Meanwhile the Senate had worked hard at the Budget, which had been so unfortunately delayed; and the Government speedily obtained the vote of the loan of 805,000,000 francs (including expenses of issue) designed to enable it to pay off the Treasury Bonds. The various sections of the Estimates of Expenditure were adopted almost without alteration. On the subject of the Estimates of Revenue the discussion was more active. The Finance Committee, supported on this occasion by M. Ribot, asked the Senate to follow the Chamber in including in the Budget a clause involving the application of the income-tax (Art. 7-27), the declaration made by the taxpayer to be subject to official revision. In spite of the opposition of M. Touron, M. Lhopiteau, and M. de Selves, the Senate passed this important innovation, though without fully accepting the text bequeathed to it by the defunct Chamber. On July 8 it finished the discussion of the Budget; and for a whole week the two Reporters-General of the Budget Commissions, M. Clementel in the Chamber and M. Aimond in the Senate, had to use all their diplomacy to induce the two Houses to agree. In these laborious sittings M. Noulens, who was making his first appearances as Finance Minister, strove to obtain concessions from all quarters and to discredit the unfavourable forecasts of the Opposition. He confidently affirmed that the deficit of 1914 would not exceed 207,000,000 francs, which would be covered by short-term obligations; that the reception of the loan had been wonderful, and that it had been subscribed forty times over. The credit of the French State had thus shown no decline.
While the Chamber was revising the Finance Bill, the Senate had to deal with a question of no less importance. M. Charles Humbert, a Senator from Lorraine, addressed an interpellation to the War Minister dealing with the bad state of the matériel of the artillery, and the grave revelations he made caused M. Clemenceau to sum up the impression made on his mind in the severe comment, "We are neither defended nor governed." M. Messimy, the War Minister, and after him the Premier, vainly attempted to modify the impression produced by the debates on this subject, and found themselves obliged to agree to an inquiry by the Senate Commission on the Army, which was requested to report when the Chambers reassembled in October. The impression made by these debates was considerable, both in France and abroad. Finally, on July 15, after a few meagre concessions accorded by the Chamber, and a much greater number extorted through the weariness of the Senate—notably in regard to increased salaries and allowances for teachers and postal employees—the Budget of 1914 was passed. It reached the formidable amount of 5,191,861,991 francs (about 207,674,479l.). But it is useless to give details of it, for it had almost at once to be completely set aside in consequence of the war. Its great innovation, the first application of the tax on income from movable property (valeurs mobilières), was also destined to be shelved, for the financial Administration eventually found itself unable to set up the system of assessing the new tax in time.
The Chambers broke up on July 15. Immediately President Poincaré, accompanied by M. Viviani, left on his important journey to Russia and the Scandinavian countries which had been postponed owing to the length of the Parliamentary Session, and which the force of circumstances was destined considerably to abridge. M. Bienvenu-Martin, who as Minister of Justice was Vice-President of the Cabinet, also took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ad interim. It was a heavy task, complicated by serious incidents at home. The very day the battleship France arrived at Cronstadt (July 20) the jury of the Seine assembled to try Mme. Caillaux. During eight sittings, the dramatic and romantic circumstances of the affair, the revelations as to the political and private life of M. Caillaux himself, made by the testimony given and the documents read in court or passed round in the lobbies, made the Palais de Justice, at first at any rate, the centre of keen and impassioned attention. But all these scandals were pushed into a secondary place, and the acquittal of the accused woman aroused but few protests, in view of the anxiety caused by the enigmatic attitude of Germany in the Austro-Serbian dispute. On arriving in Sweden M. Poincaré was obliged to break off his intended journey to Norway and Denmark, and he reached France on July 29. His return was impatiently awaited; but unfortunately the evil was now past remedy. All the efforts of the French Government and its diplomatic representatives, in concert with the British and Russian Foreign Offices, failed to induce Austria-Hungary, in her demand for satisfaction for the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, to respect the sovereignty of Serbia, or to induce Germany to influence her ally towards peace. M. Dumaine, the French Ambassador at Vienna, had vainly called the attention of Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, to the anxieties aroused in Europe by the concentration of eight army corps along the