The Annual Register 1914 / A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1914

by Anonymous

Warships were now posted on the Ulster coast to stop further gun-running, and military measures were expected; and the Prime Minister was bombarded with questions in the House on April 27. Most of them had reference to the alleged "plot" against Ulster; but in reply to a question from Mr. Lough (Islington, W.) as to the gun-running and the steps to be taken by the Government, Mr. Asquith replied that in view of this grave and unprecedented outrage the Government would take appropriate steps without delay to vindicate the authority of the law, and protect officers and servants of the King and His Majesty's subjects in the exercise of their duties and the enjoyment of their legal rights.

Other angry questions followed next day (April 28) and then the debate opened on the Unionist motion for an inquiry into the "plot." But it took an unsuspected turn. Various Liberal amendments had been put down to the effect that in view of what had happened subsequently (i.e. the gun-running) the Government would be supported in whatever measures it might take. Mr. Austen Chamberlain moved the motion, which demanded a full and impartial inquiry, in view of the "incompleteness and inaccuracy" of the statements of Ministers and of the continued failure of the Government to deal frankly with the situation. He reviewed the course of events since the Prime Minister's offer of March 9, referring to Mr. Churchill's Bradford speech, the incidents at the Curragh, the Prime Minister's statement of March 22 (which, he said, was misleading), and he complained that information was still withheld—the police reports on which the Government had acted, the instructions given to Sir A. Paget at the War Office, his address to his officers in Dublin and at the Curragh. He charged the First Lord of the Admiralty with inventing an elaborate story to support his account of Lord Morley's connexion with the peccant paragraphs, and said that Colonel Seely was only the tool of more astute and unscrupulous colleagues. [Popular rumour had specified the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.] He commented on the application for field-guns for the Fleet, the appointment of Sir Nevil Macready as virtual Military Governor of Belfast, and said also that the Government had "seized important strategic points." His charges against them were: (1) That they took measures, not against a few evilly disposed persons, but on the basis that conciliation was hopeless till they showed overwhelming force; (2) that the protection of stores was only a pretext; (3) that they insisted on movements which Sir A. Paget thought dangerous after he had done all he thought necessary to protect stores; (4) that the warships' movements were part of the larger plan never avowed by the Government, but applauded by their followers; (5) that the withdrawal of troops from Belfast could only be so explained; (6) that Sir A. Paget's announcement to his officers, that he would have 25,000 men, was not compatible with the story that only a minor movement was contemplated. For his own honour the Prime Minister should have a judicial inquiry.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, whose opening words raised a scene, described the resolution as resembling "a vote of censure by the criminal classes on the police." The Statute Book applied to the action of the Unionists language far stronger than any they had the wit to use against Ministers. The Conservative party was committed to naked revolution, to tampering with military and naval discipline, obstructing highways and telegraphs, overpowering police and coastguards, piratical seizure of ships, and imprisonment of the King's servants. The democracy, who were urged to be patient, were learning how the party of law and order cared for law and order when it stood in the way of their wishes. And what of India, in view of the "devastating doctrine" of the Opposition leader? He did not wonder the old Conservatives were uncomfortable, but there was another section, which had instigated the resolution, and postponed "law and order" till it had to deal with Nationalists and Labour men. This section's lawlessness, if it succeeded, might convince Irish Nationalists that Ireland never gained anything except by force. The Orange Army was being used to destroy Liberal reform by setting up the veto of the force in place of that of the Peers. Coming to the substance of the motion, the First Lord treated the precautionary measures as consequent on the failure of the Prime Minister's offer for a settlement. Those who were preparing civil war were aiming at the subversion of Parliamentary government. The movement of the Fleet, decided upon on March 11, had reference to the general Irish situation. The protection of the depots was a separate question; they contained from thirty to eighty-five tons of ammunition, and were scattered about unprotected. The only ships used were two scouts, to avoid moving troops through Belfast, and two boys' training cruisers were diverted in the belief that the Great Northern Railway of Ireland would refuse to carry the troops, which it ultimately consented to do. The Government also made a confidential survey of the whole military position in Ireland. The War Office and Admiralty were constantly considering quite hypothetical contingencies, but here Sir A. Paget thought that the authorised movements might lead to far larger consequences. The Government did not accept his views, but it was a good fault to be over-cautious. He scornfully declined to give details of the precise measures to be taken against potential insurgents, but said the contingencies considered were: (1) an armed attack on the depots or the troops marching to protect them; (2) the measures to be taken if a Provisional Government were set up at Belfast. No movements were authorised, but Sir A. Paget was assured of support in any contingency, and if British troops were attacked it would be the duty of the Government to chastise the assailants. The use of force rested with the Opposition. The Government would not use it till it was used against the representatives of law and order. They had an absolute right to make much greater movements. The talk of Civil War came from the Opposition. Did they think it was to be all on one side? References had been made to his Bradford speech; he held to it, but asked whether they could not reach a better solution. Let them look at the danger abroad; foreign countries did not know that at a touch of external menace we should lay aside our domestic quarrels, but why could men only do so under the influence of "a higher principle of hatred"? Why could not Sir E. Carson say boldly, Give me the amendments I ask for to safeguard the dignity and interests of Protestant Ulster, and I in my turn will use all my influence and goodwill to make Ireland an integral unit in a Federal system?

