On July 28 war was declared against Serbia, and the Emperor Francis Joseph addressed a manifesto to his people, stating that it had been his fervent wish to consecrate the years still remaining to him to the works of peace, and to protect them from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. "The intrigues of a màlevolent opponent," however, had compelled him, in the defence of the honour and dignity of the monarchy, of its position as a Power, and of the security of its possessions to grasp the sword after long years of peace. When, "after three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Emperor extended his sovereign rights to those lands, Serbia, whose rights were in no wise injured, had assumed an attitude of "bitterest hate" to the monarchy, notwithstanding which it had only required her to reduce her Army to a peace footing and to promise that in future "she would tread the path of peace and friendship." Again, when Serbia was embroiled two years ago in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, it was to Austria-Hungary, which had "restricted its action to the defence of the vital interests of the monarchy," that Serbia "primarily owed the attainment of the objects of the war." But "the hope that Serbia would appreciate the patience and love of peace of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and would keep its word," had not been fulfilled. "The flame of its hatred" for the Emperor and his House had "blazed always higher," and the design to tear from it by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary "had been made manifest." "A criminal propaganda extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State order," of making the people "waver in their loyalty to the ruling House and the Fatherland," and of inciting their youth "to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason." A series of murderous attacks, an organised, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, "whose process had wounded him and his people to the heart," had marked with its bloody track the secret machinations which were operated and directed in Serbia with this object. In vain did his Government make a last attempt to preserve the honour, dignity and interests of the monarchy from these criminal shocks, "and to induce Serbia, by means of a serious warning, to desist." Serbia had rejected "the just and moderate demands" of his Government; he must, therefore, proceed by force of arms to secure "those indispensable pledges which alone can ensure tranquillity to the monarchy at home and lasting peace abroad." Finally, the Emperor declared that "in this solemn hour he was fully conscious of the whole significance of his resolve and his responsibility before the Almighty"; that he had "examined and weighed everything," and with a serene conscience would "set out on the path to which duty points," trusting in his people "who throughout every storm always rallied in unity and loyalty round the throne, and were always prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honour, the prestige, and the might of the Fatherland," in his "brave and devoted forces," and "in the Almighty to give the victory to his arms."
The ultimatum to Serbia was, as Sir Edward Grey described it, unprecedented in the harshness of its demands of an independent State, and its style was so different from that of Count Berchtold that it was believed at Vienna to have been drafted at the Emperor Francis Joseph's request by Baron Burian, the Hungarian Minister a latere of the Emperor, an expert in South Slavonic affairs and himself of Slovak origin. The German Chancellor and his Secretary of State professed a total ignorance of the text of the ultimatum, but there seems to be no doubt that it was sent to the German Emperor in Norway and met with his complete approval, as it was more in accordance with the policy of "the mailed fist" than the polished and conciliatory despatches of Count Berchtold. The latter repeatedly asked the Emperor Francis Joseph to be relieved of his post, and only remained to carry out a policy distasteful to him out of loyalty to his Imperial master. He strove up to the last for a pacific issue, and he announced in London and Paris on July 31 that he would consent to submit to mediation the points in the Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence,[19] but the matter had by that time passed into the hands of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian military leaders and could not be pursued diplomatically any further. The policy initiated by the late Count Aehrenthal in 1908, the disastrous consequences of which Count Berchtold had done his best to minimise, was now again predominant at the Hofburg, and threatened to lead Austria-Hungary to her ruin.
War was declared against Russia, France, and England, on August 6, and the Austrian troops marched across the Russian frontier, which had been left unguarded, on August 7. The Austro-Hungarian Army was well organised and equipped, and though composed of men of several different nationalities, showed a unity of action and a rigid discipline not surpassed by that of its German ally. The Polish legion, numbering 20,000 men, many from Russian Poland, and equipped out of a fund raised by private subscription among the Poles of Galicia, greatly distinguished itself by its headlong valour and the high military qualities of its officers. Austria-Hungary was a most efficient ally for Germany, but the task assigned to her of invading Serbia, defending her own territories against the overwhelming forces of Russia, and at the same time assisting the Germans in their defence of East Prussia, was beyond her strength. This was the cause of her failures in Serbia; she crossed the frontier at Shabatz on August 13, after having bombarded Belgrade, but the necessity of massing her troops in Galicia to resist the Russian invasion prevented her from sending sufficient reinforcements to the army of 15,000 men with which she had occupied Shabatz, and she announced on August 23 that as she was "obliged to gather all her forces for the principal struggle in the north-east," her attack upon Serbia was to be regarded "as a punitive expedition and not as a definite war." The campaign which followed (p. [360]) was disastrous to the Austro-Hungarian arms; three attempts were made to invade Serbian territory, and in the third, further troops having been brought up from Hungary, they succeeded in capturing Belgrade, but a fortnight after the Serbians recaptured their capital and drove the Austro-Hungarians in disorder from the country (p. [361]). Montenegro having joined Serbia in declaring war upon Austria her coasts were blockaded on August 12 by the Austro-Hungarian Fleet and the Montenegrin fortress of Lowczen, opposite Cattaro, was bombarded with little effect. The Montenegrins and Serbians repeatedly attempted to invade Bosnia, but did not succeed in reaching Sarajevo, the capital, being on each occasion beaten back by the Austrians.
The capture of Lemberg by the Russians and the Austro-Hungarian disasters in Serbia were a great blow to Austrian prestige, and much discontent was expressed at Vienna because Germany had apparently neglected the interests of her ally in her anxiety to protect Prussian territory against Russia. Repeated negotiations took place on the subject between the two Governments, and Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was sent on a mission to the German headquarters, the result of which was that numerous German troops were sent to assist in a fresh expedition against Serbia.
War was declared against Belgium on August 27, and a treaty of arbitration with Switzerland was concluded on September 2.
FOOTNOTES:
[6] The French Ambassador at Berlin stated on July 24 that great weight must be attached to the Emperor's feeling that monarchies must stand together, and that his impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a Prince whose guest he had been a few days previously (French White Book, No. 30).
[7] British Blue Book, No. 17.
[8] Ibid., Nos. 18, 32.
[9] Ibid., No. 46.