To face page 164.
In the opinion of those holding the line, the decision not to advance any further was unnecessary—it was felt that the Battalion might well be engaged very soon in defensive rather than offensive operations, and some such idea was in the mind of Colonel Segrave as he went round the Battalion front that day.
Any remaining doubts as to the enemy intentions were dispersed on the morning of the 30th of November, which opened with an intense bombardment from German guns of every calibre. Smoke barrages were put down on the flanks of the intended attack, and before long the enemy infantry could be seen advancing in many waves from the country beyond Bourlon village. The Battalion was not in signal communication with anybody, either Brigade Headquarters or adjoining units, and the Commanding Officer had therefore to rely on the services of runners and four pigeons. According to the rules of the signal service, pigeons had to be despatched in pairs, so the stock was only good for two messages. When it is mentioned that it took a good runner well over an hour to reach Brigade, the state of isolation of the Battalion will be realised.
The battle raged throughout the morning without any infantry engagement on the front held by the Civil Service Rifles, though S.O.S. rockets were seen on several occasions on adjoining sections of the line.
Company Commanders reported that the attack appeared to be directed on the sectors held on each side of them, but up to midday they had not been interfered with. The waves of enemy infantry had advanced diagonally across their front, and both “B” and “D” Companies had put in some excellent work with rifles and Lewis guns. The enemy, however, was extraordinarily well served by his low-flying aeroplanes, which seemed to swarm like bees over the Battalion area, and the machine-gun fire from these caused a good many casualties during the day.
Prominent among the early incidents of the battle was the performance of Lance Corporal S. Fletcher of the Battalion scouts, and a “D” Company runner who brought the first report from the front line to Battalion Headquarters. The distance they had to cover was more than a mile over very rough country, but in their anxiety to deliver the result of their observations as quickly as possible they ran the whole way, although fully equipped, and carrying rifles. The effort proved too much for the runner, who collapsed on reaching Battalion Headquarters, and fell unconscious down the stairs of the dug-out without being able to deliver his message. The N.C.O. was little better off, but after a time he recovered sufficiently to be able to give a good account of what was going on.
Soon after midday the S.O.S. signal was seen on the Battalion front, and it was reported that a gap had been made in the Brigade front on the left of the line held by “B” Company.
The Support Company, “C,” led by 2nd Lieutenant C. V. Marchant, had by this time moved up to reinforce “B” and “D” Companies, who had both suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the left platoon of “B” Company, finding the line originally held by the Battalion on their left to be unoccupied, pushed along to try to find touch. Instead of finding their friends, however, they found Bosches in large numbers, who appeared to come from all sides, with the result that about ten of the Civil Service Rifles were taken prisoners.
Lieutenant Kilner, observing the enemy in the left rear of the Battalion front, gathered the rest of his Company together and formed a defensive flank in the sunken road on the Western edge of the wood. Meanwhile, Colonel Segrave formed up the personnel of Battalion Headquarters and his reserve Company, “A,” and led them in two waves across the open country outside the wood. Leaving the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters at about 4.0 p.m., they advanced through heavy fire from rifles, machine guns, and low-flying aeroplanes, and although they suffered many casualties, they succeeded before dusk in restoring the line as originally held, and later in the evening established touch on the left with the Post Office Rifles, who had come up from Brigade Reserve to reinforce the line. The example set by their Commanding Officer inspired the men of the Civil Service Rifles with such confidence and enthusiasm, that they carried out their advance as at a Salisbury Plain manœuvre, the Colonel, with a map in one hand and a whistle in the other, giving his directions by signal.
Colonel Segrave’s prompt action was specially commended in a pamphlet afterwards published by General Headquarters entitled “The Story of a Great Fight,” and those who were with him on that day regard it as the finest example of leadership in the history of the Battalion. There was nothing theatrical about the affair—it was just done in the calm and methodical manner in which Colonel Segrave always behaved in the front line.