These things render details of the work of diplomatic spies almost impossible to obtain. Several books have been published, purporting to detail the work of diplomatic agents, but their contents may be discounted as far as accuracy goes; they make good reading as fiction, and that is all they are, for the most part. If in any stories detailed in them the writers have told the truth, it may be considered a matter of accident. One case, which may be regarded as authentic, is narrated by Von Blowitz, but it is dated so far back that all the participators in the incident are dead, and it may be said as a whole that the world grows wiser as it grows older, so that the case of which Von Blowitz speaks is no guide to the doings of to-day. Further, that particular case concerns a woman spy, of which class more anon.
Chapter Seven.
Communications.
Such reports as the German agents at fixed posts have to make to their employers are communicated, whenever possible, by means of the travelling inspectors, for the postal service is not to be trusted where espionage is concerned. During the French Revolution there was originated what was known as the “Cabinet Noir,” or secret service of the post office in France, of which the duties were to intercept, open, and where desirable destroy or replace, such letters as were deemed unfit to reach their senders, in the best interests of the State. Berlin, with its genius for developing other people’s inventions, adopted this idea, and made of it one of the regular weapons of the secret service. It operates not only internally, but also internationally, and any suspected letters are freely opened and read; sometimes they are suppressed altogether from their recipients; sometimes false letters, giving contrary instructions, are substituted, and suspected spies of other Powers are caught by this means.
The idea has been generally adopted by most countries; but, in practically any country but Germany, the idea of personal and national honour is sufficiently strong to keep absolutely secret the doings behind official doors. For instance, at the trial of the spy Ernst at Bow Street, it came as a surprise to many people to learn that the British postal authorities possessed powers under which they might open any suspected missives, with a view to ascertaining their contents when deemed essential for the safety and well-being of the State. It is common knowledge in Germany that no letter is safe from being opened, and the powers which the British post offices exercise only in case of genuine suspicion are utilised in Germany to a far greater extent. Further, the officials at the Berlin post office “Cabinet Noir” do not always maintain the absolute secrecy that their work demands, and sometimes there creep out details of other things as well as espionage. Apparently, every German official has his price in his own country, and the habit of spying is so ingrained in the race that commercial secrets are bought and sold not only in the interests of German firms as a whole, but in the interests of one rival German firm which desires to steal a market from another firm of Teutonic name and standing. It appears that Stieber, by organising his colossal system of espionage, laid the foundations of national pettiness and deceit—the German character as a whole has been undermined by the knowledge that nobody is safe from espionage, and all acts are liable to be reported, while blackmail is a flourishing industry.
In the event of active service, the German system of communication between spies and the army in the field is very largely on the lines laid down by Klembovski, whose “Military Espionage in Peace and War” is one of the recognised textbooks on espionage. So clearly and well does Klembovski indicate the methods to be followed, that certain passages of his work with regard to this matter of communications are worthy of reproduction as they stand in his original work, in order to assist in a conception of the means employed.
It is not always possible, he says, for the spies to report personally to their chief about the results of their investigations; therefore it is of interest to consider the methods of communication by means of which they can forward the required information to the stipulated place. These methods of communication are to be grouped in three divisions, according to their nature: 1. Optical signals; 2. Agreed communications by writing; 3. Despatches in cipher.
1. Optical signals.—In operations in heavily wooded districts which obstruct reconnoitring by cavalry, or in the operations of detachments which consist only of infantry, the assurance of guarding against danger which is obtained by means of the despatch of patrols in the direction of the enemy embraces no especially broad stretch in the front of the troops. In such cases the duty of reconnaissance can be allotted to spies, who should collect the simplest and fullest possible information about the enemy. For example: presence or absence of the enemy in certain directions and at certain distances; the approximate strength of his troops; whether the enemy is on the march, at rest, or occupying a position. Such information is especially of importance to such detachments as possess cavalry, for the commander of the detachment can, if he has fresh knowledge of the presence and dispositions of the enemy, execute cavalry reconnaissances far better than he could without the knowledge to be obtained by spies. He can estimate the number and strength of the patrols which he intends to send out, and can give them the correct direction of marching to achieve their purpose, etc.