tokar cotton area "has more than justified the policy of the Government. A marked improvement in the cultivation of the land and in the handling of cotton has taken place and consequently higher average yields and better prices have been obtained. The sale of cotton by public auction, after estimation by Government classifiers, has ensured a fair market price to the cultivators." The revenue for 1913 was E. 1,644,000l. and there was a surplus over expenditure of E. 29,000l. The estimates for 1914 were for a revenue of E. 1,644,000l. also with expenditure of a like sum. There was E. 65,000l. in reserve on January 1, 1914. There are brief but instructive administrative reports. In the Sudan, as in Egypt, a considerable increase in serious crime is recorded. The slave traffic has been made "almost impossible." The population continues to increase, but there is excessive infant mortality. Health was "satisfactory," malaria being less frequent owing to the dryness of the year; but sleeping sickness was prevalent in the Yei River district and is now found over a large area in Western Mongalla and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal; it was also reported to be prevalent in the Congo to the west and south-west of Tembara. Cattle disease had been exceptionally prevalent. The opening of new districts had increased the territorial responsibility of the Army. The British garrison at Khartoum consisted at the time of the Report of six companies of infantry and a detachment of garrison artillery. A list is given of nine military operations in as many different districts for the suppression of raiding parties and tribal disturbances. A new general map of the Sudan on a scale of 1:5,000,000 is nearing completion. The condition of the south-eastern frontier is described as "not altogether satisfactory." An extensive trade in arms was carried on between Abyssinia and the Nuer country. Financial considerations precluded the Government from setting up an effective administration between the Khor Yabus and Lake Rudolph, and from occupying the Boma plateau. Something had been done by the construction of posts after the expedition to the Anuak country in 1912. These are at Khobo Bonjak and Nasser; "but the problem will never be satisfactorily solved until the whole country up to the frontier is effectively occupied. The political situation at Adis Ababa, and the apparent inability of the Abyssinian Government to put a stop to the smuggling of arms from the coast, also make for unrest in the outlying districts bordering on the Sudan, which do not appear to be under the full control of the central Government."

The war had had no apparent disturbing effect on the Sudan and the scanty news from Khartoum and beyond by the end of the year was reassuring as to the attitude of the inhabitants. Sir Reginald Wingate, the Governor-General and also Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, which was believed to be for the most part in the Sudan when war was declared, was in England on leave in August but returned immediately. After spending some time in Cairo he visited the Sudan and held receptions of Sheikhs and notables at various centres. The most important gathering was at Khartoum on November 8. The Sudan Gazette of the previous day had contained a Proclamation announcing that, at the instigation of Germany, Turkey had violated the Egyptian frontier and that a state of war existed between Turkey and Great Britain, and calling upon the inhabitants of the Sudan to render to the British, Egyptian and Sudanese forces all the assistance that might be required of them. The private receptions prior to this proclamation had already made the Sheikhs and Notables cognisant of the situation as regards Turkey. The gathering of Sheikhs and Ulema at Khartoum was addressed by Sir Reginald Wingate. After announcing the state of war with Turkey, as from November 7, he told them that in order that they should fully understand the causes of this new war he would call upon the Grand Mufti to read an Address from him—Sir Reginald—to themselves and to other religious leaders in the Sudan. The Grand Mufti read the Address in Arabic. Addressing the company as men of intelligence and education, possessing a good influence over the people, the Governor-General appealed to their knowledge of the regenerative work the English had done in the Sudan, and emphasised our non-interference with any man in the exercise of his religion. With this knowledge in his mind and in theirs he was, he said, able to talk to them candidly and without reservation. He then described to them the condition of Turkey on the eve of and since the overthrow of the Sultan Abdul Hamid—how the men who had arrogated to themselves the direction of affairs had mismanaged the Empire, and had now gone to war with the one Power which by her actions and the sentiments of her people had ever been a true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems and to Islam. "These men—this syndicate of Jews, financiers and low-born intriguers, like broken gamblers staking their last coin, and in deference to the urgent demands of Germany and our enemies," had gone to war. After an argument that England had thus been forced to war by the Turkish adventurers and that it was not her object to gain territory or advantage at the expense of a Mohammedan State, the Address assured the gathering that the world policy of Great Britain would remain unchanged. The sanctity and inviolability of the Holy Places would be maintained and enforced on others. She would shelter and protect all Mohammedan mosques on her borders, as she had done for a hundred and fifty years in India, where she had guarded the interests of 62,000,000 Mohammedans, "many thousands of whom are now fighting alongside their British fellow-subjects against the German Army." The Sudan Sheikhs and Ulema knew the evils of Turkish rule, said the Address, from bitter experience. But they might feel—and Sir Reginald sympathised with them—"a certain sorrow at this war." Some might fear that the result might affect the situation of Mohammedans in other parts of the world. He assured them before God that their fears were groundless. The position of no single Mohammedan in the British Empire would be changed one iota nor a single privilege granted to Islam repudiated. The Address concluded thus:—

Now I ask you at this present time, you, men of religion, learning, and experience, to give honourable and wise counsels to the people who will listen to you; for here in the Sudan, as elsewhere in the world, the fools will listen to the wise, the ignorant to the learned, and the common people to men of wisdom and education. I ask you, then, and I rely upon you, to publish true reports, to be careful and wise in your words, and by your example to allay baseless and ignorant fears, to contradict false or alarmist rumours, and by all means in your power to ensure a sane and reasonable judgment of events by your co-religionists and the natives of this country.

