The debate covered much well-worn ground, but it resulted in a marked sense of relief. Mr. Long asked how the Opposition could consider the legislative programme of the Ministry in the face of a threatened civil war; but his speech was distinctly temperate. Incidentally he mentioned that there was grave anxiety in the Army and Navy, but he believed that the Unionists, whenever they had been asked, had advised the members of the Services to do their duty.
The Prime Minister, after reminding the House that when the Bill was introduced he had offered to consider further safeguards, if suggested, for Ulster, pointed out that in the earliest stages of the Parliament Bill it was contemplated that that measure should be applied to the Home Rule Bill (A. R., 1910, p. 87 seq.). The Unionists said that during the general election of 1910 Ministers had indulged in a gigantic system of mystification; he did not think that in all the annals of anthropology there had ever been a case in which a myth had so quickly crystallised into a creed. He himself had made it clear that the first use of the Parliament Act would be to carry the Home Rule Bill. The recent bye-elections showed a somewhat increased majority for Home Rule. The average elector was not seriously excited. A dissolution would admit that, so far as concerned Home Rule—the Parliament Act was an absolute nullity, and, of its three conceivable results, a stalemate would not improve the prospects of a solution, a Unionist majority would be faced with the problem of governing three-fourths or four-fifths of the Irish people against their will, and a Liberal victory would not lead the Ulstermen to drop their resistance. Would the Unionists, in that case, acquiesce in the passing unmutilated of the Government of Ireland Bill? He did not believe any such guarantee could be given. His conclusion was that if the matter was to be settled by a general agreement, it would be much better settled than by "a dissolution here and now." The King's Speech had mentioned the "conversations" between leaders; they were, and must remain, under the goal of confidence, The one satisfactory feature about them was that the Press had been completely at sea as to what was going on; and, though they had not resulted in any definite agreement, he did not despair. The language of the King's Speech ought to find an echo in every quarter of the Chamber. After touching on the proposed exclusion of Ulster, and Sir Horace Plunkett's plan (p. [18]), he said that the Government recognised that they could not divest themselves of responsibility of initiative in the way of suggestion, but suggestions must not be taken as an admission that the Home Rule Bill was effective; they would be put forward as the price of peace,—meaning thereby not merely the avoidance of civil strife, but a favourable atmosphere for the start of the new system. There was nothing the Government would not do, consistently with their fundamental principles, to avoid civil war. He agreed that there ought to be no avoidable delay, and the Governments when the necessary financial business had been disposed of, would submit suggestions to the House.
The debate was continued for some hours by Liberal and Unionist members. Mr. Austen Chamberlain was not very responsive to the Prime Minister's concessions; but Sir Edward Carson next day (Feb. 11) was more conciliatory. In an impressive speech, which later speakers recognised as contributing to the change in the situation, he emphasised the extreme gravity of the statement in the King's Speech, and the inability of the House to meet the situation by amending the Bill. The Prime Minister gave no indication of the steps proposed, and he thought the Government was manœuvring for position. Its proposals could only be made by an amending Bill. The insults offered to the Ulstermen had made a settlement far more difficult. Ulster must go on opposing the Bill to the end whatever happened; but if its exclusion were proposed, it would be his duty to go to Ulster at once and take counsel with the people there. But if the Ulstermen were to be compelled to come into a Dublin Parliament, he would, regardless of personal consequences, go on with them in their resistance to the end. The Government must either coerce Ulster, or try in the long run, by showing that good government could come under the Home Rule Bill, to win her over to the care of the rest of Ireland. He did not believe that Mr. Redmond wanted to triumph any more than he did, and one false step taken in relation to Ulster would render for ever impossible a solution of the Irish question. Hoping that peace would continue to the end, he declared that, if resistance became necessary, he would not refuse to join in it.
Mr. John Redmond (N., Waterford) said he shared to the full the anxiety expressed in the King's Speech for an amicable settlement, The Prime Minister had created a new situation by accepting responsibility for the Government in initiating proposals for such a settlement; while accepting the situation to the full, he thought the responsibility for the initiative might fairly have been left to the Opposition. He ridiculed Sir E. Carson's statement that the only course possible for the Government was an amending Bill—which would at once come under the Parliament Act—and assumed that the Prime Minister meant procedure by suggestions under that Act. In view of the numerous suggestions daily being made, the Prime Minister could hardly make proposals at once. He wished to shut the door in advance on no suggestions, but he examined critically the possible exclusion of Ulster, pointing out that what was meant was presumably the four north-eastern counties, in which, he contended, 37 per cent. of the population were Home Rulers. None of the Ulster members desired the exclusion of Ulster, and Irish Unionist opinion was against it, The Nationalists asked only that the concessions proposed should be consistent with the main principles of the Bill, and that, as a quid pro quo, there should be peace and consent. He was anxious to remove every honest fear, however unfounded, and would consider in the broadest and friendliest spirit any proposals the Government might make.
Later the Chief Secretary for Ireland, referring to a statement by Lord Hugh Cecil that the Unionists would treat the United Kingdom as one country, said that there was a new Ireland—not necessarily Home Rule or Nationalist, but "the renaissance of a nation." He had noticed, even in Sir E. Carson's speech, a feeling as of an Irishman speaking to Irishmen. The great difficulty was that the Government, in finding a solution, exposed itself to the taunt that it was yielding to force. He hoped for a national solution.
After other speeches, including one from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who summed up for the Government,—
Mr. Bonar Law (U., Lancs., Bootle), after again admitting the responsibility of the Opposition in countenancing resistance, confined himself to the speech of the Prime Minister. If the threatened calamity happened, the Prime Minister alone would be held responsible. At any rate, no popular mandate was given for the armed coercion of Ulster, and, if Ulster was to be coerced, the order should be given by the people themselves. The Prime Minister's proposals should have been made at once. His speech had changed the situation; he admitted that the Bill could not be imposed on Ulster without provisions for its protection, and that Ulster had a special identity justifying its separate treatment. If his proposals failed of acceptance, there was no alternative but to leave Ulster out. Ulster had claimed not to veto Home Rule for Nationalist Ireland, but to resist the right of Nationalist Ireland to govern her. If any kind of Home Rule was possible, the exclusion of Ulster was the only solution. If the Bill were sincerely meant as part of a general scheme of devolution, of which there was no evidence, let Ulster be left out till it was complete. The Nationalists had committed themselves against the exclusion of Ulster, and, so far as he could judge of Ulster and speak for the Unionists of Great Britain, such efforts as "Home Rule within Home Rule" would do the greatest harm; they would be made to be rejected, merely for the Government to improve its strategical position. Ulster was determined on resistance, on principle. Serious people no longer talked about "bluff." The Prime Minister knew that the passing of the Bill would be the signal for an outbreak of civil strife of which no man could foresee the end. Leave out Ulster, and automatically the danger of civil war ceased; or the Government might avoid it by submitting their proposals to the people. The Parliament Act, however, was used by Ministers to make themselves dictators. It was said that the Opposition were opposing Home Rule to defeat that Act, but until Parliament met the day before the Government could have submitted its proposals to the people, and if the people were behind them the Act would not have been interfered with. The Government won the last election by the cry that the will of the people must prevail; what they meant by the Parliament Act was that their will was to prevail even against the will of the people. A general election won by the Government would change the situation both for the Unionists and for Ulster, and would give the Government the moral force they lacked. Or let them take a referendum on Home Rule, and if the decision were adverse they could go on with their other measures under the Parliament Act. If the coalition did not then hang together, it would show that the legislature did not represent the opinion of even the majority of its supporters. If they went on now there would be bloodshed in Ulster, and an appeal to the people must follow, and then how would the people regard them? The game was up. They must either make proposals removing the resistance of Ulster, or submit themselves to the judgment of the people.
The amendment was rejected by 333 to 78. There was a majority for it among the members representing Great Britain of three, but some twenty Liberals and Labour men were absent.
In the House of Lords, after the Address had been moved by Lord Glenconner and seconded by the Earl of Carrick, the Opposition amendment was moved by Viscount Midleton; but the debate added little to that in the Commons, and only a few points can be mentioned here. Lord Morley of Blackburn put the Government case in reply to Lord Midleton; Earl Loreburn, while holding that the exclusion of Ulster would not effect a settlement, thought that certain other additional safeguards might be given it; the Marquess of Lansdowne, while declaring himself not much enamoured of the exclusion of Ulster, said that if its complete exclusion were accompanied by safeguards for the Unionists outside Ulster, he was prepared to consider the proposal; Earl Roberts said briefly that the use of the Army to coerce Ulster was "unthinkable"; and, after three days' debate, the amendment was carried by 243 to 55.
Meanwhile the Commons had passed to the Labour amendment moved (Feb. 12) by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald (Lab., Leicester), praying that the Governor-General of South Africa should be instructed that the Indemnity Bill should be reserved under Clause 64 of the South Africa Act, 1909, until after a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of the proclamation of martial law and the scope of the Bill, especially the provision relating to the deportation of the trade union leaders. In moderate language, the mover contended that, on the information available, which had been carefully sifted and contained the whole case of the Union Government, the proclamation of martial law was not justified. Incidentally he described the Syndicalists as the greatest enemies of organised labour; but he said that the meeting which resolved on the general strike was perfectly peaceful. Convictions might have been obtained under the sedition law, but the South African Government had no evidence, and wanted, by one comprehensive swoop of illegality, to stamp out trade unionism. The deportation clause was really a Bill of Attainder, and undesirable aliens should be defined by legislation; then test cases could be raised by the deported leaders. One did not desire to interfere with the powers of the self-governing Dominions, but the Empire was faced with the problem of Imperial citizenship. If British citizens were not to carry their historical rights with them, the Empire could not retain its present place of honour.