J. S.
J. F.
J. S. E.
23 March, 1914
General Gough, it was rumoured, had at once shown this document and talked freely to reporters, and had received an ovation on his return to the Curragh.
The whole White Paper, and especially the letter above quoted, filled the Liberals with anger and dismay. The Westminster Gazette described it as "incredible," and declared editorially that it would prefer the defeat of the Government to an abject surrender to the Army.
On March 25 the position was further elucidated on the second reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill. Before this, however, there was another sensation and a scene. Questioned by Lord Charles Beresford as to the movements of the Third Battle Squadron, alleged to be meant to intimidate Ulster, the First Lord of the Admiralty said that a fortnight earlier the Cabinet had decided to station a battle squadron at Lamlash (Arran) as a convenient place to exercise from, and near Ireland if there should be serious disorder. On March 22, the precautionary movements of troops having been carried out without opposition, it was decided to delay the movement till after the Easter period of leave. The field-guns were asked for by the Admiral to exercise the men ashore at Lamlash if the weather was bad (a statement scoffed at by the Opposition). The insinuation made by a Unionist member that the precautionary movements were provocative he repudiated as "hellish." Subsequently Colonel Seely, the War Minister, stated in detail the facts relating to the correspondence published and to the statement quoted above. Having seen General Gough, he went to the Cabinet meeting and said he would ask the Adjutant-General to draft a document for him. He then had to go to the King, and (he said parenthetically) the suggestion made outside Parliament that His Majesty had taken any initiative in the matter was "absolutely without foundation." When he returned, the Cabinet had separated, having discussed the draft prepared by the Adjutant-General (Sir J. S. Ewart). He added the two concluding paragraphs to conform to the statement he had made. On receiving this document General Gough asked Sir John French if it meant that he would not be called on to order his brigade to assist in coercing Ulster to submit to Home Rule, and Sir John French wrote across it "I should read it so." Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart did not know that it was a Cabinet document, and no blame rested on them or on Sir A. Paget; but blame rested on himself for altering it, and, having been absent from the Cabinet meeting, he did not apprehend that his colleagues had seriously considered the document and regarded it in the form in which it had left their hands as a matter of vital concern. Having unintentionally misled his colleagues, he had tendered his resignation. It appeared, however, that this had not been accepted; and Mr. Balfour, after scouting the Ministerial explanation of the naval and military movements and defending Ulster's right to resist, asked how the Government explained the two "peccant paragraphs" which were binding on Colonel Seely and the Army Council, and which "the whole Army would take as its charter." They made it impossible to coerce Ulster.
The Prime Minister, after declaring that the King had throughout observed every rule comporting with the dignity of a constitutional Sovereign, pointed out that in fact the Government had offered the Ulster counties exclusion till after two consultations of the electorate against an offer by the Opposition of one such consultation at once. Was it really believed that there was a plot to provoke Ulster? The movements were purely protective, and were ordered on March 14. Sir Edward Carson and his friends might equip a force said to number 100,000, but, if the Government consulted their general, it was an intrigue and an outrage. General Paget acted like any prudent general in the circumstances. The officers were uneasy, as to the possible initiation of active operations against Ulster, and sent in their resignations. When they came to the War Office, every one realised that there had been a misconception. On the 23rd, after the interviews, the Cabinet received the draft of the proposed letter from the Army Council to General Gough. They did not know of his previous letter nor did the War Secretary. They authorised the three first paragraphs of the letter from the Army Council, which gave no assurance of any sort and stated plainly the duties of the officers. As soon as he received the copy of the whole letter, he sent for the War Secretary, who explained how the two last paragraphs had been added, and said that it was too late to alter them, for General Gough had had the letter. Mr. Asquith pointed out to the House that General Gough's letter shifted the question to a remote and hypothetical contingency It was not right to ask an officer what he would do in such a contingency, still less could it be right for an officer to ask a Government to give him any assurance. Such a claim, once admitted, would put the Government and the House at the mercy of the Military and the Navy. (This was received with prolonged Liberal and Labour cheers and waving of handkerchiefs and papers.) Were that issue once raised, he had little doubt as to the verdict of the country. The War Secretary, under great stress, had committed an error of judgment, but to accept his resignation would be ungenerous and unjust.
Mr. Bonar Law declared that the Government had decided on a great military and naval demonstration to impress the people of Ulster, and Sir A. Paget's statement was inconsistent with their explanation. He read a letter from an infantry officer, stating that Sir Charles Fergusson had told his officers that "steps had been taken so that any aggression must come from the Ulsterites." He insisted that the position amounted to civil war, and, with reference to the Labour attacks on the Ulster people and the Army, he declared that the Ulster Volunteers were thoroughly democratic, and the feeling among the rank and file of the Army was as strong as among the officers. If he were an officer he would resign, and (he hoped) would face a court martial rather than be sent against Ulster. The Government's duty was to find some means of saving the nation from an impossible position.
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) declared that Mr. Bonar Law's statement was an encouragement to mutiny. The sentence quoted from Sir Charles Fergusson meant that the offensive must not be taken against Ulster. The officers were acting as party politicians, and had communicated with the Press. Had the position revealed in the White Paper been that of the Government, the Government could not have lived for twenty-four hours.
Later, the Foreign Minister said that the Government repudiated the two paragraphs because they appeared as an answer to General Gough's letter making conditions, and General Gough had returned unconditionally. His question was not one that an officer should put. No question must be raised by the Army as to the orders given them.