The Address was received with enthusiasm and many speakers publicly protested their loyalty, among them the Mahdi's eldest son. The document was circulated throughout the country and "it is said there is hardly a noteworthy person in the Sudan who has not written or telegraphed to the Governor-General." Offers of assistance were almost embarrassing in their generosity. Until the end of the year not so much as a whisper of disaffection had reached England from the Sudan—or, if that should prove to be inaccurate, had passed the Censor. Despatches published on December 30 confirmed the unofficial accounts of the satisfactory attitude of all classes of Sudanese.

III. NORTH-EAST AFRICA AND THE PROTECTORATES.

In the Somaliland Protectorate the action at Dul Madoba in August, 1913, had serious consequences and a state of war prevailed throughout 1914. Among Supplementary Estimates submitted to the House of Commons in February was one for 25,000l. "to meet additional expenditure entailed upon Somaliland in connexion with the activity of the Mullah." At that time he was believed to be preparing for an attack on Burao, where, however, we had no garrison, the force having been withdrawn after the disaster to Captain Corfield and his camelry. He had been raiding friendly tribes in the interior and there was a risk that he might attack Berbera. Our garrison there consisted of 260 Carnatic infantry and a body of camelry and about the same number at Sheikh. Further troops were on their way from Aden. It appeared that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had ordered the camel corps to be increased from 150 to 300, and this had been done; and in February he ordered a further increase to 500. The policy was to reoccupy Burao, about eighty miles from the coast, and to occupy Sheikh, midway between Burao and Berbera, but not to occupy the interior nor send a punitive force against the Mullah. The forts at Burao and Sheikh would be strengthened and the Indian contingent kept at 400 instead of 200 as before. The estimates for 1914 showed that the recurrent cost of these permanent defence forces—Indians and camelry—would be 58,800l. Mr. Harcourt claimed that these measures met the requirements of the men on the spot. The Mullah was an old man, he said, in an advanced stage of dropsy, physically immovable and incapable of leading the Dervish forays. He had no probable or possible successor. Since he had been ex-communicated from Mecca he had been left enfeebled—a robber, but not a prophet. With a little patience and endurance Somaliland might yet be comparatively peaceful. The policy, therefore, was to go no farther than Burao and wait for the death of the Mullah. The Dervish reply to it was an attack in March on Berbera itself, a body of horsemen dashing to within firing distance of the town and making good their escape. In July there were disturbing reports of Dervish activity and it was telegraphed from Aden that more troops had been requisitioned. The war in Europe closed the usual channels of knowledge, but in December the Press Bureau issued a short review of what had occurred. Burao was to be the base of the enlarged camel corps. Major F. A. Cubitt, D.S.O., had been put in command of the troops and had arrived in the Protectorate in August. On November 20 the camelry were patrolling the grazing grounds of the tribesmen at Burao as far as the Ain Valley, and Colonel Cubitt "encountered strong opposition at Shimberberris, where the dervishes were in a strong position." He attacked them and again on the 23rd when all their forts were captured. "The dervishes, overcome by the moral effect of shell fire"—there had been no previous mention of artillery in Somaliland—took to flight and suffered material loss. The forts were demolished as far as practicable. The walls were over six feet thick. One of the British officers—Captain H. W. Symons—was killed and two others wounded. The camelry returned to Burao and the Commissioner reported that "he could not overestimate the excellent effect which this success will have throughout the Protectorate." It appears that naval airmen were employed in these operations—the first time aircraft could have been seen in this region of Africa. The Colonial Office, while not denying the statement, declined to throw any light upon its plans for the future.

