The German Spy System from Within

by Anonymous

Agents Provocateurs.

This subject of political work, apart from espionage proper on the part of German agents, is a delicate one, for proof is not only hard to come by, but direct proof is practically non-existent, owing to the nature of the work. The most that can be done is to take cases of political work which, on the face of them, are such that no honest citizen would attempt: by a process of mental elimination one may arrive at the source of such work, though the result of the process is little more than conjecture. Still, half a dozen or so of results, all pointing the same conclusion, are of value, and, in spite of the absence of definite proof, police-court and criminal-court trials and the like, there can be no reasonable doubt that the work of the agent provocateur goes on, and that the central office at Berlin pays in order to keep it going.

Harking back once more to Stieber, it will be remembered that, at the outset of his career, he took service in a mercantile firm, and identified himself with German Socialism of the revolutionary kind. He learned at first hand the power which Socialism has among the working classes; he learned that, with very little reality behind the promises, it is easy to make a workman do nearly anything, if only the promises as regards the future of the working class are large enough. He came to his own as a master in espionage and treachery—by betraying the men to whom he posed as a leader—at almost the first beginnings of the German Socialistic movement, and he watched that movement grow as the years went on. He saw that working men had a passion for organising in defence of their rights, and that they could be led by nearly any appeal which proclaimed their rights, no matter how extravagant the proclamation might be.

Further, he saw that in Germany, under the Empire, workmen’s rights would never win them anything—repression was too efficiently conducted, and there was no good in the workmen’s movement for him; so he joined in with the forces that unto to-day (1914) govern Germany and suppress all that makes for real democratic government. Stieber was an opportunist, and knew well which side would best reward him.

Later on in his career he gained opportunities of studying the social conditions involved in the political constitutions of other countries; after 1870 the constitution of France interested him, and, studying it as he studied all things, with a view to the furtherance of his plans, he saw that much nominal power was placed in the hands of the people—illiteracy and ignorance were no bars to the free expression of opinions, and, further, a man might agitate and stir up discontent among the working people to his heart’s content, compared with what might be done in Germany, and there was no aristocracy nor any bureaucracy to say him nay. Now, said Stieber, if these workmen could be stirred up in a way that would make them distrustful of the governing classes: if class could be set against class, unions formed, and the men led to strike and paralyse industry at a given time—say, at a time when Germany wanted to make war—the benefits accruing would be immense; but not to France.

We have no definite proof that modern Syndicalism and its evils arose out of Stieber’s efforts. We have certain evidence, and certain coincidences, that are nearly as good as definite proof. For instance, there is no actual proof of this contention in the fact that the incident of the Panther and Agadir, which so nearly precipitated the whole of Europe into war, was practically coincident with one of the worst strikes that the history of British industry can show; but there is proof that, for years past, German agitators have been teaching both British and French workmen the way to organise “in defence of their rights,” and have been advocating Syndicalism and the weapon of the general strike as a panacea for all evils to which the classes subject the masses.

With the economic aspect of the question we are not concerned for the purpose of this book, and lest we be misunderstood let us pay tribute to the fine loyalty of the leaders of labour in this country; to such men as Will Crooks, who have helped to bring the nation into line in the hour of national peril, and are men worthy of all honour and all praise. We are concerned more with certain coincidental happenings, like that of Agadir and our own great strike, and certain other happenings which point to the same conclusion—that Germany has tried, by means of industrial unrest, disaffection, and other means, to weaken the hands of potential enemies in the hours when strength was most needed.

First of all, it must be noted that the two chief essentials to the mobilisation of troops for war, and the placing of a navy on a war footing, are an efficient railway and transport system, and the assurance of an adequate coal supply. We may call it a coincidence, and no more, that the two industries which have made most progress towards Syndicalism and the use of the general strike, both in England and France, are those of transport and coal-mining. The first piece of evidence may be regarded as coincidence pure and simple, and it is only when the coincidences mount up that they may be accepted as evidence of weight.

In order to render effective the railways of the country, which as far as France is concerned are on strategic plans toward the western frontier, Germany has increased its establishment of railway engineers to fifty-four military companies. That is to say, no matter what sympathetic action might have been taken by German railwaymen in case of an international strike, the German railways could still have run with full staffs, and every man was trained to his place on the lines that would be concerned in the mobilisation and placing of troops on the western frontier of the country, to act against France. No Syndicalist movement could shake German power—the defensive action was too strong for that. Further, the railways of the state system, organised with a view to mobilisation of troops rather than peace requirements, are controlled not by capitalists, nor by political figures, but each by a colonel of the German Army, at the head of his military division of railway engineers, and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of these railway engineers are qualified railwaymen; their military duties consist in the efficient performance of railway work. For it is no use forging a weapon that will, in time of need, prove as dangerous to the holder as to the one it is aimed against.

As a final guard against trouble of this kind, Stieber laid down as a definite rule in 1884: