On the evening of the 3rd of November the Battalion moved again to Bargut, some two miles or more north of the town of Beersheba, but were not privileged to pass through the town; passing it on its western outskirts. At Bargut a bivouac camp was erected, and the Quartermaster’s Stores and transport sections moved with us. Officers were allowed the benefit of their valises which had been reduced to 25 lb. in weight, and blankets were issued to the men.

Meals were soon prepared, and a day of complete rest away from the filth of the Turkish trenches was thoroughly enjoyed by all.

At this time it had become apparent to the Higher Command that the enemy had been able to anticipate our threat of enveloping his left flank, by a concentration of his reserves on the high ground in the neighbourhood of Khuweilfeh. The Corps Commander therefore decided to throw our whole weight upon the centre of the Turkish defences represented by the Kauwukah system and a series of works extending some 5,000 yards to the east, and at the same time occupying the enemy’s left flank by the employment of the 53rd Division and mounted troops at Khuweilfeh.

Accordingly the 60th Division moved over in the direction of Kauwukah on the 4th of November, the Battalion moving to Wadi Welfare, a distance of 7 or 8 miles as the crow flies. This was a most trying march over sandy desert and the sand was not of that “golden” type which one associates with the east when reading books, but was of a dirty black variety, and our memories went back to that first dusty march from Belah to Abu Sitta some months previously. Every one was covered with black dust, and eyes and nostrils became unbearable. Water was limited and the day’s supply had not been received before starting. The water camels had returned to Beersheba, but here the supply was insufficient, and they were re-directed to Abu Irgeig, which was about 7 miles in the direction of Gaza, and in quite a different direction to that taken by the Brigade.

The ground over which we travelled was extremely hilly, and the Battalion constantly descended into deep wadis and ascended over the steep ridges for practically the whole of the last four miles. It was getting dark, and the difficulties were tremendous, and credit is due to those responsible that the various battalions of the Division ever found their allotted areas, most of which were in the beds of deep wadis. The Battalion halted about 10.0 p.m., and an outpost line covering the Divisional front was taken up by the 181st Brigade. No water, however, was obtainable. All we knew was that the camels had gone back as far as Beersheba, and knowing the difficulties of the march that we had encountered, the possibility of the camels arriving that night appeared remote. However, shortly after midnight a small voice was heard on the surrounding heights, “Who is down there?” “2/15th,” we shouted. “Thank God,” uttered the small voice, “How the devil do you get down there?” No one could say how we had got down into this basin-like dip, in the darkness it appeared to be surrounded by steep cliffs. The small voice was heard no more, but an hour afterwards the swishing of the water in the “Fanatis” was heard approaching along a branch wadi, and Lieutenant Gearing appeared, followed by his convoy of water camels and their weary leaders. How this officer performed the journey that night from Bargut to Beersheba and thence to Abu Irgeig—where water was drawn—and eventually across the wilderness to the Battalion, which was concealed in one of the many holes in the ground, is beyond imagination. The water camels, with their officer and his Company guides had dragged over a distance of at least 15 miles in the dark. Even Gearing himself cannot explain; in fact, he never attempted, and “Sparrow,” as our tiny water officer was called, simply grinned and felt pleased. There were heroes in the battle of Beersheba, but no one was so deservedly popular as Gearing that night. He had done great things through sheer grit, where thousands would have failed (and not without reason). Great was the relief on the arrival of the water camels, and then our minds turned to the transport and Quartermaster’s stores with its precious rations which had not yet arrived. However, ere long the voice of Lieutenant Pearson (not a small one this time) was heard, and we knew that the “gods” were with us. The route taken by the Battalion had been impossible for wheeled transport, and it had been diverted some four miles back on to a different track. Even this second route was extremely difficult, but the transport section “stuck to their guns,” and after a somewhat lengthy and tedious journey had struck the Battalion. It was simply a matter of “striking,” too. Maps were indistinct, and in the darkness every wadi is a replica of its neighbour; signposts were badly needed in these parts. However, daylight came, and this put a better complexion on the state of affairs.

Officers were called to Headquarters and given details of our next attack which was to be against the centre of the Turkish line in Palestine, at a place called Kauwukah. The rest of the day was spent in reconnaissance of the ground. Landmarks were few, but all hoped for the best, and compass bearings were taken. Final preparations were made in the evening and rations were issued. Water again presented a difficulty, as the wells at Abu Irgeig had run dry, but it was hoped that the R.E. would open up a new source during the night.

CHAPTER XXXIV
KAUWUKAH AND RUSHDI SYSTEMS—ATTACK—SHERIA—MUNTARET—HUJ—NEJILEH—AND TO GAZA VIA SHERIA

The position to be attacked was on the high ground at Khirbit Kauwukah, just north of the Beersheeba-Gaza Railway and south of Sheria. This was an extensive stretch of trenches about four miles long, which faced south-west from near Samarra Bridge to Abu Heirira on the Wadi Sheria. The left of this trench system was swung round forming a strong defensive flank facing south-east, and it was against this flank that the 60th Division was to make its attack. In front of our objectives stretched an open plain for over a mile and, of course, formed an excellent field of fire for the defenders.

The general plan of attack consisted of an enfilade assault from the east to be started by the 74th Division on our right attacking and rolling up the enemy’s works east of the actual Kauwukah System, followed by our own Division which was to operate against the main defences with one Brigade of the 10th Division on our left; each Division being echeloned back from the right.

Careful arrangements were necessary with regard to the timing of the advance of each Division in order to safeguard the possibility of the troops of the 60th and 10th Divisions being enfiladed from the enemy’s works to be attacked by the 74th Division before the latter had accounted for them.