Great Britain4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4
As compared with Germany 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 2.

For the provision to cover the period of delay of the Canadian ships, however, there was a special reason—viz., that, in July, 1912, the Cabinet had decided that a British battle squadron should be maintained in the Mediterranean, that Great Britain might be the guardian of her own interests there, and by the end of 1915 a battle squadron of eight battleships, based on Malta, would replace the four battle cruisers now stationed there. The force there would then consist of eight battleships, four large armed cruisers, four light cruisers of the "Town" type and sixteen destroyers of the Beagle type. Hence the acceleration of three ships of the 1913-14 programme and two of the 1914-15 programme; these latter would be ready in the third quarter of 1916. Turning to the Pacific, the situation there was regulated by the British naval strength in European waters, which protected New Zealand and Australia from European Powers, and from any present danger from Japan, and Japan from European attack by sea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, renewed up to 1921 and likely to continue, was the true protection of Australia and New Zealand, and depended entirely on the maintenance of British naval supremacy. He extolled the policy of New Zealand in giving a splendid ship to strengthen the British Navy at a decisive point; and, though the natural desire of the Dominions to have their ships in their own waters was hard to reconcile with naval strategy, the combination of the two was aimed at by the design of the Imperial squadron, a fleet of large ships supported in each Dominion by local repairing establishments, light cruisers, and small craft, and bringing sufficient aid wherever needed in war. Finally, the First Lord dealt with the supreme importance of a strong Navy to Great Britain, pointing out that while other Powers built navies in order to play a part in the world's affairs, Great Britain's Navy was to her a question of life or death. By sober conduct and skilful diplomacy she could disarm or divide the elements of potential danger; but her diplomacy depended largely on her naval strength, and, in the face of the unprecedented armament increase of Continental Powers, the Government could not feel that they were doing their duty to their country unless its naval strength were solidly, amply, and unswervingly maintained.

Mr. Lee (U., Hants, Fareham) maintained that on the 60 per cent. standard of superiority Great Britain was five ships short (28 against the Germans 21, when there should be 33) and that three ships to replace the Canadian ships should be begun at once; we must keep faith with the Dominions.

The debate, however, was suspended to allow Mr. Butcher (U., York) a resolution declaring that the House was not satisfied that the provision for defence against invasion was adequate, and demanding the publication forthwith of the conclusions of the Defence Committee. After several speeches, the First Lord, after dealing with special points raised, replied that of the new factors in the problem, submarines told against the invader; aircraft and wireless telegraphy in favour of the strongest fleet; on the other hand, the changes in the strategic front told against Great Britain. The Invasion Committee had dealt with all these matters, and the naval manœuvres had yielded important lessons, but he deprecated the popular interpretation of them (A.R., 1913, p. 179). If the Expeditionary Force was at home no invading force could be large enough, if it had left, the Fleet would have been fully mobilised. He vindicated Prince Louis of Battenberg's action and promised a day later in the session for a debate on the Report of the Imperial Defence Committee; and, incidentally, he made an attack on Sir R. Pole-Carew (U., Bodmin) which caused a scene. The motion was rejected by 290 to 190.

Next day the debate was continued by a vigorous and comprehensive attack on Admiralty policy from Lord Charles Beresford (U., Portsmouth). The number of ships, he said, was inadequate, the men were overworked and underpaid, the deficiency of officers was dangerous, and the Admiralty was trusting to oil, which they could not guard, nor could Great Britain produce it. More significant, however, was an attack on the "armaments ring" by Mr. Snowden (Lab., Blackburn) which was applauded (even, contrary to rule, from the Strangers' Gallery). The shareholders in armament companies, he pointed out, included Bishops, the President of the Free Church Council, the Colonial Secretary, and the Postmaster-General; with British co-operation, battleships were being constructed by members of the "ring" for Italy, and Whitehead torpedoes for Austria. The debate was again suspended for a resolution moved by Mr. Aubrey Herbert (U., Somerset, S.), declaring that the protection of the route to India and other services of the Empire demanded the provision of an adequate naval force in the Mediterranean. This discussion extended also to Near Eastern problems. The Foreign Secretary, in the course of a long reply, held that the understandings between the Powers of the Triple Entente had made for peace. As Great Britain could not maintain in the Mediterranean a fleet superior to the combined fleets of all the other nations represented there, her policy should be to keep there a fleet equal to any combination she was likely to have to meet. Foreign policy depended on naval strength rather than conversely, for policy must be so shaped that the country would not have to face a combination that the Navy could not meet. In the Near East British policy was to use diplomatic influence to preserve the integrity of Turkey. There was nothing to offend Mohammedan feeling in the proposed Turco-Greek settlement, and it should be considered as a whole. After a speech from Mr. Lee (U.) on the naval position in the Mediterranean, the motion was withdrawn.

The debate next week (March 23) on the Navy Estimates was almost crowded out by the Ulster and Army crises, but the Votes for wages, victualling and clothing, and works and buildings, were agreed to on March 23, after debate and two divisions. An additional day for the discussion of naval policy was promised after Easter.