Danube and Drina, and by the information circulated regarding the Note prepared by the Austro-Hungarian Chancellery. The answer given him was that the demands formulated, and their tone, would admit of the expectation of a pacific solution, and M. Jagow had told M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, that he did not know its wording. While the authorised representatives of the Triple Entente were concerting their measures, Austria-Hungary was acting; and on Thursday, July 23, it sent a Note to Belgrade, inviting the Serbian Government to agree to its demands within forty-eight hours. France made efforts to gain more time, but M. Jules Cambon informed the French Foreign Office that Germany was mobilising secretly, and M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, gave his opinion that the only means of preventing the Germanic Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude lay in the demonstration of the solidity of the Triple Entente. In the result France associated herself fully and loyally with the efforts of Russia and Great Britain to avert the conflict and obtain an extension of the period accorded to Serbia for her reply, and also to persuade Germany to exercise a conciliatory influence at Vienna. All these overtures encountered manifest ill-will and the utmost coldness. The diplomatic breach between Austria-Hungary and Serbia took place on July 29 at the appointed hour; France at once gave her adherence to the steps suggested by Sir Edward Grey to prevent hostilities and to secure by the intervention at St. Petersburg and Vienna of the four disinterested Powers, that the Russian and Austrian Armies should not advance beyond their own respective frontiers. These efforts were paralysed by the hostility of Germany; Herr von Schoen, while declaring that his Government did not know the intentions of Austria-Hungary, gave it to be understood that Germany would not try to influence her ally. This attitude, and the information received from London, Berlin, and Rome, made France understand that the situation was hourly getting worse. Thus matters stood when M. Viviani resumed the direction of foreign affairs (July 30). While expressing the hope that peace might still be preserved, he declared clearly that, if Russia were attacked by Germany, France was resolved to fulfil all her obligations as Russia's ally. In response to the military measures taken in Germany, the Government hastened its preparations; but several days had been lost, and already the covering troops of the German Army were massed all along the frontier between Luxemburg and Alsace. To avoid any frontier incident, the French troops were ordered to leave a zone of ten kilometres between their outposts and the boundary line. But all the conciliatory proposals were rejected either at Vienna or at Berlin. Telegrams exchanged between the Tsar and the German Emperor merely convinced Russia that Germany had made her decision. On the morning of July 31, a general mobilisation was decreed at Vienna; for a few hours it was nevertheless hoped that Germany and Austria-Hungary would nevertheless draw back before the consequences of a declaration of war against Russia: Vienna hesitated, Berlin decided; and on Saturday, August 1, at the moment when Austria consented to enter into a discussion with the Powers regarding the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Serbia, Germany required Russia to countermand within twelve hours all the measures of mobilisation already taken. M. von Schoen invited France to state if she would support Russia.
Germany, which had already prepared for her general mobilisation by announcing the condition of "danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand), decided on August 1 to proceed to this mobilisation, and at the same time her troops entered Luxemburg under the pretext of protecting its railways against occupation by French troops; and the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the declaration of war with Russia, thus rendering useless the negotiations between Vienna and the Powers of the Triple Entente. France then ordered a general mobilisation of her own forces, and applied to Great Britain, who undertook to protect the coasts of the Channel and the Atlantic against attack by the German Fleet (p. [171]), The day following, German troops entered the territory of Belfort, and Germany required the Belgian Government to declare, within seven hours, whether it was disposed to facilitate German military operations against France. Finally, on August 3, at 6 P.M., Herr von Schoen delivered a letter to M. Viviani, notifying him that a state of war existed between Germany and France. M. Cambon was then instructed by the French Government to demand his passports and leave Berlin. To the last, and even in the practical details relating to international courtesies, the methods of Germany and of France were conspicuously different; M. Schoen was taken to the frontier by a special train—of which the Germans kept possession for several weeks; M. Cambon was subjected to treatment unworthy of a country with knowledge of the practices customary between civilised States.
France was faced by the most formidable war in her history. She courageously prepared to carry it on. The Government summoned the Chambers for Tuesday, August 4. The sitting was destined to have a decisive influence on the whole subsequent course of events; it showed how profoundly the German aggression had altered the opinion of the whole of France. All the disquieting forecasts which seemed to be supported by the debates in the Chambers and the party conflicts were found to be wholly falsified. M. Raymond Poincaré, who some days earlier made a personal appeal to King George V. to use his great influence in favour of peace, the French Ministry now asked for the armed intervention of Great Britain in the interest of the future equilibrium of Europe. The German entry into Belgium compelled Great Britain to declare herself. The Triple Entente was transformed into an alliance, while the Triple Alliance broke up, inasmuch as Italy refused to be drawn into a war declared without consulting her. At this momentous juncture the attitude of France upset the calculations of her enemies. They had counted on two great causes of her inferiority, want of artillery and internal disturbance. As to the first, it was true that the German heavy artillery was greatly superior in the early days of the war, but, to compensate for this, the French troops, brought into the field a light artillery weapon, the 75-millimetres cannon, of which the manufacture had been hurried on in the utmost secrecy, thanks to an understanding between the Government and the Parliamentary Committees on the Army and the Budget, and of which the mobility, precision, and rapid fire contributed in no small degree to sustain the moral of the troops. Moreover, a vigorous impulse was given to the production of howitzers and long-range cannon which in a few months made up for the initial inferiority of France in these weapons. The dangers arising from internal disturbance and unrest were obviated very soon. The attitude of the trade unionists, and even of the Socialists, caused some anxiety to the Government. Towards the end of July the Executive Committee of the International had met at Brussels and had declared against the war. It had decided to hold a kind of congress at Paris on August 9; but the declaration of war caused this to be given up. An attempt at a trade-unionist demonstration in the streets of Paris had been forcibly suppressed by the police, with the entire approval of the public. Other attempts at disorder were made under the guise of patriotism, and a number of shops and stores were plundered; some arrests were made, and it was found that the nationality of some of the agitators was questionable. The murder of M. Jaurès by a wretched youth whose mental balance had been upset, had not the terrible consequences that there had been reason to apprehend. On the contrary, the horror manifested by the entire Press, the full justice done to the victim in impressive fashion by the Prime Minister, the loyal attitude taken up by the Socialist party, converted this great disaster into an opportunity for an imposing exhibition of the unity of the nation. But legislative sanction was required for the measures of public safety that the war compelled the Government to take. The Chambers met on August 4. On the previous day there had been some changes in the Ministry. M. Viviani, thinking—and quite rightly—that he would be fully occupied in the general superintendence of affairs, turned over the Foreign Ministry to M. Doumergue. M. Gauthier, for reasons of health, left the Ministry of Marine, which was taken by M. Augagneur. M. Sarraut, a deputy and Governor-General of Indo-China, became Minister of Public Instruction. This rearrangement was not altogether happy. It left the Cabinet distinctively Radical at a moment when it would have been desirable to summon the two men whose return to office was hoped for by the public—M. Delcassé and M. Millerand. For a few days longer personal and party animosities kept them out.
