Then Sir Edward Grey spoke. He said that Ministers, then as always, had worked for peace, but in vain. As to British obligations he had told the Russian Foreign Minister in 1908 that he could promise no more than diplomatic support, and in the existing crisis, till the day before, he had promised nothing more. During the general election of 1906, at the crisis which led to the Algeciras Conference, he had been asked if, should a Franco-German war break out, Great Britain would give armed support; he had replied that he could promise nothing which would not be fully supported by public opinion, but, if war were forced on France through the Anglo-French entente regarding Morocco, British public opinion would rally to her support. The French Government had then suggested conversations on this support between military and naval experts; and he had agreed, after consulting Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Haldane, and Mr. Asquith—since he could not, owing to the general election, consult the Cabinet—on the understanding that such conversations should in no way bind the Government. In the Agadir crisis he took the same line, and on November 22, 1912, he exchanged letters with the French Ambassador to this effect, but agreeing that if either Great Britain or France had grave reason to expect an attack by a third Power or a menace to the general peace, both Governments should consult whether they should co-operate and what measures they should take in common. But the British Government remained perfectly free to decide whether it should intervene. In the Morocco question, however, it was pledged to diplomatic support; in the existing crisis France was involved because of its obligation of honour to Russia, which did not apply to Great Britain, a Power which did not even know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance. But in view of the Anglo-French friendship, let every man look into his own heart and construe the extent of the British obligation for himself. In view of that friendship, the French Fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, and if, in a war which France had not sought, her unprotected coasts were bombarded, he felt that Great Britain could not stand aside. And, from the point of view of British interests, suppose the French Fleet withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Italy involved in the war, Great Britain, if she now stood aside, might be exposed to appalling risks. He had, therefore, on the previous afternoon given the French Ambassador an authorised assurance that, if a hostile German Fleet came into the Channel or North Sea the British Government would give France all the assistance in its power. He had just heard that the German Government would be prepared, were Great Britain pledged to neutrality, to agree that the German Fleet should not attack the northern coast of France (p. [170]); but that was far too narrow an engagement. There was also the question, hourly becoming more serious, of the neutrality of Belgium. In 1870 Prince Bismarck had acknowledged the sanctity of the Treaty of 1839, and the Government could not take a narrower view of its obligations than Mr. Gladstone's Government took in 1870. He had asked in the previous week the French and German Governments whether they were prepared to respect that neutrality; and he quoted the replies: France had promised to do so, Germany had delayed replying. Belgium had promised neutrality. But Germany had sent Belgium an ultimatum; and the British Government had been asked in the past week whether an assurance would satisfy it that Belgian integrity would be preserved after the war. It had replied refusing to barter away its interests or obligations in Belgian neutrality. The King of the Belgians had that day telegraphed to King George, appealing to the British Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. Great Britain had great and vital interests in the independence of Belgium, and integrity was the least part of that independence. Compliance with the ultimatum would be fatal to that independence, and that of Holland would then perish also. If Great Britain stood aside, ran away from her obligations, and merely intervened at the end of the war, her material force would be of little value, in view of the respect she would have lost. She would suffer terribly in the war in any case, but if she stood aside, she would be in no position after it to prevent Europe falling under the domination of one Power, and her moral position would be such as to have lost her all respect. The Fleet was mobilised, the Army was mobilising, but no engagement had yet been taken to send abroad an Expeditionary Force. The one bright spot was Ireland. The feeling there made the Irish question a consideration that need not be taken into account. Unconditional neutrality was precluded by the commitment to France and the consideration of Belgium. To stand aside would be to sacrifice the good name of Great Britain without escaping the most serious economic consequences. The forces of the Crown were never more ready or more efficient; the Government had worked for peace to the last moment, and beyond it; when the country realised the situation, they would have its united support.
Mr. Bonar Law promised emphatically the full and unhesitating support of the Opposition, mentioning also, as another bright spot, the certainty of that of the Dominions. Mr. John Redmond, in a speech that made a profound sensation, declared that the events of recent years had completely altered the Nationalist feeling towards Great Britain. He recalled the support given by Catholics to the Irish Volunteers in the eighteenth century, and said that the Government might withdraw all its troops from Ireland: her coasts would be defended by her armed sons, and the Nationalist Volunteers would gladly join in doing so with their brethren of the north. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab.) contended that the Foreign Minister had not shown that the country was in danger, the Crimean and South African Wars were fought on the plea of British honour; and the conflict could not be confined to the neutrality of Belgium. The Labour party wanted to know what would happen to Russia, and the annihilation of France was impossible. He admitted that the feeling of the House was against his followers, but they held that Great Britain should have remained neutral.
