"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]
As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey:—
"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."[39]
FOOTNOTES:
[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.
[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.
[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.
[20] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 11.
[21] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 25.
[22] Great Britain and the European Crisis, No. 34.