The German Spy System from Within

by Anonymous

Chapter Five.

Naval Espionage.

The routine of naval espionage is very similar in character to that followed by military spies. The naval spy, however, must be a rather more intelligent and highly trained man than his military confrère, and cases that have come to light prove that his position is one of more responsibility, and that he is entrusted with more funds for the carrying out of his work. It is an interesting fact that, for many years past, officers and men of the German naval service have been employed along the East coast of England in compiling extremely detailed plans of places and fortifications. The accuracy of these plans is ascertained by persistent redrawing done by new members of the naval espionage staff, and all changes in building, roadmaking, bridge-construction, and as far as possible the interior work of fortifications, are duly recorded on the Berlin maps. Not that this information is of definite working value at the present time, but the principle of secret-service headquarters is that no item is too trivial for record, and information is acquired without regard to its direct uses, but in view of the fact that it may possibly be of some use at a future date. The adoption of such a principle involves an immense amount of work in checking and sorting the masses of information obtained, but beyond doubt the principle itself has gone far to assure such successes as German arms have obtained, either on land or at sea.

In addition to the work of fixed naval posts, stationed at dockyards and harbours, the work of spies at sea must not be overlooked, either in time of peace or in war. In the former case an innocent-looking trawler or private yacht is useful for taking soundings, ascertaining channels, and even locating naval mines used for purposes of harbour defence and fired by land contact. In time of war the services which may be performed by such vessels are even more valuable; the reports of the sinking of three British cruisers by German submarine attack are fairly unanimous with regard to the presence of a trawler in the vicinity of the spot at which the engagement took place. All that can be definitely learned with regard to this trawler is that she was not a British boat, and it is reasonable to assume that her business consisted in signalling to the submarines particulars which they may have been unable to obtain themselves, or in shielding them from sight during their approach towards the cruisers. Although there are no substantial proofs of this assumption, it is hardly likely that the vessel was a trawler engaged in usual and legitimate business.

The work of the naval spy in time of peace is best illustrated by the record of cases which have actually come to light through actions taken in the courts. One noteworthy case is that of Sub-Lieutenant Ullmo, a gifted naval officer of the French service, serving in the Republican warship Carabine. Ullmo was an officer of undoubted ability, but he came under the influence of a female spy, known to him and his fellows as Lison, who persuaded him to set up an establishment for her and managed to secure his assent to a plan by which this establishment, maintained at his expense, was to be converted into an opium-den. So great an ascendancy did Lison gain over her victim that in a period of two years he had spent 3,000 pounds, which was all that was his in the way of capital and income apart from his pay. His position in the service rendered money a necessity, and, once his private fortune was gone, Lison pointed out to him that more money could be obtained. As soon as she spoke of the means by which he could obtain money he repudiated the suggestion, but, by working on his jealousy with regard to her acquaintance with a brother officer, she secured his consent to a bargain by which he was to give up the secret documents kept in a safe on board his ship, in return for a price which was fixed at more than ten times his previous competence. The bargain was to be arranged by the medium of advertisements, and it was through the wording of these advertisements that the plot was detected by the French secret service. Ullmo’s reward for his treachery was degradation from his rank and imprisonment for life, and Lison put in an appearance at his trial in order to watch the proceedings as an uninterested spectator.

The system of counter-espionage thus evidenced on the part of a foreign Government has its counterpart in the British service. Since Britain is the most powerful enemy Germany has to fear in a naval sense, it follows that German naval espionage is principally directed against Britain, and that the establishment of naval spies is greater in this country than in any other. It is safe to say, however, that the majority of the fixed posts of the German naval service in Britain are known to the police, and that, as soon as information which, in the opinion of the British naval authorities, is of value, is in danger of being communicated to Germany, action is taken to prevent the transmission of the spies’ reports to headquarters. A case in point is that of Doctor Max Schulz, who, charged with espionage at Devon Assizes, was sentenced to a year and nine months’ imprisonment for acts attempted rather than acts committed.

According to his own account, Schulz became implicated in the work of the military branch of the German secret service in 1910, when he was engaged to obtain reports about British military and naval affairs for statistical purposes. Although no more was said, there can be no doubt that Schulz realised quite well the nature of the work he was undertaking, especially as, on the evidence of Sir Rufus Isaacs, who prosecuted at the trial, he was able to offer 500 pounds a year to a British subject for continuous information of a confidential character. He began his career as a spy by ineffectual work in Ireland, following up this by a visit to Toulon, still in search of information. After various adventures, he returned in 1911 to Plymouth, and thence went for a trip up the River Yealm on a yacht called the Egret; here, according to the evidence of Crown witnesses for the prosecution, he was visited by a Mr Duff and a Mr Tarrant, to whom he made overtures with regard to the obtaining of information concerning naval matters.

The charges against Schulz, as outlined by the Attorney-General in opening the case, were four in number. The first charge was that, in the summer of 1911: “He, at the borough of Plymouth, having possession or control over knowledge which had been obtained by means of an act which constituted an offence against the Official Secrets Act, communicated or attempted to communicate the same to a person to whom the same ought not in the interest of the State to be communicated at the time.” The second charge amplified the first in that Schulz was accused of having intended to communicate his illegally gained knowledge to the Government of a foreign State. The third and fourth counts against him were that he had “endeavoured to procure Samuel Hugh Duff and Edward Charles Tarrant respectively to communicate to him information relating to the naval affairs of His Majesty which ought not in the interests of the State to be communicated to any person.”

Sir Rufus Isaacs stated, in his outline of the case for the prosecution, that Schulz had offered Duff a salary of 500 pounds a year, with a possibility of this sum being doubled, for confidential information. Schulz alleged that the confidential information in question would be published in a German newspaper, but, at the time of Schulz’s arrest, there had been found in his possession a letter which proved the purpose for which the information was required. One passage of the letter which was read in court is enlightening as regards the detailed information required of German naval spies. The passage is as follows: