"A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military Attachés and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order to transform these reports into documents which would justify Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the précis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded did reference only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had already been violated. The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only answer that they deserve—they are a tissue of lies, all the more shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have studied the original documents.
"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:—
"(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views as to the way in which England could help Belgium in case the latter were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a hypothetical case—viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.' The translation in the Norddeutsche Zeitung of November 25 omits this clause, the phrase which gives its exact scope and significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.' For the word conversation the Norddeutsche Zeitung substitutes the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that 'our convention' has been absolutely confidential![116]
"Such proceedings need no commentary.
"(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression, could only take place with our consent.' The British Military Attaché raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium, without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter was a necessary preliminary.
"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no 'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it. The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of them is either garbled or suppressed.
"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government, faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of infamy—his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is obvious, that:—
"(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the smallest size, had entered Belgium.
"(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her guarantors.
"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for that defence.
"Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."
In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:—
"As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.'
"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did not believe England would take such a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was:—'I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it.'
"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract—railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it were previously violated by another Power...."
FOOTNOTES:
[114] Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the New York World, March 28, 1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the Associated Press, in New York papers, January 25, 1915.
[115] No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing reference only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912 "conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.
[116] In a letter to the Morning Post of February 8, 1915, Mr. A. Hamon, Professor de l'Université, Nouville de Bruxelles, writes:—
"In October and November last (13th and 24th) the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung published the documents seized by the Germans in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning of the document.
"But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention' (overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."