In the 179th Brigade, the 2/14th Battalion (London Scottish) were given the hill of Muntar as their objective, and they concentrated in the depths of the Wadi en Naar near Ibn Obeid. During the night of the 19th of February the companies deployed and crept up the hill-side under cover of darkness. At dawn the trenches were heavily bombarded, and the attack was pushed home under the artillery support. The hill was captured, and fortunately the strength and resistance of the enemy had been over-estimated, with the result that the Scottish casualties were small. The same morning, the 180th Brigade were successful and captured the caves at Arak Ibrahim in the centre of the Turkish line with comparatively few casualties. Further north, however, the 181st Brigade had met with strong opposition at Ras el Tawil, and after several hours of heavy fighting gained possession of the hill and put to flight a strong force of Turks. Casualties, however, on both sides were fairly heavy.
The first phase of the advance had proved successful, and the battalions detailed for the second day’s move were able to push forward and prepare for the assaults on Jebel Ektief and Talat ed Dumm. Like the first day’s operations the second day’s attacks resulted in the objectives being taken, although the fighting was more strenuous as the objectives were surrounded by more difficult country, which provided the defenders with better cover. The Turk, finding himself overwhelmed and outmanœuvred, retired over the hills to the Jordan Valley, covering his withdrawal with machine-gun rear-guards so that the third day’s work came under the heading of “peaceful penetration.” Thus the 60th Division was master of the Jordan Valley from the commanding heights on the west of the plain, and the possibility of an attack on Jerusalem from the east had disappeared.
To return to the particular part in these operations performed by the 2/15th Battalion it will be remembered that they were in bivouacs in the Wadi Hindi on the 13th February.
For the few days previous to the commencement of the advance we were occupied in road-making in the wadi beds to assist the bringing forward of guns, ambulances and transport for the attack. Reconnaissances were also made towards the front, and on one of these “stunts” our Brigade Major, Captain Sherston, was seriously wounded in the leg.
On the early morning of the 19th of February we were awakened by the artillery fire from Abu Dis, where our heavies were assisting the attack of the London Scottish on Muntar. A few hours later we learnt of the success, and realised it was now our turn. During the morning the Battalion gradually moved along the valley of the Wadi Hindi under cover of the surrounding heights, “D” Company forming the advance guard. After advancing some three miles the Battalion was halted as further advance was impossible by day. Under the cover of an outpost line the Battalion rested until darkness came, thus making further progress possible. During the afternoon patrols were sent out and reconnaissance towards Jebel Ektief was made, and resulted in a sharp skirmish with the Turkish advanced posts, but no casualties occurred to our party, although several Turks were seen to be carried away on stretchers.
About 6 p.m. the order was given to advance to the attack, and three platoons of “D” Company were ordered to “make good” the high ground west of the deep ravine in front of Jebel Ektief while a fourth platoon under Sergeant Cross moved along the wadi bed to a point where the deep wadi in front of Jebel Ektief branched off to the left. When these platoons had pushed ahead sufficiently the remainder of the Battalion marched along the wadi in order to reach the line of deployment before daybreak.
Probably of all the country over which the Battalion had passed throughout its stay in both Salonika and Palestine none could compare with the deep ravines and precipitous cliffs over which the advanced guard had to pass, and if this statement is accepted, there is no need for further comment on the difficulty of the advance. To move forward a matter of three miles occupied a full six hours of hard climbing over ridges and difficult descents down precipices. The night was exceedingly dark, and great credit is due to Lieutenants Clark and Neall, platoon commanders in “D” Company, for maintaining their direction and reaching their objective; the men behaved splendidly and struggled along through this wretched patch of the Holy Land. Fortunately no opposition in strength was met except an occasional volley of fire from the Turkish advanced posts, but they soon retired to their main position on Jebel Ektief. Great caution, however, was necessary as large bodies of the enemy had been seen that afternoon leaving Jebel Ektief, and advancing towards our lines. When, however, the advanced guard had reached the limit of their advance, the Battalion pushed along the bed of the stony wadi, and were supposed to halt at the junction of the wadi in front of Jebel Ektief and the main wadi, where they hoped to turn the corner into their place of deployment. However, the noise had apparently disturbed the Turk, and he constantly poured machine-gun fire on to this junction corner. It was therefore found necessary to find another way into the Jebel Ektief Wadi, and the only way was to climb the steep, precipice-like sides of the main wadi on to the high ground held by “D” Company. This was accomplished, but how, no one can tell; when the Battalion with its Lewis guns, regimental aid post, and signalling mules reached the crest, dawn was appearing in the east. It was decided, therefore, to make a hurried descent into the Jebel Ektief Wadi in spite of the casual fire from the enemy’s snipers and machine guns. Luckily the going down into the second wadi was easier and more speedily accomplished than the climb from the first wadi, and just as daylight arrived the tail of the Battalion disappeared into the bed of Jebel Ektief Wadi, out of sight of the Turks. Once in the bottom of the wadi the companies sorted themselves out and prepared for the actual assault, “A” and “B” being the attacking companies, “C” in support, and “D” in reserve. It had been arranged that the 2/13th (Kensingtons) were to assault the position on our left, having approached the wadi at Jebel Ektief by a night march on a parallel route to the one we had taken. Unfortunately, the ground over which the Kensingtons had to pass had proved too difficult, and when daylight came they found themselves perched on a precipice unable to cross the deep ravine before them.
At seven o’clock on the morning of the 20th February, the artillery opened up a heavy bombardment on the hill. The advance up the hillside described officially as “trickling forward” should have taken place under this barrage, while the assault was timed for eight o’clock when the barrage was to lift.
Unfortunately little or no progress could be made owing to the fact that the heavies were shelling the “bench mark” some 1,000 yards behind the enemy’s forward lines thereby leaving the enemy’s machine guns undisturbed, while at the same time other machine guns on our left raked us, those, in fact, which should have been concentrating their attention on our brother battalion, the Kensingtons, who had been so unfortunate in their advance march.
At eight o’clock, when we should have assaulted, the attack was therefore hung up for a while. An hour later a Forward Observation Officer having come up, a second barrage was fired for fifteen minutes concentrating accurately on the forward Turkish trenches.