But meanwhile the Home Rule controversy had passed into a phase of unprecedented gravity. The "British Covenant" had been supplemented by a "Women's Covenant," and both documents had been numerously and influentially signed, about 3 or 4 per cent. of the signatories, it was said, being Liberals. On the other hand, the First Lord of the Admiralty had spoken at Bradford (March 14), apparently as the messenger of the Cabinet. The Chief Liberal Whip, who presided, declared that the Government's position was impregnable, and that there would be no general election till the three Bills under the Parliament Act had become law. Mr. Churchill, on his part, referred to his own past admissions of Ulster's claim to special treatment; the Prime Minister had made a fair and reasonable offer, with the assent of the Nationalist leaders, and it seemed to him final. It represented the hardest sacrifice ever asked of Irish Nationalism. But the Unionists were not satisfied. The sole return offered was that there would be no civil war. The Ulstermen still showed the old spirit of ascendency. They seemed to think a settlement could only be achieved by threats; but, in the event of violence, the larger issue would be dominant, whether Parliamentary government was to be broken down before the menace of armed force. That had been fought out at Marston Moor. Apparently some sections of the propertied classes desired to subvert Parliamentary government. Against such a mood, when manifested in action, there was no lawful measure from which the Government should or would shrink. He had had to send soldiers out during the railway strike (A.R., 1911, p. 209), and there was no Unionist condemnation then. They knew how the Unionists would treat the Nationalists, and how they applauded martial law in South Africa. The Government met the menace with patience, but with firmness. They were responsible for the peace of the British Empire; who would dare to break it up? There must be one law for all; Great Britain was not to be reduced to the condition of Mexico. If Ulster sought peace and fair play, she knew where to find it; if she were to be made a tool in Parliamentary calculations, if the British civil and Parliamentary systems were to be brought to the challenge of force, he could only say, "Let us go forward together and put these grave matters to the proof."

The finality of the Prime Minister's offer was further emphasised on that day and the next in speeches by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin; the adverse feeling of the Independent Nationalists by an "All-for-Ireland" Conference (March 14) at Cork; and on March 16 the Prime Minister made a further statement in the Commons, in the form of a collective reply to twenty-six questions, of which notice had been given. Prefacing this reply by a general survey of the situation, he said that the Government had put forward its proposals for the separate treatment of Ulster not as the best way of dealing with Home Rule, but as a basis of settlement; if they were accepted in principle, the Bill would have to be supplemented by a number of adjustments, financial and administrative, which were being worked out, but to discuss them would interfere with a discussion on the main issue. He then began curtly to dispose of the questions; the Unionists objected, as the form of his reply precluded supplementary questions; and he presently intimated that the details would not be formulated unless the general principle were adopted and treated as a basis of agreement. Mr. Bonar Law and Sir Edward Carson pressed for the details, and, in view of the Prime Minister's replies, a Vote of Censure was determined on. Incidentally, the Prime Minister endorsed the First Lord's speech at Bradford, and the latter was loudly cheered by the Liberals.

The Vote of Censure was moved by Mr. Bonar Law on March 19. It regretted the refusal of the Government to formulate their suggestions before the debate on the second reading of the Home Rule Bill. This moderation in its language was said to represent a reaction from the impatience manifested three days earlier. Mr. Bonar Law's tone, too, was more pacific. He laid stress on the danger of the situation and on his desire to avoid civil war; he and his colleagues had not closed and would not close the door hastily on any proposal put forward by the Government in the hope of securing peace. If the principle to which they were asked to agree was that Ulster was not to be driven out of the Imperial Parliament into a Nationalist Parliament, they accepted it as a basis of discussion; if Ulster was to be brought in automatically against its will, they would help Ulster to resist. He made a formal offer; if the new suggestions were put into the Home Rule Bill and accepted by the country on a Referendum, he had Lord Lansdowne's authority to say that, as far as his influence in the House of Lords went, he would not oppose the will of the people. That, he maintained, was a reasonable offer. Were Ulster brought in as a new Poland, what hope was there for a united Ireland? As to the Army, in a case merely of disorder, it would and ought to obey; if it were a question of civil war, "soldiers are citizens like the rest of us." If blood were shed in Ulster, there would be the same outburst of feeling in Great Britain as there was in the United States when the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter.

The Prime Minister, after protesting against Mr. Bonar Law's view as to the duty of the Army in the case of civil war, restated the aim of his proposal. Ulster was to be excluded for a term of years, to give the electorate of the United Kingdom an opportunity of expressing its opinion, and to enable it to be seen from the working of the Irish Legislature whether the objections of Ulster were well founded. Suppose the proposals accepted on a referendum of the United Kingdom, did the Unionist leaders hold that this would carry with it authority to coerce Ulster? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated assent.) Then, was not the Government's proposal more favourable? Would there be plural voting on the Referendum? (Mr. Bonar Law indicated that there need not.) And would Ulster accept the decision? (Sir Edward Carson offered to answer if it were a "firm offer.") On a Referendum it would be impossible to isolate the issue. He believed the proposals were fair, and the Government were quite satisfied with the Home Rule Bill as it stood. Even partial and temporary exclusion was an evil, but it was only because it offered the only avenue to a pacific settlement that the Government had felt compelled to take it.