This suggestion made a good impression, but the speech was followed by stormy scenes. Mr. Mitchell Thomson (U., Down, N.) endeavoured to fix a charge of untruth on the Home Secretary, who had said, before the revised White Paper was published, that there was nothing further to add; Lord Charles Beresford (U.) described the First Lord as "a terrible failure" when in the Army; and Sir R. Pole-Carew (U.) also made a very provocative speech. Later Colonel Seely stated that Sir John French had told him the day before that "As part of a strategic movement such movements [as the precautionary movements taken] would be idiotic," and that Sir A. Paget had been assured in reply to an inquiry that he should have all the troops necessary if grave disorder arose. If that were a plot, no Government which did not make it was fit to remain in office. A new situation, however, had been caused by the gun-running, and the law must be vindicated at all costs.

The debate was resumed next day in a much more conciliatory tone. The Prime Minister said that the First Lord's closing suggestion had been made on his own responsibility; but he added that he was personally in sympathy with it. Mr. Balfour (U.), however, was less conciliatory. He described the First Lord's speech as "an outburst of demagogic rhetoric," and reviewed the history of the "plot" from his own standpoint, saying that the Government had found it necessary to protect the stores by preparations almost as extensive as those of the United States in Mexico. He found discrepancies in the accounts, and intimated that the Government had adopted the odious rôle of the agent provocateur. Challenged by the First Lord to produce evidence of provocation, he said the evidence was in his speech, and they might have an inquiry. Civil war would be alike justifiable and ruinous; but the First Lord's suggestion seemed to have the promise and potency of a settlement which would avoid it. He thought nothing could do so save the total exclusion of North-East Ulster. The Government seemed afraid lest this should be regarded as a party triumph. He would not so regard it. For the greater part of his own political life he had been defending the Union. He had hoped for the removal of grievances, for the growth of a common hope, a common loyalty, confidence in a common heritage, between the islands, under a common Parliament. For that he had striven and worked; if the result was that a separate Parliament should be established in Dublin, he should regard it as the mark of the failure of his life's work.

Later, Sir E. Carson (U.) after reading from a Belfast trade unionist manifesto to show the gravity of the crisis, and laying stress on the weakening it entailed in the position of Great Britain abroad, said that he would not quarrel with the matter or the manner of the First Lord's proposal. He referred to his speech at Manchester (A.R., 1913, p. 249) to show that they would not complain if Ulster got equal treatment with other parts of the United Kingdom, and said that he was not very far from the First Lord. He would say that, if Home Rule passed, his most earnest hope would be that it might be such a success that Ulster might come in under it, and that mutual confidence and goodwill might arise in Ireland rendering Ulster a stronger unit in the Federal Scheme. But that could only be brought about by goodwill. All he wanted was loyally to carry out his promises to those who had trusted him, and to get for them terms preserving their dignity and their civil and religious freedom.