The sitting held on the historic date of August 4 was profoundly impressive. President Poincaré's message and M. Viviani's address were received with enthusiastic acclamations; and the Bills necessary for national defence were passed unanimously without debate. There were eighteen in all; mention may be made of the following. One authorised the Government to issue decrees in Council of State opening the supplementary and extraordinary credits required by the needs of national defence, subject, however, to approval by the Chambers within the fifteen days next after their reassembling. Another provided for the grant of allowances to necessitous families of mobilised soldiers. A third authorised the extension of the note issue of the Bank of France from its actual figure of 6,800,000,000 francs (272,000,000l.) to 12,000,000,000 francs (480,000,000l.); another prolonged the period at the termination of which commercial bills would fall due. Another established the state of siege in France and the colonies. Another, again, permitted the incorporation either of commissioned officers or of privates of the Territorial Army into the Field Army, or conversely. Finally, there was a Bill to put a stop to indiscreet revelations on the part of the Press. When the Government had been invested with these very extensive powers, the Chambers were prorogued sine die, and the whole strength of the country rallied to meet the crisis, unprecedented in history, which had imposed this sudden strain. In the very first days of the war reassuring symptoms appeared. The Press resigned itself to strict censorship; the preparations for mobilisation were soon seen to have been skilfully co-ordinated; within a few days the regiments of the second line were ready to leave to rejoin the covering troops already stationed along the frontier. The great work of concentration was carried out with a marvellous punctuality and precision which aroused general admiration. The Northern and Eastern Railway companies adapted themselves most skilfully and readily to a task which was made even more complicated in that the German violation of the neutrality of Belgium compelled the French General Staff to make its principal effort in a different direction from that contemplated beforehand. The King of the Belgians on August 4 had appealed to France, Great Britain, and Russia to co-operate for the defence of Belgium as guarantors of its neutrality, and had declared that the defence of the Belgian fortresses would be undertaken by Belgium herself. There was, therefore, reason to expect that the abrupt German attack in the north would be so retarded by the resistance of Liège and Namur as to permit the British and French forces to come to the assistance of the Belgians. Consequently it was decided that the French Armies should take the offensive in Alsace and Lorraine in such a way as to attract to this region the greatest possible number of the invaders. As it was stated that Austria-Hungary had sent Slav regiments to the Rhine, France recalled her Ambassador, M. Dumaine, from Vienna, and gave the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, Count Széczen, his passports on August 10. By prolonging the ambiguity of her attitude for nearly a week, Austria-Hungary had hoped to compel France to declare war on her, and thereby to enable her to call on Italy to fulfil her treaty obligations. This measure, however, proved futile; for, by her despatch of troops, and especially of howitzers, Austria-Hungary had manifestly taken the initiative in making war.
While Belgium was holding back the invasion by the north, the French Army on the extreme right made its way into Alsace by the Gap of Belfort and the passes of the Vosges. It was commanded by General d'Amade, who had previously been in command of the Corps of Observation in the Alps, and who was available for other service owing to the certainty that Italy would remain neutral. The first conflicts were favourable to the French. Altkirch and Munster were carried, and on August 6 the French outposts were enthusiastically welcomed at Mulhouse. But the forest of the Hardt and the heights situated beyond the town had been protected by a very strong system of defences. While General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, issued a proclamation promising the Alsatians that they should be restored to France, the German Commander, General von Demling, was strongly reinforcing his defensive positions, and the French were overwhelmed by a heavy artillery surpassing their own field guns in number and range. They fell back; the people of Mulhouse, who had openly welcomed them, were shot by the Germans without mercy. General d'Amade was superseded by General Pau; but it was recognised that it was through inadequate information that his advance had failed; and some days later he was sent to Arras. General Pau made great efforts to resume the attack, he was supported by part of the troops from Algeria, who had crossed the Mediterranean without incident, and had been brought to the front with praiseworthy speed by the Paris, Lyons and Mediterranean Railway; and also by the Chasseurs Alpins, for whom on the South-Eastern frontier there was nothing now to do. By three weeks' desperate fighting the French recovered the plain of Alsace up to the gates of Colmar, and obtained control of the high valleys of the Vosges. But meanwhile the armies of the Ardennes and Lorraine were attacked by forces so greatly superior that the continuance of the work of liberating Alsace had to be given up. General Pau was ordered to retire. He contested every step of his retreat; created positions defending the passes through the Vosges, furnished General Thévenet, the Governor of Belfort, with the troops necessary to hold the enemy in check between the Ballons and the Swiss frontier, and emerged from the struggle with his prestige increased. On August 26 the French offensive in Alsace was suspended; and up to the close of the year this region took a secondary place. Strongly defended by the 21st Corps, whose officers had previously familiarised themselves thoroughly with the country, and by the Alpine troops, it became as it were the bastion on which the extreme right of the French Army might safely rest.
More serious consequences resulted from the miscalculation made by the French Government on the front towards Lorraine and Belgium. As it had expected a sudden attack directed on the right bank of the Meuse and along the Moselle, the bulk of the French forces had been divided between the Vosges and the Meuse. French Flanders was, at the very first, left undefended. The town of Lille was protected only by forts of which the construction dated as far back as the first conceptions formulated in 1875; not one was constructed of concrete or provided with cupolas. The heavy guns had been partly sent to the fortresses of the North-East or to the sea front. Maubeuge was better off, though its defences were not equal to those of Verdun, Toul, or Épinal, which were fairly good. Now, if the invasion came—as it actually did—by the left bank of the Meuse and the Gap of the Oise, the defensive position of the North would serve as a point of support to an army threatening the flank of the invader. Were this point of support lacking, the French would be in great danger of having their left flank turned. This danger was destined to influence the whole of the first part of the campaign, after the repulse of the French attempts to advance. In fact, contrary to the expectations entertained at the outset, the Army of Lorraine, under General de Castelnau, had not been attacked since hostilities began. Holding back the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, which had crossed the Schirmeck and Donon passes in the Middle Vosges, and was advancing on Lunéville, it had succeeded in forming before Nancy a very strongly entrenched front, which became famous as the Grand Couronné of Nancy, and then had moved forward in the direction of Metz. On August 12 it attacked the Germans at Pont-à-Mousson and Pagny, and drove them back on its left, while on the right it retook Blamont and Cirey, and then advanced rapidly on August 16 and the days following, retook the passes of St. Marie-aux-Mines and Bonhomme, occupied Sarrebourg, and pushed its cavalry forward as far as Château-Salins. But on August 20 it found itself confronted with the entrenched camp at Morhange, and met with a serious check. Its attack was stopped short by forces superior in number, and some of its units were seized with panic. The energy of the commanding officers coped successfully with these weaknesses, and the retreat on Nancy was carried out in good order. By successive stages, General Castelnau retired on the defensive positions of the Grand Couronné of Nancy, and held it with vigour. For three days (Aug. 22-24) his position was most critical, and his army suffered heavy losses. On the 25th reinforcements arrived under the command of General Dubail. The environs of Nancy were freed of the enemy by a decisive counter-attack; and when, a fortnight later, the German Emperor himself came to preside over a series of desperate efforts to capture the capital of Lorraine, it was too late. The Grand Couronné held out; and the Germans were compelled to evacuate Lunéville, which for several days they had occupied. Nancy, Toul, and Verdun thus formed as it were a barrier serving as a support for the victorious right wing of the French Army while holding back the tide of invaders pouring in from Luxemburg and Belgium.
On the west centre General Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief, had, as it proved, to face terribly severe ordeals. On August 10 the Crown Prince William's army had entered France by the Gap of Tiercelet; it had invested Longwy, carried Spincourt, and encroached on the fortified area of Verdun; but the unexpected resistance of Longwy and the invincible strength of the advanced works of Verdun delayed its march, and thus permitted the armies of Generals Bülow and Von Kluck to play the leading part during this period of the war. These two generals had made their way into Belgium, and found themselves faced by the two armies of General Ruffey and General de Langle de Carry, which had the British Expeditionary Force on their right, supported by General Lanrezac. On August 15 Dinant was occupied by the French wing, which General Joffre had been compelled to push forward beyond the lines of defence he had chosen. It took more than a week for the two armies of Generals Ruffey and de Langle de Carry to reach the front. The great conflict took place on August 22, on the wooded plateau extending along the right of the Meuse. The Germans had had time to entrench and to bring up heavy artillery, the effects of which for a time upset the French resistance. The French losses were immense; some army corps, the 11th among others, lost almost all their officers, and were compelled to retreat. The Germans advanced rapidly by both banks of the Meuse. The fall of Namur (Aug. 25) and the sanguinary conflict at Charleroi enabled them to enter France. Their daring tactics, their use of armoured motor-cars, their superiority in machine-guns, above all the overwhelmingly large proportion of their effectives, allowed their opponents to do no more than honourably contest the ground, retreating all the time. On August 24 General Lanrezac retired on Givet; on the 25th the British Army took up a position of resistance to the invaders on the line Cambrai-Le Câteau-Landrecies; but the day following it was attacked by five German army corps, and, in spite of the admirable behaviour of General Smith-Dorrien's division, it was compelled to continue its retreat. The situation of the Anglo-French Army then became extremely critical. It was threatened with envelopment on its left flank by a great turning movement of the enemy, who had masked Maubeuge and were pouring in by the North. Contrary to the views of General Percin and General d'Amade, and at the request of the civilian authority the fortified town of Lille had been declared an open town on August 24 and hastily evacuated. Flanders and Artois were swept by the cavalry and the advanced guard of the German Army; the bulk of the troops were advancing by stages of forty to forty-five kilometres daily (twenty-five to twenty-eight miles). All seemed lost.
This news produced an immense effect in Paris and throughout France, although the official bulletins were sparing of information, curt, and ambiguous, and no other source of intelligence was permitted by the censorship. General Joffre complained that he was thwarted in his plans by the War Minister; the Ministry seemed too exclusive in its composition at a time when mere politics were out of season. M. Viviani recognised the need and rapidly took his decision. On August 26 he announced to his colleagues that he proposed to resign, a step which entailed their doing likewise; but in his case it was a mere feint, for he was at once charged to reconstruct the Government, and on August 27 the Journal Officiel published the list of the new Ministry of National Defence. M. Viviani remained Prime Minister; M. Briand became Minister of Justice and Vice-President; M. Delcassé triumphantly returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in place of M. Doumergue, who became Colonial Minister; M. Ribot became Minister of Finance, M. Millerand Minister of War, M. Sembat took the Ministry of Public Works, succeeding M. R. Renoult, M. Bienvenu-Martin was given the Ministry of Labour in exchange for that of Justice; the five remaining posts were retained by their previous holders. To emphasise the wide range of the new combination, M. Jules Guesde, a Unified Socialist, was made a Minister without portfolio. As the Chambers were not sitting, the new Government published a manifesto to the French people. "A conflict is in progress which, though of supreme importance, is not decisive. Whatever the issue, the struggle will continue. France is not the easy prey imagined by the insolence of the enemy." The Ministry was well received. M. Clemenceau himself gave M. Delcassé some degree of welcome. The "sacred union" came to find a more sure foundation in the common danger. General Joffre grew even greater amid his trials. The energy he exhibited was beyond belief; and, what was perhaps a phenomenon without precedent in France, he remained popular although he required his armies to undertake the thankless task of retiring while fighting, and of abandoning the richest and most populous regions of the country to the German invasion and German atrocities. Admirably supported by his subordinates and by General French, he superintended, without an instant of weakness, the strict execution of his programme. It consisted in holding on and lasting out; avoiding any decisive battle until the moment when the elements needed for success should all be present together, but giving ground without a real combat, so that the retreat should present the appearance of a calculated manœuvre, and not of a compulsory flight. Thus General Lanrezac and the British troops gave battle and fought hard at Guise and St. Quentin, while, on the extreme left, the army which General d'Amade had begun to reorganise passed under the command of General Maunoury, disputed inch by inch Picardy and the Beauvais region, and retired on Paris, while the troops of the 1st and 2nd military depots were gradually removed towards Brittany. Similar measures were taken in Champagne. General Langle de Carry and General Ruffey gave battle, and suffered heavy losses, respectively near Chateau-Porcien and Bazeilles; and the splendid behaviour of their troops retarded the progress of the enemy, and enabled almost all the rolling stock of the railways to be saved, with important results for the subsequent operations of the war. Finally General Dubail, firmly based on the fortresses of Lorraine, harassed the left flank of the Crown Prince's army, and the delay he caused to it proved to be an important factor when the decisive encounter took place before Paris.