British East Africa was at once drawn into the vortex of the war. The Secretary of State for the Colonies announced early in October that during the previous month there had been considerable activity along the Anglo-German border because of attempts to raid British territory and cut the Uganda Railway. All the attempts, with one unimportant exception—a frontier post whose occupation by the enemy it was not at the time convenient to oppose—had been repulsed and the raiding parties forced to retire. The normal garrisons of the Protectorate and also of Uganda had been increased by "a strong body of troops from India and also by mounted and unmounted volunteer forces locally raised; and no anxiety was felt as to the military situation." One of the earliest moves of the enemy was to send a small party under white officers to blow up the Uganda Railway near Maungu, but the party was broken up and its dynamite and outfit captured. At Tsavo on September 6 there was "a hot engagement" between a strong force of the enemy and Indian troops and King's Royal Rifles. The enemy were severely handled and repulsed. The enemy had Maxim guns, which the Punjabis made "a gallant effort to rush with the bayonet," and our losses were not slight. On the 10th there was another engagement with an invading force 400 strong including fifty Europeans. This force occupied Kisi on the 11th, and was attacked on the 12th by a British column which was, however, compelled to retire. On the 13th the enemy abandoned Kisi, which the British occupied, finding there ten dead Germans (Europeans) and six wounded. The Germans had retired to Karungu. Meanwhile German and British steamers on the Victoria Nyanza had been engaged and German dhows sunk. On the 20th the Germans attacked a British post at Campi ya Marabu and after two hours' fighting retired into their own territory, leaving thirteen dead. Lieut. A. C. H. Forster, in command of the King's African Rifles there, was killed. The officer who took over the command reported that the conduct of the King's African Rifles was splendid and that the success had "materially encouraged the Masai who lived in the neighbourhood." The British outpost at Majoreni was attacked on the 23rd, but the enemy again repulsed. On the 25th a German force of thirty-five Europeans and 150 natives, with two maxims, attacked a mounted squadron of the Rifles, and after an hour's bush fighting retreated, leaving eleven dead and many wounded. The next day a strong force of the enemy, including fifty Europeans, attacked the Rifles at Mzirna, but were repulsed, leaving seventeen dead. During November and December the published casualty lists showed that fighting had been actively continued and occasional letters home suggested that it was severe. On November 19 complaint was made in the House of Lords by Lord Curzon of the secretiveness of the Government, which had merely issued "a very extensive list of casualties." Lord Crewe pointed out that German East Africa covered some 350,000 square miles and had a white German population of between 5,000 and 6,000. The German force there had been reinforced by reservists and he believed that some naval force had also been brought from the Far East. The Germans were well provided with weapons and had machine guns and constituted a formidable force. While the white population of British East Africa equalled the German (Lord Crewe was in error here) it had not the same military element in it. The native infantry and police force in the German Protectorate numbered 2,000. In the British there was a considerable force of native police and a military force—the Rifles—which, though not so large, was extremely efficient and well officered. It was clear that at the beginning of the war our position in East Africa could not be altogether secure and it was necessary to send reinforcements at an early date. The fighting had been in a good many parts, with varying results and considerable losses. The total casualties in two months were about 900. It had become necessary to send reinforcements from India. The fate of the German possessions, Lord Crewe pointed out, would depend on the ultimate settlement of the war; but it was necessary to preserve the position of Great Britain as the paramount Power in Central Africa where she would repel the German attacks with all the force she could muster. That was the position of affairs when the year closed. In the earlier months of the year there had been serious trouble in Jubaland Province, owing to an incursion of Somalis, armed with rifles. They had probably been fighting against us in Northern Somaliland. A new post had just been set up at Seremli with Lieut. Lloyd Jones and a few men in charge. The Somalis—of the Marehan tribe—said they had not come to fight and were told that they must give up their rifles, which had apparently been obtained from Abyssinia, which does a large trade in arms and ammunition—a trade which it has been found impossible to keep out of Jubaland and Somaliland as also out of the Sudan border country. The Somalis would not give up their arms and went away, but returned and attacked the station. Lieut. Lloyd Jones was severely wounded. Troops had been telegraphed for through the Italian Marconi station at Bardera and companies of Rifles hurriedly sent from Uganda and Nyasaland. There was severe fighting, the Somalis abandoning their bush tactics and charging down on the troops. They failed to break the square, owing in part to the maxim fire. A midnight attack was also repulsed. Our losses were slight and that of the Somalis heavy. Other operations followed later for the disarmament of the invaders. Two British officers lost their lives in the fighting and the affair illustrated the extreme difficulty of maintaining authority in Jubaland, notwithstanding the co-operation of the Italians on the other side of the Juba. Until the traffic in arms can be stopped Somali incursions could be checked only by a chain of posts or the constant use of a mobile force. The Protectorate was making good progress until the war plunged African affairs everywhere into confusion. One effect of the war was to suspend the agitation at Nairobi and in the settled districts for some form of self-government, beginning with representation on the Legislative Council. Nor has the question of the reservation of the Highlands for European settlement advanced. A Bill was passed without opposition—scarcely without criticism—in the Imperial Parliament guaranteeing a loan of 3,000,000l. for the Protectorates of British East Africa, Uganda, and Nyasaland. In East Africa the money was to be disbursed upon harbour works and wharves at Kililundi, on roads and bridges, improvements of the Uganda Railway, additional rolling stock and more steamers for Lake Nyanza; and on roads and railways in Nyasa. Repayment of the loan is to be made within forty years. No charge on the British Treasury was involved.