Subsequently Mr. Bonar Law (U.), after defending his own strong language by reference to that of the Unionist leaders in 1886 and 1893, and the action of Ulster and the Unionist support of it by the American War of Independence, and Mr. Gladstone's concession to the Boers after Majuba, urged the Government to realise and meet the position before bloodshed came. Restating the Opposition view of the "plot," and criticising discrepancies in the official accounts, he described one of the orders as "suited to the Napoleonic genius of the commander at the Sidney Street siege" (A.R., 1911, p. 2). But the Unionists were really thinking of the finding of any tolerable way out of an impossible position. They were ready to consider seriously the Federal solution, and he was quite prepared to agree to a renewal of the "conversations" (p. [5]). If the Prime Minister preferred to deal with Lord Lansdowne or another Unionist, he would let no amour propre stand in the way.

The Prime Minister said that they had learnt from the Opposition leader the flimsy and contemptible character of the Opposition case. An undefined and unknown body was to be set up to inquire into a mare's nest. The grounds alleged were that the Government had withheld information and had given misleading information. Since his re-election he had answered at least 500 questions on this matter; the time-honoured practice of the House had been degraded in a manner reminiscent of the worst traditions of the Old Bailey. Having gone through that experience with as much good temper as the conditions permitted, he gave fair notice that after the next day he would answer no further questions on the matter. As to the charge of giving misleading information (through The Times) he had not mentioned that besides the small cruisers there were eight destroyers. The Cabinet had authorised the ordering of the battle squadron to Lamlash ten days earlier than the precautionary movements, and the two movements were independent of one another. He heard that the order had actually been given on Saturday (March 21) and suggested, in view of the public excitement, that it should be countermanded. This was done, and his statement on Sunday night was the strict truth. He did not know about the destroyers till some days later. After defending himself as to a charge of misleading the public as to the questioning of officers, he described the "plot" as one of the absurdest stories in the annals of mankind. Having made a conciliatory offer to the Ulstermen, would the Government, have engineered a plot for their provocation? He briefly summarised the Government's account of the measures described as the "plot," and remarked that an Opposition whose leader said it might be the duty of officers to disobey the law, and which had been admiring a "piratical adventure," had never presented a flimsier case against a responsible Government. But the debate would be remembered for the speeches of Mr. Balfour and Sir E. Carson. He did not think settlement would be successfully attempted by bargaining across the House, and every one must be brought in, Ulstermen and Nationalist. It must be accepted with sincerity by all the parties concerned. He took note of Mr. Bonar Law's statements, and fully recognised that his speech was meant to help a settlement. That spirit the Government entirely reciprocated. He would never close the door on any means of reaching a settlement, provided it secured the sincere assent of those mainly interested.

The motion was rejected by 344 to 264. The Nationalists were said to be rather disquieted at the tone of the Ministerial speeches.

The negotiations for a settlement were now privately resumed, and the hopes of their success had been strengthened by the smooth passage through the Upper House of the Army (Annual) Bill (April 27, 28). There had been frequent rumours that the extreme Unionist Peers would either throw it out or seek to insert a clause forbidding troops to be used to force Home Rule on Ulster—a course which would have so delayed the measure as gravely to imperil the discipline of the Army throughout the Empire; but the design, if it had ever been seriously contemplated, was abandoned, possibly because of the explosion of wrath occasioned by the belief that the Army was being used as a political instrument by the Unionists. But the Marquess of Lansdowne, at the annual meeting of the Primrose League at the Albert Hall (May 1), was not altogether encouraging. The first part of his speech was an elaborate attack on the Government. He detected signs of a "chastened spirit" among Ministers, but they were not sufficiently their own masters to make an effective proposal. He carefully defined the attitude of the Opposition, insisting that they maintained their objection to Home Rule and the temporary exclusion of Ulster, but they were ready to examine a federal solution provided that Ulster could find an honourable and acceptable place in it, and that it was consistent with the interests of the rest of the United Kingdom. And Mr. Balfour and Viscount Milner, at a meeting next day at Coventry, were pessimistic. Mr. Balfour spoke of the recognition by some Ministers of "the clean-cut separation of the North-East of Ireland from any scheme of Home Rule"; and "the clean cut" passed into a catchword.