The sitting was suspended till 7 P.M., when the Royal Assent was given to the Postponement of Payments Bill, and the debate was continued discursively, several Liberal and Labour members condemning, and others supporting, the course taken by the Government. Eventually Mr. Balfour pointed out that all this was "the mere dregs and lees of the debate," and would be misunderstood abroad as representing the opinion of the House. He urged that it should be ended, and after a few words of protest from Colonel Seely (L.) the advice was taken.
Next day the proceedings in the Commons commenced with a momentous statement by the Prime Minister, embodying the earlier telegrams in the series, of which the substance is given below; the outstanding Votes in Supply were then passed, and a Message was read from the King announcing the Proclamation calling out the Army Reserve and embodying the Territorial Force; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer outlined the scheme of the Government for insurance against war risks, so as to secure the continuance of overseas trade. It had been devised by an expert sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee, and conditions in the shipping trade had changed since such insurance had been discountenanced by an expert Committee in 1908. Details cannot here be given; but, substantially, the State took 80 per cent. of the risks on vessels trading oversea (which were mainly insured through three great mutual societies) and received 80 per cent. of the premiums, charging no premium on vessels on a voyage on the outbreak of war, and allowing the cancellation of a policy if a voyage were delayed by the Admiralty. For cargoes a State Bureau was opened, to insure cargoes despatched after the outbreak of war. A flat rate was to be charged, subject to certain variations from time to time, and a strong Advisory Board established. Mr. Austen Chamberlain (U.) and Mr. A. Henderson (Lab.) approved the scheme, the latter urging the Government to consider the organisation of distribution; but here, as it proved, there was no need for alarm.
Meanwhile the Government prepared actively for war in other ways. It assumed the control of the railways, vesting it in a Committee of General Managers under the Board of Trade; it took over the two Dreadnoughts completed and nearly completed in Great Britain for Turkey, and the two destroyer leaders building for Chile; Field-Marshal Sir John French was appointed Inspector-General of the Forces, and it was understood that he was to command the Expeditionary Force; and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was appointed to the supreme command of the Home Fleets, with Rear-Admiral C. E. Madden as his Chief of Staff. The King, too, issued a Message to the Overseas Dominions expressing the "appreciation and pride" with which he had received the Messages from their respective Governments. "These spontaneous assurances of their fullest-support," the Message continued, "recall to me the generous, self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibility which rests upon me by the confident belief that, in this time of trial, my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God."
In the country generally the action of Germany and Sir Edward Grey's statement had driven the great mass of the Liberal and Labour parties to agree that war was inevitable and just. In the Ministry some members were still unconvinced. On Monday, August 3, four members of the Cabinet, it was said, still advocated peace; by next day there were but two, Lord Morley of Blackburn, Lord President of the Council, and Mr. John Burns, President of the Board of Trade. They, however, resigned office; but it was stated that they had decided to do so independently and at different stages of the controversy, and largely to avoid hampering the freedom of the Cabinet in a great emergency. Their example was followed by Mr. Charles Trevelyan (Yorks, W.R., Elland), the Secretary of the Board of Education. These three were replaced respectively by Earl Beauchamp, Mr. Runciman, and Dr. Addison.
The breach between Germany and Great Britain became definitive on Tuesday, August 4. Following his statement of the previous day in the Commons, Sir E. Grey telegraphed in the morning to the British Ambassador in Berlin, protesting against the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, and asking for an immediate reply. Before it came he received official Belgian intimations that the violation had already been announced to Belgium and had taken place. The German Government also telegraphed to the German Ambassador in London, instructing him to repeat most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of an armed conflict, Germany would under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory, and that she had disregarded Belgian neutrality to prevent what was to her a question of life or death, the French advance through Belgium. Thereupon the British Government sent an ultimatum to Berlin, asking for an unequivocal assurance that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium identical with that given the week before by France both to Belgium and to Great Britain, and for a satisfactory reply by midnight to it, and to Sir E. Grey's telegram of the morning; otherwise, the British Ambassador was instructed to make what was, substantially, a declaration of war. Late that night this request was refused: and on Wednesday morning, August 5, Great Britain found herself called to be once more the saviour of Europe.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Mr. Gulland (L., Dumfries) had made a speech in the Wick bye-election contest (A. R., 1913, p. 257) which was interpreted as a promise of a new harbour if the Liberal were returned. He had disclaimed this interpretation in February.